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The verification of systems for protecting sensitive and confi-
dential information is becoming an increasingly important issue in
the modern world. Many protocols for protecting confidential in-
formation have used randomized mechanisms, to obfuscate the link
between the secret and the public information. Typical examples
are DCNets, Crowds, Onion Routing, Freenet and Tor. Another
common denominator of them is that various entities involved in the
system to verify occur as concurrent processes, and present typically
nondeterministic behavior.
This dissertation is devoted to the development of novel reason-
ing techniques for verifying differential privacy in concurrent sys-
tems. Differential privacy is a promising notion of privacy origi-
nated from the community of statistical databases, and now widely
adopted in various models of computation. We use the principle of
differential privacy as a criterion to measure the level of privacy that
a concurrent system satisfies.
The first part of the present thesis is focused on modular rea-
soning about differential privacy in a probabilistic variant of Robin
Milner’s Calculus of Communicating Systems (CCS). We show that
the calculus operators such as non-deterministic choice, probabilistic
choice, restriction and a restricted form of parallel composition are
safe, in the sense that combining components with these operators
does not compromise the privacy of the entire system.
The second part focuses on the applicability of bisimulation - a
fundamental technique in Concurrency Theory - for characterizing
differentially private behavior. We borrow the idea of amortisation,
which was initially applied on some bisimulations with cost-based
actions, and coin an amortised probabilistic bisimulation. We show
that it allows us to verify differential privacy and it is a more liberal
notion than the work of Tschantz et al.
In the third part the focus is shifted to the development of proof
systems - an axiomatic way for proving properties of concurrent sys-
tems. We provide sound and complete proof systems for our amor-
ii
tised bisimulation and its weak counterpart. The proof systems make
it possible to reason about long-term (observable) differentially pri-
vate behavior by syntactic manipulation.
The last part presents an extension of the bisimulation metric
based on the Kantorovich distance. This is a metric that has be-
come very popular in Concurrency Theory, thanks to its principled
and solid mathematical foundations. While the standard notion is
additive in nature and therefore not suitable to prove the property of
differential privacy (which is multiplicative), the extension developed
in the thesis is parametric with respect to the underlying distance,




La vérification des systèmes de protection des données sensi-
bles et confidentielles est un défi important que le monde moderne
doive relever à l’ère du tout numérique. De nombreux protocoles
pour la protection de ces données sensibles utilisent des mécanismes
aléatoires pour masquer le lien entre une donnée secrète ou sensible
et l’information publique qui lui est associée. Les systèmes de pro-
tection tels que DCNets, Crowds protocol, Onion Routing, Freenet
et Tor sont des exemples typiques. L’autre dénominateur commun
de ces systèmes est le fait que différentes entités impliquées dans le
système se produisent simultanément, et présentent généralement un
comportement non-déterministe.
Cette thèse est consacrée au développement des nouvelles tech-
niques de raisonnement pour vérifier le concept de la “differential pri-
vacy” dans les systèmes concurrents. Differential privacy est une no-
tion prometteuse provenant de la communauté des bases statistiques.
Elle est maintenant largement adoptée dans différents modèles de
calcul. Nous l’utilisons dans cette thèse comme un critère pour
mesurer le niveau de confidentialité qu’un système probabiliste et
non-déterministe satisfait.
Dans la première partie de cette thèse, nous considérons le raison-
nement modulaire sur la differential privacy dans une variante proba-
biliste de “Calcul des Systèmes Communicants” (CCS) de Robin Mil-
ner. Nous montrons que les opérateurs du modèle de calcul tels que
le choix non-déterministe, le choix probabiliste, la restriction ainsi
qu’une forme restreinte de la composition parallèle préservent tous
la differential privacy, dans le sens que combiner des composantes
(ayant un certain niveau de protection au sens de la differential pri-
vacy) avec ces opérateurs ne compromet pas la differential privacy
du système entier ainsi obtenu.
La deuxième partie porte sur l’applicabilité de bisimulation - une
technique fondamentale dans le domaine de la concurrence - pour
caractériser le comportement du système au sens de la differential
privacy. Nous adoptons l’idée de l’amortissement, qui a d’abord été
iv
appliquée sur certaines bisimulations avec des actions en fonction des
coûts, et construisons une bisimulation probabiliste amortie. Cette
bisimulation nous a permis de vérifier la differential privacy. Nous
avons également montré que notre notion est plus flexible que celle
dans le travail de Tschantz et al.
Dans la troisième partie l’attention porte sur le développement
des systèmes de preuve : une manière axiomatique pour prouver les
propriétés de systèmes concurrents. Nous fournissons deux systèmes
de preuve cohérents et complets pour notre bisimulation amortie et
son homologue (c’est-à-dire la bisimulation) faible. Les systèmes de
preuve permettent de raisonner sur le comportement (observable)
sur le long terme d’un système grâce à la manipulation syntaxique
de son modèle.
La dernière partie présente une extension de la métrique de bisim-
ulation basée sur la distance de Kantorovich. C’est une mesure qui
est devenue très populaire dans le domaine de la concurrence, grâce
à ses fondements mathématiques solides. Mais la notion standard est
de nature additive et donc pas appropriée à prouver la propriété de
la differential privacy (qui est de nature multiplicative), l’extension
développée dans la thèse est paramétrique par rapport à la distance
sous-jacente, et donc appropriée pour capturer une vaste gamme de
propriétés, y compris la differential privacy.
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Introduction
The most recent developments and usages of information technologies such
as data profiling in databases, or user tracking in pervasive computing, pose
serious threats to the confidential information of the users. For instance,
the social networks Twitter and Flickr carefully protect their users’ data
by anonymization, and yet Narayanan and Smatikov [NS09] were able to
conceive a de-anonymization algorithm which could re-identify 30% of the
people who have accounts in both of them, with only a 12% error rate. The
verification of systems for protecting sensitive and confidential information
is becoming an increasingly important issue in the modern world.
This thesis is devoted to the formal verification of differential privacy in
probabilistic concurrent systems. Differential privacy is a promising notion
of privacy originated from the community of statistical databases, and now
widely adopted in various models of computation. We shall use the principle
of differential privacy as a criterion to measure the level of privacy that a
concurrent system satisfies.
1.1 Concurrent and Probabilistic Processes
Many protocols for protecting confidential information have been proposed
in the literature. In order to obfuscate the link between the secret and the
public information, several of them use randomized mechanisms. Typical
1
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examples are DCNets [Cha88], Crowds [RR98], Onion Routing [SGR97],
Freenet [CSWH00] and Tor [DMS04]. Another common denominator is
that various entities involved in the system to verify occur as concurrent
processes, and present typically nondeterministic behavior. A formal appa-
ratus for reasoning about these systems should allow to characterize both
non-deterministic and probabilistic behaviors.
Process algebras, also known as process calculi, are a powerful mathe-
matical model for the specification and verification of concurrent systems.
They provide a formalism for representing and reasoning about the behav-
iors of distributed systems, algorithms and protocols (in a compositional
way). Some of the most prominent representants of these formalisms are
CCS [Mil89], ACP [BK84, BW90] and CSP [Hoa85].
In a process algebra, typically there are only a few operators, such as
action prefix, summation (nondeterministic choice), recursion and parallel
composition. The latter is particularly important for concurrency, since it
allows to specify the structure of systems composed of several interacting
agents. An internal action, τ , which is one of the most important features in
the design of process algebra, is used to represent synchronization between
agents. In this thesis we focus on CCS, because it allows all of these kinds
of behaviors but still is simple and general.
Bisimulation is a central notion at the heart of the theory of process
calculi [Mil89]. The idea is to match any transition in one process with
a transition labelled by the same action in the other process, and their
residuals can continue to mimic each other. Weak bisimulation relaxes
bisimulation by regarding two systems as equivalent if they exhibit the
same pattern of external actions. Weak bisimulation is proved fundamental
for the verification of systems where abstraction from internal actions is
essential. The correctness of a system can then be verified by proving that
it is equivalent to its desired external behavior, which can be expressed
as process terms. (Weak) Bisimulation equivalence is a mathematically
elegant, tractable concept. Many tools, either automated or interactive,
have been developed for proving bisimulation between processes (e.g. [CAD,
Lin95]). The principle of bisimulation will also play an important role in
2
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this thesis, being used to reason about behaviors of systems.
The theory of process algebra has been applied to systems equipped
with quantitative features, such as cost [KAK05], time [LY00] and proba-
bilities [BS01]. For specifying probabilistic behaviors in security protocols
and systems, in this thesis we focus on probabilistic systems. In [vGSS95],
van Glabbeek et al. classified probabilistic models into reactive, genera-
tive and stratified. In [Seg95] Segala pointed out that neither reactive nor
generative nor stratified models capture real nondeterminism. He then in-
troduced a model, the probabilistic automata (PA), where both probability
and nondeterminism are taken into account. Segala further proposed a sim-
plified version of PA called simple probabilistic automata (SPA), which are
similar to ordinary automata except that a labelled transition leads to a
probabilistic distribution over a set of states instead of a single state. In
this thesis, we shall use SPA as the operational semantics of our process
algebra.
For probabilistic systems, accordingly, a notion of probabilistic bisim-
ulation was first defined in [LS91]. It has been admitted to be not robust,
namely small changes to any of those probabilities may cause equivalent
states to become inequivalent. This is particularly relevant for security sys-
tems where requiring all agents to behave identically is impractical. It is
therefore desirable to know the extent they differ from each other, thus see-
ing how difficult it is for the attackers to differentiate them. This started
the quest for approximate notions of behavioral equivalence for probabilistic
systems.
Originally proposed in the seminal works of van Breugel and Worrel
[vBW01b, vBW01a] and of Desharnais et al. [DGJP99, DJGP02, DJGP04],
the pseudometric based on the Kantorovich lifting has become very popular
in the process algebra community. It is particularly appealing because it
extends weak bisimilarity (captured by the property of having distance 0)
and it is based on a natural way of relating probability masses distributed
on a metric space. More recently, the Kantorovich bisimilarity metric has
been shown to provide a bound on the statistical distance on probabilistic
traces [CvBW12]. This means that it can be used to verify certain proba-
3
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bilistic properties on traces. More specifically, these properties are linear,
in the sense that the difference increases linearly wrt variations on the dis-
tributions. Whether and how the solid theoretical background built for the
pseudometric based on the Kantorovich lifting can be explored to charac-
terize properties other than linear ones motivates part of the work of the
thesis.
1.2 Differential Privacy
Several formalization of the notion of protection have been proposed in the
literature. Among those based on probability theory, we mention the true-
or-false properties in the Anonymity hierarchy: like strong anonymity which
describes an ideal situation where a protocol does not leak any information
about the identity of the user, and some weaker notions like conditional
anonymity [Cha88, HO05, BP05] and probable innocence [RR98]. More
refined approaches, based on information theory, aim at measuring also
the degree of protection provided by a system. The idea is to express the
leakage of information in terms of the notion of mutual information. A
nice feature of this approach is that we can consider different notions of
entropy depending on the kind of adversary we want to model. The most
used are the Shannon entropy, see for example [CHM05, Mal07], and the
Rényi min-entropy [Smi09].
Differential privacy [Dwo06, DL09, Dwo11] is a promising definition
of confidentiality that has emerged recently from the field of statistical
databases. It provides strong privacy guarantees, and requires fewer as-
sumptions than the information-theoretical approach. We say that a system
is ǫ-differentially private if for every pair of adjacent datasets (i.e. datasets
which differ in the data of an individual only), the probabilities of obtaining
a certain answer differ at most by a factor eǫ. Differential privacy captures
the intuitive requirement that the (public) answer to a query should not be
affected too much by the (private) data of each singular individual.
Although differential privacy originates from the field of statistical databases,
it is becoming increasingly popular in many other fields, ranging from
4
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programming languages [RP10] to social networks [NS09] and geolocation
[MKA+08]. One of the reasons of its success is its independence from side
knowledge, which makes it robust to attacks based on combining various
sources of information.
The extension of the principle of differential privacy to secrets with a
generic adjacency relation has been universally adopted in the literature,
see for instance [BKOB12, GHH+13, CABP13]. Therein, the sensitive in-
formation to be protected was other than the value of a single individual in
databases. A general notion of adjacency was considered, formalized by a
general metric that measures the distance between values of secrets. They
showed that within this setting, it is still reasonable to employ the same
principle of differential privacy and to obtain a meaningful notion of privacy.
In this thesis we also consider the principle of differential privacy under a
general notion of adjacency, which provides the basis for formalizing also
other security concepts, like anonymity.
1.3 This thesis: Differential Privacy in
Concurrent Systems
The goal of this thesis is to develop formalisms for probabilistic concurrent
systems that can reason about differentially private behaviors. We address
this issue mainly from three directions: modular reasoning provided by pro-
cess combinators, distance measuring based on approximate bisimulations
and axiomatic theories.
1.3.1 Modular reasoning
In Chapter 3 we consider a probabilistic process calculus equipped with
secret labels as a specification formalism for concurrent systems, and we
propose a framework for reasoning about the degree of differential privacy
provided by such systems. In particular, we investigate the preservation
of the degree of privacy under composition via the various operators. We
illustrate our idea using a variant of the anonymity protocol: Crowds. Our
5
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extension allows anonymous users to send messages probabilistically over
the users they think trustable, rather than over all users as strictly required
in standard Crowds. Furthermore, we show that this trust information
may compromise privacy, and we introduce a notion of adjacency relation
to eliminate this factor, thus retrieving the real level of differential privacy
in this case. Then, we investigate how the users’ preference levels affect the
degree of privacy.
1.3.2 Bisimulations for differential privacy
In Chapter 4 we investigate techniques for proving differential privacy based
on approximate bisimulations. Our motivation stems from the work of
Tschantz et al. [TKD11], who proposed a verification method based on
proving the existence of a stratified family between states, that can track
the privacy leakage, ensuring that it does not exceed a given leakage bud-
get. We improve this technique by investigating a state property which is
more permissive and still implies differential privacy. We propose a new
probabilistic bisimulation by integrating the notion of amortisation, which
results into a more parsimonious use of the privacy budget. We show that
the closeness of automata in our amortised bisimulation still guarantees the
preservation of differential privacy, which makes it suitable for verification.
Moreover we show that our amortised bisimulation is substitutive under
typical process combinators. We apply the bisimulation verification frame-
work to reason about the degree of differential privacy of protocols by the
example of the Dining Cryptographers Protocol with biased coins.
1.3.3 Complete proof systems
The concept of amortisation was initially introduced for cost-based bisimu-
lations [KAK05, dFERVGR07] to make long-term behavioral comparisons
between nondeterministic systems. The idea of amortisation has been bor-
rowed in the previous chapter to formulate an approximate notion for prob-
abilistically behavioral equivalence: amortised probabilistic bisimulation. In
Chapter 5 we present sound and complete proof systems for amortised
6
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strong probabilistic bisimulation and its weak counterpart, and prove their
soundness and completeness. Our results make it possible to reason about
long-term (observable) probabilistic behaviors by syntactic manipulation.
1.3.4 Generalized bisimulation metrics
The pseudometric based on the Kantorovich lifting is one of the most pop-
ular notions of distance between probabilistic processes proposed in the
literature. However, its application in verification is limited to linear prop-
erties. In Chapter 6 we propose a generalization which allows to deal with
a wide class of properties, such as those used in security and privacy. More
precisely, we propose a family of pseudometrics, parameterized on a notion
of distance which depends on the property we want to verify. Furthermore,
we show that the members of this family still characterize bisimilarity in
terms of their kernel, and provide a bound on the corresponding distance
between trace distributions. Then we study the instance corresponding to
differential privacy, and we show that it has a dual form, easier to compute.
We also prove that the typical process-algebra constructs are non-expansive,
thus paving the way to a modular approach to verification.
Related works
We present some related work concerning verification of differential privacy
in various contexts, and formalisms of other notions of information protec-
tion based on process calculi. Detailed comparison between our work of
each part and works in the literature can be found sprinkled in each chap-
ter. To the best of our knowledge, the line of work in this thesis is the first
to investigate differential privacy for concurrent systems within the setting
of process calculi.
Verification of differential privacy has been itself an active area of re-
search. It has been investigated in a SQL-like language [McS09] for statisti-
cal databases and a MapReduce-based system for cloud computing [RSK+10].
Prominent approaches based on formal methods are those based on type
systems [RP10, GHH+13] and logical formulations [BKOB12, BDG+13].
7
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An earlier paper [TKD11] defined stratified bisimulation relations suitable
for proving differential privacy, however it suffered from the fact that the
respective kernel relations do not fully characterize probabilistic bisimilar-
ity.
Among several formalizations of the notion of information protection
based on probability theory, we mention some rather popular approaches,
mainly based on information theory, in particular, to consider different no-
tions of entropy depending on the kind of adversary, and to express the
leakage of information in terms of the notion of mutual information. We
name a few works also discussed in the models of probabilistic automata
and process algebra: Boreale [Bor06] establishs a framework for quantify-
ing information leakage using absolute leakage, and introduces a notion of
rate of leakage. Deng et al. [DPW06] use the notion of relative entropy to
measure the degree of anonymity. Compositional methods based on Bayes
risk method are discussed by Braun et al. [BCP08, CPB]. A metric for
probabilistic processes based on the Jensen-Shannon divergence is proposed
in [Mu09] for measuring information flow in reactive processes. Unlike the
information-theoretical approach, differential privacy provides strong pri-
vacy guarantees independently from side knowledge. However, progress for
studying differential privacy in the models of probabilistic automata and
process algebra has been relatively new. It would be interesting to see how
the issues stressed and the reasoning techniques developed there can be
adapted for differential privacy.
1.4 Plan of the Thesis and Contributions
This thesis provides the theoretical basis for developing algorithms and tools
of verifying or computing differential privacy in probabilistic processes. The
most significant contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
1. We prove that non-deterministic choice, probabilistic choice, the re-
striction operator and a restricted form of parallel composition pre-
serves differential privacy, in the sense that combining components
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under these operators does not compromise the privacy of the system
(in Chapter 3).
2. We propose an approximate notion for probabilistically behavioral
equivalence: amortised probabilistic bisimulation. We show that this
bisimulation is suitable for verifying differential privacy and it im-
proves the method based on a stratified family between states in the
work of Tschantz et al.(in Chapter 4).
Furthermore, we build sound and complete proof systems for amor-
tised probabilistic bisimulation and its weak counterpart, and prove
their soundness and completeness, which makes it possible to reason
about differentially private behaviors by syntactic manipulation. (in
Chapter 5).
3. We propose a family of generalized bisimulation metrics based on
the Kantorovich lifting. The kernel of this family fully character-
ized bisimilarity. The metrical closeness between processes indicates
a bound on the distance between the corresponding trace distribu-
tions. This allows to deal with a wide class of behavioral properties;
importantly, one of its instances corresponds to differential privacy
(in Chapter 6).
Besides these four chapters, there are two introductory chapters, the first
being the present introduction. Chapter 2 introduces some preliminary in-
formation about probability spaces, probabilistic automata, a probabilistic
version of CCS and differential privacy. Finally, in Chapter 7 we make our
final conclusions.
1.5 Publications
Most of the results in this thesis have already appeared in scientific publi-
cations. More specifically:
• Chapter 3 is based on the paper Modular Reasoning about Dif-
ferential Privacy in a Probabilistic Process Calculus [Xu12]
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that appeared in the proceedings of the 7th International Sympo-
sium on Trustworthy Global Computing (TGC 2012), and the comple-
mentary technical report Privacy-Preserving Process Construc-
tors [XHP14].
• Chapter 4 is based on the paper Metrics for Differential Privacy
in Concurrent Systems [XCL14], which was published in the 34th
IFIP WG 6.1 International Conference on Formal Techniques for Dis-
tributed Objects, Components and Systems (FORTE 2014).
• Chapter 5 is based on the paper Complete Proof Systems for
Amortised Probabilistic Bisimulations [XL14], which is about
to appear on Journal of Computer Science and Technology.
• Chapter 6 is based on the paper Generalized Bisimulation Met-
rics [CGPX14] that appeared in the proceedings of the 25th Interna-




In this chapter we give a brief overview of the technical concepts that will
be used throughout this thesis.
2.1 Probability Spaces
In this section we recall some basic notions in Probability Theory.
Let X be a set. A σ-field (or σ-algebra) over X is a collection F of
subsets of X closed under complement and countable union and such that
X ∈ F .
Definition 2.1.1 (Probability measure). A probability measure on F is a
function µ : F → [0,∞) such that





i µ(Ci), where {Ci}i is a countable collection of pairwise
disjoint elements of F ;
3. µ(X) = 1.
Definition 2.1.2 (Probability space). A probability space is a tuple (X,F , µ)
where
1. X is a set, called the sample space;
11
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2. F is a σ-field on X called the event space, of which elements are
called events;
3. µ is a probability measure on F .
A probability space and the corresponding probability measure are called
discrete, if F = 2X and




In this case, we can construct µ from a function p : X → [0, 1] satisfying∑
x∈X p(x) = 1 by assigning µ({x}) = p(x). The function p is called a
probability distribution over X . We denote by Prob(X), Disc(X) the set of
all and discrete probability measures (or distributions) over X respectively.
Given x ∈ X , we use δ(x), (called the Dirac measure on x), to denote the
probability distribution that assigns 1 to the event {x}, namely, if y = x
then δ(x)({y}) = 1, otherwise δ(x)({y}) = 0. The set {x ∈ X |µ(x) > 0}
is called the support set of µ, represented by supp(µ).
Definition 2.1.3 (Conditional probability). If A and B are two events,
then their joint A ∩ B is also an event. If µ(A) > 0, then we define the







If p(B |A) = µ(B), namely µ(A ∩ B) = µ(A) · µ(B), then A and B
are independent . If p(A ∩ B |C) = p(A |C) · p(B |C), then A and B are
conditionally independent given that C holds.
2.2 Probabilistic Automata
We recall here some basic concepts about probabilistic automata, following
the notions of simple probabilistic automata in [Seg95]. It will be used as
the operational semantics of probabilistic process algebra.
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Definition 2.2.1 (Probabilistic automata). A probabilistic automaton (hence-
forth PA)1 A is a tuple (S, s, A,D) where
• S is a countable set of states;
• s ∈ S is the start state;
• A is a finite set of labels;
• D ⊆ S ×A×Disc(S) is a transition relation.
Informally, if (s, a, µ) ∈ D then there is a transition from the state s
performing a label a and then leading to a distribution µ over a set of states
instead of a single state. It is also occasionally written as s
a
−→ µ. The
transition in D is chosen nondeterministically, and the target state among
the ones allowed by µ is chosen probabilistically.
A fully probabilistic automaton (henceforth FPA) is a probabilistic au-
tomaton without nondeterminism, namely at each state at most one transi-
tion can be chosen. We denote by L(s) and π(s) the label and distribution
of the unique transition starting from s (if any).
We say that a PA A is finitely branching iff the nondeterministic choices
at any state are finite, and supp(µ) is finite for all s
a
−→ µ.
An execution α of a probabilistic automaton is a (possibly infinite) se-
quence of alternating states and labels s0a0s1a1s2a2s3 · · · , such that for
each i there is a transition (si, ai, µi) ∈ D with µi(si+1) > 0. We will use
Exec∗(A) to represent the set of all the finite executions of A, Exec(A) to
represent the set of all the executions of A, and lstate(α) to denote the last
state of a finite execution α ∈ Exec∗(A). X ⇀ Y represents the partial
functions from X to Y .
Definition 2.2.2 (Scheduler). A scheduler of a probabilistic automation
A = (S, s, A,D) is a function
ζ : Exec∗(A) ⇀ D
such that ζ(α) = (s, a, µ) ∈ D implies that s = lstate(α).
1PA defined here is in fact the “simple probabilistic automata” defined in [Seg95,
SL94]. For simplicity we just call them “probabilistic automata” in the rest of the thesis.
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Intuitively, a scheduler resolves the nondeterminism by selecting a tran-
sition among the ones available in D, based on the history of the execution.
Definition 2.2.3 (Execution tree). The execution tree of A with respect
to a scheduler ζ, denoted by etree(A, ζ), is a fully probabilistic automaton
A′ = (S ′, s′, A′, D′) satisfying
1. S ′ = Exec(A);
2. s′ = s;
3. A′ = A;
4. (α, a, µ′) ∈ D′ if there exists a distribution µ such that ζ(α) = (lstate(α),
a, µ) and µ′(αas) = µ(s).
Intuitively, etree(A, ζ) is produced by unfolding the executions of A and
resolving all nondeterministic choices using ζ .
A trace is a sequence of labels in A∗ ∪ Aω obtained from executions
by removing the states. We use [ ] to represent the empty trace, and a to
concatenate two traces. In a FPA A, a state s of A induces a probability
measure over traces as follows. The basic measurable events are the cones
of finite traces, where the cone of a finite trace ~t, denoted by C~t, is the set
{~t′ ∈ A∗∪Aω|~t ≤ ~t′}, where ≤ is the standard prefix preorder on sequences.
The probability induced by s on a cone C~t, denoted by Pr[s ⊲ C~t ], is
defined recursively as follows:




1 if ~t = [ ]
0 if ~t = aa~t′ and a 6= L(s)
∑
si












mation is taken over the default range S. This probability measure is
extended to arbitrary measurable sets in the σ-algebra of traces in the
standard way. We write Pr[s ⊲ σ] to represent the probability induced by
s on the measurable set of traces σ.
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There are other probabilistic models analogous to ours, for example,
the reactive probabilistic automata used in [LS89, vGSS95] and the alter-
nating model defined in [HJ90]. The former equips a transition with the
information of both an action label and a probability, which would not
make intuitive the distinction between non-deterministic and probabilistic
behaviors. The latter classifies the set of states into two categories: one
for non-deterministic states and the other for probabilistic states, where
an execution of a system is generated by a strict alternation of the two
kinds of states. From the point of view of expressiveness, these two kinds of
models and our model are basically the same and can be converted to each
other (see the survey [SV04], and the difference between the alternating and
non-alternating models in axiomatizations in [BS01]).
2.3 Probabilistic Process Algebra
In this section we present a probabilistic process algebra CCSp. It extends
Milner’s CCS [Mil89] with an addition of a probabilistic choice operator,
allowing to describe both non-deterministic and probabilistic behaviors.
Let I be a finite set of indices, a be an element of a countable set of
channel names. The syntax of CCSp is:
α ::= a | a | τ prefixes





i∈I piQi probabilistic choice
| Q +R non-deterministic choice
| Q |R parallel composition
| (νa)Q restriction
| !Q replication
The term 0, representing the terminated process, is syntactic sugar for
an empty non-deterministic choice. The + operator is the classical nonde-
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−→ δ(Q1 |Q2 | !Q)
Figure 2.1: The semantics of CCSp
terministic choice as defined in [Mil89]. It is folklore that + is associative
and commutative. We shall write
∑
i∈1..nQi for Q1 +Q2 + · · ·+Qn.
The term
⊕
i∈I piQi represents a blind probabilistic choice, where pi’s
satisfy pi ∈ (0, 1] and
∑
i∈I pi = 1. We use the notation Q1 ⊕p Q2 to
represent a binary sum with p1 = p and p2 = 1 − p. When I = {1} it will
be abbreviate to ∆(Q1).
We let µ, ν range over distributions over processes. We represent a
distribution over processes by µ = ◦
∑
i∈I piQi where µ(Qi) = pi. When
n = 1, it is degenerated to the Dirac measure on Q1, namely, µ = δ(Q1).
The operational semantics of a CCSp term Q is a probabilistic automa-
ton whose states are the processes reachable from Q, and whose transition
relation is defined according to the rules in Fig. 2.1. SUM1 and PAR1 have
corresponding right rules SUM2 and PAR2, omitted for simplicity. We use
Q
a
−→ µ to represent the transition (Q, a, µ). We denote by µ |R the mea-
sure µ′ such that µ′(Q |R) = µ(Q) for all processes Q, and µ′(Q′) = 0 if Q′
is not of the form (Q |R). Similarly (νa)µ = µ′ such that µ′((νa)Q) = µ(Q).
A transition of the form Q
a
−→ δ(Q′), having for target a Dirac mea-
sure, corresponds to a transition of a non-probabilistic automaton. All the
rules in Fig. 2.1 follow the transition rules in standard CCS, except the
rule PROB. The latter models the internal probabilistic choice: a silent
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τ transition is available from the sum to a measure containing all of its
operands, with the corresponding probabilities. Note that in the produced
probabilistic automaton, all transitions to non-Dirac measures are silent.
2.4 Probabilistic bisimilarity
We recall the notion of probabilistic bisimilarity first defined in [LS91].
An equivalence relation over S can be lifted to a relation over distribu-
tions over S by stating that two distributions are equivalent if they assign
the same probability to the same equivalence class. Formally, given an
equivalence relation R on S, its lifting L(R) is an equivalence relation on
Disc(S), defined as
(µ, µ′) ∈ L(R) iff ∀s ∈ S : µ([s]R) = µ
′([s]R)
where [s]R denotes the equivalence class of s wrt R.
We recall the notions of probabilistic bisimulation and bisimilarity, fol-
lowing the formulation in terms of post-fixpoints of a transformation on
state relations:
Definition 2.4.1. • The transformation B : S × S → S × S is defined
as: (s, s′) ∈ B(R) iff
– if s
a
−→ µ, then there exists µ′ such that t
a




−→ µ′, then there exists µ such that s
a
−→ µ and (µ′, µ) ∈
L(R).
• A relation R ⊆ S × S is called a bisimulation if it is a post-fixpoint
of R, i.e. R ⊆ B(R).
It is easy to see that B is monotonic on (2S×S,⊆) and that the latter
is a complete lattice, hence by Tarski’s theorem there exists the greatest
fixpoint of B, and it coincides with the greatest bisimulation:
Definition 2.4.2. The bisimilarity relation ∼⊆ S × S is defined as:
∼ = max{R |R = B(R)} = max{R |R ⊆ B(R)} =
⋃




A pseudometric is a relaxed notion of a normal metric in which distinct
elements can have distance zero. We consider here a generalized notion
where the distance can also be infinite, and we use [0,+∞) to denote the
non-negative fragment of the real numbers R enriched with +∞. Formally,
an (extended) pseudometric on a set X is a function m : X2 → [0,+∞)
with the following properties:
• (reflexivity) m(x, x) = 0,
• (symmetry) m(x, y) = m(y, x),
• (triangle inequality) m(x, y) ≤ m(x, z) +m(z, y).
A metric has the extra condition that
m(x, y) = 0 implies x = y
Let MX denote the set of all pseudometrics on X with the ordering m1 
m2 iff ∀x, y.m1(x, y) ≤ m2(x, y). It can be shown that (MX ,) is a com-
plete lattice with bottom element ⊥ such that ∀x, y.⊥(x, y) = 0 and top
element ⊤ such that ∀x, y.⊤(x, y) = +∞ if x 6= y and 0 otherwise.
2.6 Differential Privacy
Differential Privacy [Dwo06] captures the idea that a query on a dataset
does not provide too much information about a particular individual, re-
gardless of whether the individual’s record is in the dataset or not. In
order to achieve this goal, typically some probabilistic noise is added to
the answer. The formal definition is the following (where M denotes the
randomized answer, Pr the probability measure, and ǫ a finite non-negative
number): Two datasets x1 and x2 are adjacent if their Hamming distance




Definition 2.6.1 (Differential Privacy [Dwo06]). A mechanismM provides
ǫ-differential privacy iff for all adjacent datasets x1 and x2, and for all
Z ⊆ Range(M),
Pr[M(x1) ∈ Z] ≤ e
ǫ · Pr[M(x2) ∈ Z]
It has been shown in [McS09] that, when the composition properties
of differential privacy is studied, using eǫ is easier to do mathematics than
using ǫ,
It can be proved that if the set of answers is discrete, Definition 2.6.1
can be equivalently stated in terms of singleton Z’s [DKM+06]. Clearly,
the smaller the privacy parameter ǫ is, the higher is the protection.
We shall adapt the notion of differential privacy to our framework.
Apart from data points, we consider more general notions of secret infor-
mation, and hence corresponding symmetric adjacency relations ` between
secrets. This extends the dataset-based adjacency notion of “differing for
only one record” to more comprehensive settings. This idea of extending the
principle of differential privacy to measure the degree of protection of secrets
in more general settings is also studied in [BKOB12, GHH+13, CABP13].
See also the following two examples.
Example 2.6.2 (Anonymity). In the case of anonymity the confidential
data U are the agents’ identities. Since the identities are just names without
any particular structure, it is natural to assume that each name is adjacent
to any other. Hence (U ,`) is a clique, i.e. for all u1, u2 ∈ U and u1 6= u2,
we have u1 ` u2.
Example 2.6.3 (Geolocation). In the case of geolocation, the confidential
data are the coordinates (latitude , longitude) of a point on the earth’s sur-
face. If the purpose is to protect the exact location, a good definition of
adjacency is: two points are adjacent if their Manhattan distance is 1, i.e.
(a1, b1) ` (a2, b2) iff |a1 − a2| = 1 and |b1 − b2| = 0, or |a1 − a2| = 0 and
|b1 − b2| = 1.
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Modular Reasoning in a Probabilistic
Process Calculus
The main goal of the present chapter is to investigate differential privacy for
concurrent systems in the context of a probabilistic process calculus (CCSp).
We present a modular approach for reasoning about differential privacy,
with respect to the constructs of CCSp. More specifically, we show that
the restriction, the probabilistic choice, the nondeterministic choice, and a
restricted form of parallel composition are safe under composition, in the
sense that they do not decrease the privacy of a system. Compositionality
plays an important role in the construction and analysis of security systems:
Rather than analyzing a complex system as a whole, the safe constructs
allow us to split the system in parts, analyze the degree of privacy of each
part separately, and combine the results to obtain the global degree of
privacy.
We will use the Crowds protocol as an example running all through the
chapter. Crowds [RR98] is an anonymity protocol which allows Internet
users to perform web transactions without revealing their private identity.
This is achieved by using a chain of forwarders, chosen randomly, rather
than sending the message directly to the final recipient. In the standard
analysis, it is often assumed that attackers stop forwarding the message after
the first detection of an honest user. We provide a formal proof showing
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that continuing forwarding the message after the first detection does not
compromise the level of differential privacy, meaning that the assumption
is indeed reasonable.
We illustrate our compositionality results by proving an anonymity-
preservation property for an extension of the Crowds protocol. In the
standard Crowds protocol, all members have the same probability of be-
ing used as forwarders, which gives the protocol a symmetric structure (cf.
equations (13) and (14) in [CP06]). Unfortunately, the reality is differ-
ent. Indeed, anonymity users behave as prosumers, i.e., the consumers of
the anonymity service are at the same time its providers, as they cooper-
ate to generate the network activity that grants anonymity to the system
as a whole. Cooperation entails relaying other users’ messages in order
to create sufficient “doubt” as to whom the real message originator ac-
tually is. Hence, the success of such protocols depends strongly on the
attitude towards cooperation with each involved individual. However, co-
operation cannot be taken for granted due to the rational behavior (aka
selfish behavior) of the users [NDW10, YSH12] leading to a degraded user
experience. Consequently, incentive mechanisms stimulating cooperation
are being increasingly used to enhance the reliability of anonymity systems.
Roughly, we have two types of incentive mechanisms: trust based mecha-
nisms [DBMC14, SHY10] which set up reputation systems quantifying the
subjective reliance on the expected behavior of users and virtual currency
which monetize the effect of prosocial behaviors [JJS13]. More recently, it
has been recognized that a successful combination of both social and eco-
nomic strategies should be taken into account to enhance privacy [ABLS14].
In this chapter, we consider a Crowds protocol enhanced with both a
trust based mechanism and a virtual currency. The trust mechanism allows
each member to establish a set of trusted users to whom she can forward
messages. The virtual currency allows cooperating users to earn sufficient
money to use the system for their own benefit. We call such “wealthy” users
the legitimate initiators as they are the only members who can initiate trans-
actions. This breaks the symmetry properties of the original protocol, thus
making the standard analysis of [RR98] unapplicable. We argue that, in the
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asymmetric case, reasoning about the protocol as a whole is difficult. But
our compositional approach manages to prove an anonymity-preservation
property without relying on the symmetry properties.
Furthermore, for Crowds containing trust information, we discover some
cases in which the leak of information is brought in by trust information
rather than the fault of the Crowds protocol. We introduce a corresponding
notion of adjacency relation to rule out this factor, thus retrieving a measure
of real privacy.
In [HPSE10] the authors notice that each user in the crowd must estab-
lish a path between her and a server out of a set of servers, the message
forwarded in the network reveals also the identity of the target sever. This
additional observation may leak additional information about the initiator
of the transaction, when users’ habits of Web browsing is not uniform, which
is usually the case in the real world. We analyze the impact of these addi-
tional observables on the security of a protocol in the context of differential
privacy, and show that compared with the work in [HPSE10], our expres-
sion is simpler, i.e. in terms of the privacy level of the channel modeling
the source of the additional observation.
Summary of Contributions
- We prove that in the Crowds protocol, continuing forwarding the message
after the first detection does not compromise differential privacy.
- We present a modular approach for reasoning about differential privacy
for protocols expressed in a probabilistic process algebra (CCSp).
- We apply our compositional method to prove an anonymity-preservation
property for an extended version of Crowds.
- We define a notion of adjacency relation between members of Crowds
involving trust information, to exclude some loss of privacy induced by
the trust information.
- We show that in the setting of differential privacy, the impact of users’
preference levels in Crowds has a simpler formulation than in the case
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of probable innocence (which can be considered as another merit of the
notion of differential privacy).
Plan of the Chapter We begin by giving background on CCSp and dif-
ferential privacy with secret labels, Crowds, and present a proposition of
Crowds. Next, in Section 3.2 we investigate the compositionality of differ-
ential privacy with respect to CCSp constructs. In Section 3.3, we apply
our compositionality result to an extended Crowds. In Section 3.4 a no-
tion of adjacency relation is tailored for Crowds with trust information. In
Section 3.5, we revisit Crowds in the presence of users’ preference levels.
Section 3.6 and 3.7 discuss further related work and conclude.
3.1 Preliminaries
In this section we present the preliminaries for this chapter: a CCSp with se-
cret and observable labels introduced for the purpose of specifying information-
hiding protocols, the formalism of the notion of differential privacy estab-
lished therein as well as the Crowds protocol.
3.1.1 CCSp with secret labels
In order to model security systems and protocols, we use a variant of the
calculus CCSp presented in Section 2.3. We adopt the idea in [BCP08,
CPB], making a distinction between observable and secret labels.
Formally, we consider a finite set A of labels, partitioned into a set Sec
of secrets, a set Obs of observables and a silent action τ . We denote labels
in A, Sec and Obs by a, u and o, respectively, with primes and indices when
necessary. Secret labels and the silent action τ 1 are unobservable from the
point of view of outsiders (viz adversaries). For each o ∈ Obs, we assume
a complementary label o ∈ Obs with the convention that o = o. Being
unobservable, τ and secret labels have no complement.
1Following the tradition in concurrency theory where τ is not observable. We note,




The syntax of CCSp with secret and observable labels is obtained from
the syntax of CCSp presented in Section 2.3 by replacing prefix α.Q and
non-deterministic choice Q+R with the following two guarded choices:

i∈I ui.Qi secret choice (ui ∈ Sec)

i∈I ri.Qi nondeterministic choice (ri ∈ Obs ∪ {τ})
Accordingly, its semantics is obtained from the semantics presented in
Fig. 2.1 by replacing the rules of ACT and SUM1 with the following two













We need to adjust the definition of scheduler for the distinction between
secret and observable labels. Following [BCP08, CPB] we assume secret la-
bels to be the inputs of the system. Secrets are given as input to a scheduler
and determine completely the secret choices, namely a secret label can only
be performed if it matches the input. The scheduler then has to resolve the
residual nondeterminism, which is originated by nondeterministic choice
and parallel operator. From an outsider’s point of view, only observable
labels can be seen.
The definition of a scheduler with secret labels is specified as follows.
Let α|Sec and α|Obs be the projection of α on Sec and Obs , respectively.
For instance if α = Q1u1Q2u2Q3τQ4u3Q5o1Q6 where for all i, ui ∈ Sec and
oi ∈ Obs , then α|Sec = u1u2u3, α|Obs = o1. The projection of an execution
on secret labels should be consistent with a given input.
Definition 3.1.1 (Scheduler with secret labels). Let Q be a process in
CCSp and A be the probabilistic automaton generated by Q. A scheduler
is a function ζ : Sec∗ × Exec∗(A) ⇀ D such that for a given secret ~u =
u1u2 · · ·un and an execution α, α|Sec = u1u2 · · ·um with m ≤ n iff ζ(~u)(α) is
defined. Furthermore, let ζ(~u)(α) = (lstate(α), a, µ), if m < n and a ∈ Sec
then a = um+1, else if m = n then a /∈ Sec. We will write ζ~u(α) for ζ(~u)(α).
We now define the execution tree of a CCSp term with secret labels, in a
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Figure 3.2: An execution tree with secret labels.
is that in our case the execution tree depends not only on the scheduler,
but also on the secret input.
Definition 3.1.2 (Execution tree with secret labels). Let A = (S,Q,A,D)
be the probabilistic automaton generated by Q. Given an input ~u and a
scheduler ζ, the execution tree of Q, denoted by etree(Q,~u, ζ), is a fully
probabilistic automaton A′ = (S ′, Q, A,D′) such that:
(i) S ′ = Exec(A),
(ii) (α, a, µ′) ∈ D′ iff ζ~u(α) = (lstate(α), a, µ) for some µ and µ
′(αaQ) =
µ(Q)
Example 3.1.3. Figure 3.1 shows a probabilistic automaton of a process
with secret labels, where Sec = {u1, u2} and Obs = {o1, o2}. Its execution
tree is shown in the left part of Figure 3.2. Define a scheduler ζu1(s1) =
(s1, u1,∆(s2)), ζu1(s1u1s2) = (s2, o1,∆(s4)) and undefined on the remaining
execution states, we obtain a fully probabilistic automaton as shown in the
right part of Figure 3.2.
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3.1.2 Process terms as channels
We now show how CCSp terms can be used to specify systems manipulating
confidential information.
A system can be seen as an information-theoretic channel [CT91]. A
finite sequence of secret labels constitutes the secret information (or a se-
cret), given as an input to the channel, and a finite sequence of observable
labels constitutes the public information (or an observable), obtained as an
output from the channel. Given an input ~u, a run of the system will produce
an output ~o with a certain probability which depends on the input, on the
randomized operations performed by the system and also on the scheduler
ζ resolving nondeterminism. We denote the probability by pζ(~o|~u). Given
a scheduler ζ , the probabilities pζ(~o|~u) constitute a matrix Mζ , which is
called the channel matrix, where the rows are indexed by the elements of
Sec∗ and the columns are indexed by the elements of Obs∗.(See some toy
examples of channel matrices in Example 3.1.6 and 3.1.7.) We present a
formal definition of channel matrix below.
First we define a probability measure on executions. Given an input
~u ∈ Sec∗ and a scheduler ζ , the execution tree A′ = etree(Q,~u, ζ) induces a
probability measure over executions as follows. The basic measurable events
are the cones of finite executions, where the cone of a finite execution α,
denoted by Cα, is the set {α
′ ∈ Exec∗(A′) ∪ Exec(A′)|α ≤ α′}, where ≤ is
the standard prefix preorder on sequences. The probability of a cone Cα,
denoted by pζ(α|~u), is simply the multiplication of the probabilities along
the execution. More precisely, let α = Qinita0Q1a1Q2 · · · anQn and αi be




Now we are ready to give the formal definition of a channel matrix.
Definition 3.1.4 (Channel matrix). Given a process term Q and a sched-
uler ζ, the channel matrix Mζ(Q) is defined as the matrix such that, for
each row ~u ∈ Sec∗ and column ~o ∈ Obs∗, pζ(~o|~u) is the probability of the







3.1.3 Differential Privacy in CCSp with secret labels
In Section 2.6 we have introduced the basic notion of differential privacy.
Here we adapt it to measure the degree of privacy provided by a CCSp
process with secret labels. Let U ⊆ Sec∗, O ⊆ Obs∗.
Definition 3.1.5 (Differential Privacy in CCSp with secret labels). A pro-
cess Q provides ǫ-differential privacy (ǫ-DP) iff for all schedulers ζ, for all
secret inputs ~u1, ~u2 ∈ U such that ~u1 ` ~u2, and for all observable ~o ∈ O,
pζ(~o|~u1) ≤ e
ǫ pζ(~o|~u2)
We use dpζJQK to denote the smallest value ǫ of differential privacy that Q
enjoys under the scheduler ζ. Furthermore we define
dpJQK = supζdpζJQK
In this chapter, we consider a simple model of attacker, in which at-
tacker can only interact with the system through observable labels. In the
above definition, we take the worst case over all schedulers, which is the
typical way of resolving a class of nondeterminism. In the real world, the
nondeterminism can be considered introduced by an adversary interplaying
with the system trying to learn as much information as possible about ~u.
Note that if there are both zero and non-zero probabilities occurring
in the same column of the channel matrix, when the respective secrets are
connected by `, then the process does not provide differential privacy for
any ǫ. We give some simple examples to illustrate the above definition. We
denoted by ∆(Q) the set of all schedulers for a process Q.
Example 3.1.6. Let Sec = {u1, u2}, u1 ` u2 and Obs = {o1, o2, a}, and
consider the following processes: Q1 = o1.0 ⊕0.3 o2.0, Q2 = o1.0 ⊕0.5 o2.0,








The probabilistic automaton of Q′ is shown in the left part of Figure 3.3.
































Figure 3.3: The probabilistic automata of Example 3.1.6 and 3.1.7.








For the process Q, we have ∆(Q) = {ζ1, ζ2, ζ3} with ζi selecting Qi.
For the process Q′ we can define the scheduler ζ ′ which selects ζ1 and






, which gives (ln 3.5)-differential privacy.
Example 3.1.7. Let Sec = {u1, u2}, u1 ` u2 and Obs = {τ, o, o1, o2}, and




The probabilistic automaton of Q′ is shown in the right part of Fig-
ure 3.3. Through the steps similar to the above example, we can find a
scheduler that if the secret is u1, first performs a label in Q1 and then Q2,
if the secret is u2, first selects Q2 and then Q1, thus producing a matrix
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breaking differential privacy, as follows:
o1o o2o oo1 oo2
u1 0.3 0.7 0 0
u2 0 0 0.3 0.7
.
The supremum probability in the definition of DP is actually a maxi-
mum. First we shall define a suitable metric on the set ∆(Q) of schedulers
of a process Q.
Definition 3.1.8. Consider a CCSp process Q, let A be the probabilistic
automaton generated by Q. We define a distance d between schedulers in
∆(Q) as follows:




2−m if m = min{|α| | ~u ∈ U , α ∈ Exec∗(A) and ζ~u(α) 6= ζ
′
~u(α)}
0 if ζ~u(α) = ζ
′
~u(α) for all ~u ∈ U , α ∈ Exec
∗(A)
where |α| represents the length of α.
Note that A is finitely branching, both in the nondeterministic and in
the probabilistic choices. Hence we have the following (standard) result:
Proposition 3.1.9. (∆(Q), d) is a sequentially compact metric space, i.e.,
every sequence has a subsequence that converges to a limit in ∆(Q).
In the following proposition, we show that there exists a scheduler that
gives the maximum probability of DP.






Proof. If there exists a scheduler ζ ∈ ∆(Q) such that for two inputs ~u1 ` ~u2
and an output ~o ∈ O, pζ(~o|~u1) = 0 and pζ(~o|~u2) 6= 0, then trivally dpζJQK =
∞, the scheduler ζ achieves the supremum value of dpJQK.
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Thus in the following, we consider the case where for any scheduler










dpζJQK is a continuous function from (∆(Q), d) to ([0,+∞), d
′), where d′ is
the standard distance on real numbers. By Prop. 3.1.9, (∆(Q), d) is sequen-
tially compact. Consequently, ({dpζJQK | ζ ∈ ∆(Q)}, d
′) is also sequentially
















dpζnj JQK = dplimj ζnj JQK
which concludes the proof.
3.1.4 The Crowds protocol
Here we recall the Crowds protocol in details and then present the for-
mal proof of the fact that continuing forwarding messages after the first
detection gains no more information for attackers.
Crowds is an anonymity protocol which allows users to send messages
without revealing their identity. A crowd is a group of n participants con-
stituted by m honest members and c (= n − m) corrupted members (the
attackers). The destination of messages is named the server. An example
of crowds is shown in Fig. 3.4. The protocol works as follows:
- When a member, called the initiator, wants to send a message to the
server, instead of sending it directly to the server, she randomly selects a
member in the crowd and she forwards the message to this member.
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Figure 3.4: The Crowds protocol
- Every member who receives the message, either
• with probability 1− pf , delivers the message to the server, or
• with probability pf randomly selects another member (possibly her-
self) in the crowd as the new forwarder and relays the message to
this new forwarder to repeat the same procedure again.
In this way, even if the message is caught by an attacker, the attacker
cannot be sure whether the previous forwarder is the initiator or just a
forwarder on behalf of somebody else. Members (including attackers) are
assumed to have only access to messages routed through them, so that they
only know the identities of their immediate predecessors and successors in
the path, and of the destination server. For simplicity we assume that once
an attacker receives a message from an honest member, it will terminate
after reporting the detection. The reason is that by forwarding the message
after the first detection, attackers can not gain more useful information. Its
formal proof is illustrated below in Proposition 3.1.11.
We use H and B to denote the set of honest members and of attackers,
respectively. C = H ∪ B represents the set of identities of all participants
in the crowd. Let C = {1, 2, · · · , n}. We denote by ui where i ∈ H the
event that user i is the initiator, by oj where j ∈ H the event that user j is
detected by some attacker. We denote by okj where k ∈ B, j ∈ H the event
that user j gets detected by the attacker k. Namely, it represents the event
that an honest member j unluckily forwards a message to an attack k. The
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honest member’s identity is exposed to the attack, so this event can also be
considered observable. We denote by NO that there is an attacker in the
path, and OK that the request is successfully sent to the server without
revealing the identity of any user. The probability that user j is detected,
given that user i is the initiator and the request is indeed forwarded to
a corrupted member, is denoted by p(oj|ui,NO). For standard Crowds,







pf i = j
1
n
pf i 6= j
(3.1)
We present below the formal proof of the fact that by forwarding the
message after the first detection, attackers can not gain more useful infor-
mation. More precisely, Crowds in which attackers continue forwarding the
message after detections provides the same level of privacy as Crowds in
which attackers terminate after reporting the first detection.
Proposition 3.1.11. Let Crowds represent a crowd in which the attackers
terminate after the first detection, while FCrowds represent the same crowd
but in which the attackers continue to forward the message after detections.
We have
dpJCrowdsK = dpJFCrowdsK
Proof. In Crowds, only one user’s identity is observed. In FCrowds, a se-
quence of users’ identities is observed. We denote the sequence of detections
by oijα, in which o
i
j represents that user j is the first detected member and
caught by attacker i, α represents the rest of the sequence. We show that in
the channel matrices of Crowds and FCrowds, given two arbitrary initiators








Indeed, since once the first detection oij is observed, the identity of the
initiator u does not add any additional information about the following
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detections α, and the behavior of attacker i does not depend on u, thus α
and u are conditionally independent given oij. We have:




j |u) (by Bayes’ law)
= p(α|oij)p(o
i
j|u) (the conditional independence
between α and u given oij)
















It is easy to see that the channel matrix of FCrowds is a fine and expanded
one of Crowds, but the ratios between the rows are not changed. Hence,
according to the definition of differential privacy (Def. 3.1.5), Crowds and
FCrowds have the same privacy level.
3.1.5 Relation between differential privacy and
anonymity
We will use Crowds as a case study to illustrate our framework for privacy.
The purpose of Crowds is anonymity, i.e. to conceal the initiator’s identity.
We show that there is a close relation between differential privacy and some
existing notions of anonymity.
An anonymity system is a special private system in which the secret
information to be concealed is a set of identities of anonymous users. Con-
sider an anonymity system Q with m anonymous users. Let the set of se-
crets U = {u1, u2, . . . , um}, and the set of observables O = {o1, o2, . . . , om}.
We denote by pζ(oj|ui) the probability of observing user j, given that the
scheduler is ζ and the anonymous initiator is user i. We omit ζ when Q is a
purely probabilistic system, i.e., without non-deterministic behavior. Note




Strong anonymity for purely probabilistic systems was formalized by Chaum
[Cha88] as the property that the observation of user k does not change the
probabilistic knowledge of the culprit’s identity i, i.e. p(ui|ok) = p(ui) for
every k and i. Bhargava and Palamidessi [BP05] extended this notion to
probabilistic and non-deterministic systems, essentially by requiring that
the equation holds under any scheduler, and showed that it is equivalent to
the equality of pζ(ok|ui) = pζ(ok|uj) for every k, i, j and ζ . The next propo-
sition is an immediate consequence of this alternative characterization.




⇒ Under any scheduler ζ , for every k, i and j,
pζ(ok|ui)
pζ(ok|uj)
≤ e0 = 1.
(by Definition 3.1.5)
⇒ Under any scheduler ζ , for every k, i and j, pζ(ok|ui) = pζ(ok|uj).
⇒ Q is strongly anonymous. (by definition in [BP05])
Probable innocence
Probable innocence for purely probabilistic systems was defined in [RR98]
as the property that, to the eyes of an observer, each user is more likely to be
innocent rather than culpable (of having initiated the message). In [CP06]
it was shown that this is equivalent to requiring (m− 1)p(ok|ui) ≥ p(ok|uj)
for all k, i and j, where m is the number of anonymous users. (Note that
in Crowds the number of anonymous users is not the number of all users,




Proposition 3.1.13. A purely probabilistic anonymity system Q has prob-
able innocence if dpJQK ≤ ln(m− 1), where m is the number of anonymous
users.
Proof.
dpJQK ≤ ln(m− 1)
⇒ For all k, i and j,
p(ok|ui)
p(ok|uj)
≤ m− 1. (Def. 3.1.5)
⇒ For all k, i and j, (m− 1)p(ok|uj) ≥ p(ok|ui).
⇒ Q has probable innocence. (Definition in [CP06])
3.2 Modular Reasoning
In this section we investigate the compositional properties of CCSp con-
structs with respect to differential privacy and state the first important
result of the thesis. We start by introducing a notion called safe compo-
nent.
Definition 3.2.1. Consider a process Q, and observables o1, o2, . . . , ok, we
say that (νo1, o2, . . . , ok)Q is a safe component if
(i) Q does not contain any secret label, and
(ii) all the observable labels of Q are included in o1, o2, . . . , ok.
It is easy to see that all observable labels are restricted in a safe com-
ponent, nothing can be observed, thus its privacy level is 0.
We now show that non-deterministic choice, probabilistic choice, the
restriction operator and a restricted form of parallel composition are safe,
in the sense that combining components under these operators does not
compromise the privacy of the system.
Theorem 3.2.2. Let I be a finite (index) set and {Qi}i∈I be a family of










i piQiK ≤ max
i
{ǫi};
(3) dpJ(νo)Q1K ≤ ǫ1 ;
(4) Assume that (νo1, o2, . . . , ok)Q1 is a safe component, that Q1 and Q2
can communicate with each other only via the labels of the set {oh, . . . , ok},
with 1 ≤ h ≤ k, and that dpJ(νo1, . . . , oh−1)Q2)K = ǫ2. Then
dpJ(νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (Q1 |Q2)K ≤ ǫ2
Proof. 1. Let Q =

i oi.Qi. Consider an arbitrary scheduler ζ of Q, by
Rule NDC, ζ resolves the top non-deterministic choice by arbitrarily
choosing a label oj, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , h}. Define a scheduler ζj as ζ except
for the removal of the first state and the first step oj from the execution
fragments in the domain. Obviously, the scheduler ζj is compatible
with process term Qj , namely, ζj is one of Qj ’s schedulers. For every
conditional probability pζ(oj~o|~u) in Mζ(Q), there exists a one to one
corresponding element pζj (~o|~u) in Mζj (Qj), such that
pζ(oj~o|~u) = pζj (~o|~u).
From the level of differential privacy that Qj gives, we derive
dpζJQK = dpζjJQjK ≤ ǫj ≤ maxi
{ǫi}
which concludes the proof in this case.
2. Let Q =
⊕
i piQi. Consider an arbitrary scheduler ζ for Q. After one
subprocess Qi is randomly chosen according to its probability, ζ must
be compatible with one scheduler ζi of this subprocess, resolving all
the nondeterminism in it. It holds that the conditional probability
pζ(~o|~u) in Mζ(Q) and the corresponding one pζi(~o|~u) in each matrix













i pi · pζi(~o|~u)
∑








i pi · p
i(~o|~u′)
(since Mζ(Qi) gives ǫi-d.p.)
≤ emaxi{ǫi}
∑
i pi · pζi(~o|~u
′)
∑
i pi · pζi(~o|~u
′)
= emaxi{ǫi}
which concludes the proof in this case.
3. LetQ = (νo)Q1. By the rule RES,Q is not able to perform the label o.
Its execution tree etree(Q) can be obtained from etree(Q1) by cutting
all transitions labelled by o and removing the whole subtrees following
those
o
−→ transitions. From the point of view of channel matrices,
the columns which have become the same after the aforementioned
removal are collapsed into one and the same column. We show that
this transformation does not increase the level of DP.
Formally, let O′ denote the set of observables of Q. Consider an
arbitrary scheduler ζ ′ of Q. Observe that there exists a scheduler
ζ of Q1, such that, for every conditional probability pζ′(~o
′|~u) (where






where pζ(~o|~u) denotes the conditional probability in Mζ(Q1), and the
function f(~o) cuts the sub-trace following the label o. More precisely,
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~o if the label o does not occur in the
sequence ~o
o1, o2, . . . , oi if the label o first occurs in the sequence
~o at the position i+ 1 with i < k.
(3.2)
It’s easy to get that for all secret inputs ~u1, ~u2 ∈ U such that ~u1 ` ~u2,














which shows that Mζ′(Q) enjoys ǫ1-differential privacy.
4. Let Q = (νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (Q1 |Q2). The proof proceeds by reducing
the execution tree of Q under an arbitrary scheduler ζ to a new one
etree ′(Q, ζ). This new tree enjoys a level of differential privacy which
is at most as safe as the one of the original etree(Q, ζ), while it is
isomorphic to the execution tree of (νo1, . . . , oh−1)Q2 under a certain
scheduler ζ2. We derive,
dpJetree(Q, ζ)K ≤ dpJetree ′(Q, ζ)K = dpJetree((νo1, . . . , oh−1)Q2, ζ2)K ≤ ǫ2
which proves that the process Q enjoys ǫ2-differential privacy.
The reduction from etree(Q, ζ) to etree ′(Q, ζ) is described as follows.
First we give the definitions of Q1’s positions and Q2’s positions. Con-





be the generic process term of lstate(α). From the assumption that
(νo1, o2, . . . , ok)Q1 is a safe component, there are three possible kinds
of transitions performable from the state according to the operational
semantics.











−→ µ. In this case, a must be τ , be-
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cause Q1 does not contain secret labels and all its observ-







1i ∈ supp(µ). Then we have the distribu-















−→ (νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (Q
′
1 |µ) due to
a transition Q′2
a
−→ µ, with a not included in {o1, o2, . . . , ok}.











to the transitions Q′1
a




−→ δ(Q′′2). As as-
sumed in the condition, amust be an observable in {oh, oh+1, . . . , ok}.
We define Q1’s positions (resp. Q2’s positions) as the set of states in
etree(Q, ζ) where ζ chooses a transition of type (a) (resp. a transition
of type (b) or (c)). Recall that the execution α is an arbitrary state
in etree(Q, ζ), the tree etree ′(Q, ζ) is obtained by replacing each Q1’s














By simple induction on the depth of the tree, we obtain that dpJetree(Q, ζ)K
is an increasing function of its subtrees. Then by the previous result
about probabilistic choice, we have
dpJetree(Q, ζ)K ≤ dpJetree ′(Q, ζ)K
Note that after the process Q1’s impact on safety is resolved, all states
left in etree ′(Q, ζ) are Q2’s positions. It is easy to find a corresponding
scheduler ζ2 for the execution tree of (νo1, . . . , oh−1)Q2 such that
- for every b-step in etree ′(Q, ζ), ζ2 chooses the same transition in




−→ µ with a /∈ {o1, o2, . . . , ok},
- for every c-step in etree ′(Q, ζ), ζ2 chooses the same transition in




−→ δ(Q′′2) with a ∈ {oh, oh+1, . . . , ok}.
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Observe now that etree ′(Q, ζ) is isomorphic to etree((νo1, . . . , oh−1)Q2, ζ2),
which concludes the proof in this case.
Properties (1) and (2) point out that the degree of privacy of a sys-
tem, consisting of some subsystems in a non-deterministic or probabilistic
choice, is determined by the subsystem with the lowest degree of privacy.
Properties (3) and (4) intuitively say that, turning an observable label to
be unobservable, or paralleling with a safe component, maintain the level
of privacy.
Unfortunately secret choice and the unrestricted form of parallel compo-
sition do not preserve privacy, essentially due to the presence of nondeter-
minism. The replication operator is like an unrestricted parallel composi-
tion, and therefore it does not preserve privacy either. These are illustrated
by the following counterexamples, some of which are taken from [BCP08].
(In Examples 3.2.3 - 3.2.6, we use the original definition of the adjacency
relation, that is, the difference in only one label.)
Example 3.2.3 (Secret choice does not preserve privacy). Let Sec = {u1, u2}.
Consider the process Q = o1.0

o2.0. Clearly, Q provides 0-differential pri-
vacy, because for every sequence ~u ∈ U we have p(o1|~u) = p(o2|~u). Consider
now a new process Q′ = u1.Q

u2.Q, and the scheduler ζ for Q
′ which se-
lects o1 if the secret is u1, and o2 if the secret is u2. The resulting matrix un-
der ζ does not preserve differential privacy, since p(o1|u1~u) = p(o2|u2~u) = 1
while p(o1|u2~u) = p(o2|u1~u) = 0.
Example 3.2.4 (The need of condition (i) in Def. 3.2.1). Let Sec be as in
Example 3.2.3. Define Q1 = u1.0

u2.0 and Q2 = o1.0

o2.0. Clearly,
Q2 provides 0-differential privacy. Consider now the parallel term Q1 |Q2
and define a scheduler that first executes a secret label u in Q1 and then, if
u is u1, it selects o1, while if u is u2, it selects o2. The rest proceeds like in
Example 3.2.3.
Example 3.2.5 (The need of condition (ii) in Def. 3.2.1). Let Sec be as in
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o2.0). It is easy to see that Q2 provides 0-differential privacy. Consider the
term Q1 |Q2 and define a scheduler that first executes a secret label u in Q2
and then, if u is u1, it selects first Q1 and then the continuation of Q2, while
if u is u2, it selects first the continuation of Q2 and then Q1. Hence, under
this scheduler, for every sequence ~u ∈ U , p(oo1|u1~u) = p(oo2|u1~u) = 0.5 and
also p(o1o|u2~u) = p(o2o|u2~u) = 0.5 while p(oo1|u2~u) = p(oo2|u2~u) = 0 and
p(o1o|u1~u) = p(o2o|u1~u) = 0. Therefore u1 and u2 are disclosed.
Intuitively, the existence of free observables (i.e. o of Q1 in this example)
may create different interleavings, which can be used by the scheduler to
mark different secrets.
Example 3.2.6 (Replication operator does not preserve privacy.). Let Sec
be as in Example 3.2.3. Define Q1 = u1.0






τ.Q2. Clearly, Q provides 0-differential privacy, because of
the fact that both Q1 and Q2 are 0-differentially private and the composi-
tionality property for non-deterministic choice in Theorem 3.2.2. Consider
the replication !Q and a scheduler that generates two copies Q |Q | !Q. For
the first copy the scheduler selects Q1, while for the second copy it selects
Q2. We have Q1 |Q2 which is already shown in Example 3.2.4 not preserve
differential privacy.
3.3 Trust and Legitimacy in Crowds
The compositionality property helps us to learn approximately a complex
system from its sub-components or from its simplified evolutions. In this
section, we extend the Crowds protocol with trust and legitimacy. More
precisely, we consider
• Member-wise trusted forwarders : The member currently holding the
message selects a forwarder only among the members which she thinks
are trustable.
• Legitimate initiators : A member has the right to initiate requests only
when she has been accepted as a “first-class citizen”.
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First we show, through some examples, that the trust network can in-
fluence dramatically the anonymity of a crowd. We argue that, due to this
sensitivity to the local structure, it is difficult to reason globally about the
network. Then we present that our compositional method, in contrast, does
not rely on the symmetry condition, and provide an anonymity-preservation
property. It expresses that the privacy of a crowd is bounded by the value of
privacy of a simplified crowd, obtained by considering non-legitimate agents
as attackers and therefore ignoring all the trust links starting from them. In
particular, we formalize the trust and legitimacy extended Crowds in CCSp
code and we apply Theorem 3.2.2(4) to prove the anonymity-preservation
property.
3.3.1 Examples
We show an example of a network in which changing a single trust link
has a positive effect in the sense that it improves the level of anonymity,
and another example in which such change has the opposite effect. We
also explain how a channel matrix is affected when a member becomes non-
legitimate. We show that the channel matrix in this case can be gotten for
free, namely, obtained by just removing the row where this member is the
initiator, without redoing any computations.
Consider an instance of a crowd where there are 4 members (n = 4). One
of these members is an attacker (c = 1), and the others are honest (m = 3).
For standard Crowds, it is easy to compute the level of differential privacy

























for i 6= j
The channel matrix is shown in Fig. 3.5, where the value q = p(NO).
The degree of differential privacy is ǫ1 = ln 3.
We now consider the extension with trust information. We use arrows
to indicate that the user at the starting point of an arrow trusts the one at
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Figure 3.6: Two trust networks.
the end point. The square, the black circle and the white circles represent
the server, the attacker and the honest members, respectively. Standard
Crowds is a directed clique in the sense that from each node there are
arrows pointing to all the other nodes, and also to itself. The two networks
shown in Fig. 3.6 are obtained from standard Crowds by removing exactly
one trust link. We denote by Crowd(a) and Crowd(b) the crowds in which
the removed links are from user 1 to an honest member (i.e. 1 → 2) and
from user 1 to an attacker (i.e. 1 → Attacker), respectively. Dashed lines
are the removed links.
In order to compute the channel matrices, we use the reachability anal-
ysis approach [APvRS10], which consists in solving a system of linear
equations derived from the graph. Take the columns p(o1|u1), p(o1|u2) and
p(o1|u3) in Crowd(a) as an example. We have the following equations, in
which p(o1|fi) represents the probability of observing member 1, given that
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Figure 3.7: The corresponding channel matrices.






























p(o1|f1) = pf p(o1|u1)
p(o1|f2) = pf p(o1|u2)
p(o1|f3) = pf p(o1|u3)
By solving the system we obtain the channel matrix shown in Fig. 3.7(a),
which is differentially private with ǫ2 = ln 10. The channel matrix for
Crowd(b), shown in Fig. 3.7(b), can be computed analogously. The corre-




Fig. 3.7(a) shows that after the link 1 → 2 is discarded, the anonymity
of user 2 is compromised dramatically. Fig. 3.7(b) shows that, on the other
hand, if we discard a link to an attacker (1 → Attacker), the anonymity of
the whole crowd gets improved. We see that changing one single trust link
can have a huge impact on the level of privacy, in both directions.
The following example says that the channel matrix for non-legitimate
members can be obtained by removing the rows in which non-legitimate
members are initiators, rather than re-computing the system of linear equa-
tions.
Example 3.3.1. Consider the two trust networks in Fig. 3.6. Assume
that user 1 is a non-legitimate member. She is not allowed to initiate the
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Figure 3.8: When user 1 is non-legitimate in Crowd(a) and (b).
message. When we solve the system of linear equations derived from the
graph, the equations for computing the probabilities p(oi|u1) (i ∈ {1, 2, 3})
are removed, and this removal does not affect the values of the remaining
probabilities. (For example, the removal of the equation of p(o1|u1) does not
change the values of p(o1|u2), p(o1|u3) and p(o1|fi) (i ∈ {1, 2, 3})). Hence
the channel matrix when user 1 is a non-legitimate member is obtained by
simply removing the row of u1 from the previous channel matrix. After
the removal of the rows of u1, the channel matrices in Fig. 3.7 become the








Vice versa, when user 1 enjoys legitimacy again, we just add back the
row of u1 to the channel matrix, in which p(oi|u1) = p(oi|f1)/pf .
3.3.2 The CCSp code for the extended Crowds
protocol
The extended Crowds protocol with member-wise trusted forwarders and
legitimacy information expressed in CCSp is stated in Fig. 3.9. For simplic-





Output ā〈i〉 = āi
We use
⊕Uto represent a uniform distribution. Label ui represents that the
initiator is user i. Label āj〈i〉 describes that member i forwards the message
to member j. Label OK means that the request of initiator is successfully
sent to the server, while label oij represents that the attacker i detects a
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Crowds(H,B) = (νd)(νa1, a2, . . . , an)Members(H,B)
Figure 3.9: A variant of Crowds with trust and legitimacy information.
message from the honest member j. We denote by Ti the subset of crowd
members which the i-th honest member trusts, Hl the set of legitimate
honest members. Clearly, Hl ⊆ H . The set of secret labels is { ui | i ∈ Hl}
and the set of observable labels is {OK } ∪ { oij | i ∈ B, j ∈ H }.
Term Initiator first generates an initiator as per the uniform distribution
over all members in the crowd, and then sends the request to a forwarder
chosen as well according to the uniform distribution over all members in the
crowd. We refer to Section 3.1.4 for the meaning of the term Honesti and
the term Attackeri. The two parameters H and B in Members(H,B) and
Crowds(H,B) specify respectively the set of honest members and of attack-
ers in the crowd. Our extension lies in that an initiator is probabilistically
chosen from Hl rather than H , and a next forwarder is probabilistically
chosen from Ti rather than C.
3.3.3 An anonymity-preservation property
Consider a crowd with n + 1 members. Assume that the agent n + 1 just
joined the crowd but she does not enjoy the legitimacy to be an initiator
right away, namely, she is non-legitimate. Applying our compositionality
theory, we show that the privacy of this crowd is bounded by the value of
privacy of a simplified crowd, which is obtained by considering the non-
legitimate agent n + 1 as an attacker and therefore ignoring all the trust
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Members(H ∪ {n+ 1}, B) = Members(H,B) |Honestn+1
Crowds(H ∪ {n+ 1}, B) = (νd)(νa1, a2, . . . , an+1)Members(H ∪ {n+ 1}, B)
Figure 3.10: Specification of the addition of a honest agent n+ 1.
links starting from her. The fact is supported by Theorem 3.3.2. Note that
its proof does not rely on the symmetry conditions.
The process term representing the addition of honest agent n+1 to the
crowd of n participants, Crowds(H ∪ {n+ 1}, B), is presented in Fig.3.10.
Basically, it is a parallel composition of the process term Members(H,B) of
the old crowd and the process term Honestn+1 of agent n + 1. We denote
the simplified crowd by the process term Crowds(H,B ∪ {n+ 1}), which
is constructed in a similar way to Crowds(H ∪ {n+ 1}, B): instead of be-
ing paralleled with Honestn+1, the term Members(H,B) is paralleled with
Attackern+1. We omit its code for simplicity.
Theorem 3.3.2. dpJCrowds(H∪{n+ 1}, B)K ≤ dpJCrowds(H,B∪{n + 1})K,
where the user n + 1 is non-legitimate.
Proof. Consider the term Crowds(H∪{n+ 1}, B). Remove the term Honestn+1
and the corresponding restrictions on the labels of Honestn+1. Let Q be
the process term obtained in this way. Note that the free labels through
which the old crowd communicates with agent n + 1 are {d} ∪ {aj|j ∈
Tn+1} ∪ {ān+1〈i〉|i ∈ Sn+1}, where Sn+1 is the subset of crowd members
who trust the agent n+ 1. The labels ān+1〈i〉 are now observable and give
the same information as if the agent n + 1 were an attacker. Because they
reveal the identity of member i who is sending the message. Furthermore,
the labels aj give the same information as if the agent n+1 were an attacker
continuing to forward the message. Because they activate the process term
of user j and the protocol proceeds. The channel matrix we obtain from
Q is isomorphic to the channel matrix of FCrowds(H,B ∪ {n+ 1}): the
only difference is that each column on+1i is now renamed to ān+1〈i〉. Thus
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Figure 3.12: The corresponding channel matrix.
dpJQK = dpJFCrowds(H,B ∪ {n+ 1})K. By Proposition 3.1.11, we have
dpJQK = dpJCrowds(H,B ∪ {n+ 1})K.
Now we add back the term Honestn+1. Since, user n+ 1 will not be
chosen as an initiator (because she is not legitimate), the secret label an+1
will not be used. Furthermore Honestn+1 does not contain any other secret
labels. Therefore,
(νd)(νa1, a2, . . . , an+1)Honestn+1
is a safe component. By Theorem 3.2.2(4), we have:
dpJCrowds(H ∪ {n + 1}, B)K ≤ dpJQK = dpJCrowds(H,B ∪ {n+ 1})K
which concludes the proof.
The following example shows that the above theorem indeed gives a
privacy bound for the two crowds as shown in Fig. 3.6.
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Example 3.3.3 (Crowd(a) and (b) in Fig. 3.6 revisited). Recall the two
trust networks in Fig. 3.6. Assume that user 1 is a non-legitimate member.
In this case, the privacy levels of Crowd(a) and (b) have already been shown
in Fig. 3.8, with ǫ′2 = ln
40
11
and ǫ′3 = ln
8
3
, respectively. By considering user
1 as an attacker and removing all the trust links starting from her, we get
a simplified trust network shown in Fig. 3.11 and its corresponding channel
matrix with privacy level ǫs = ln 4 in Fig. 3.12. (The simplified crowd
obtained from Crowd(a) is the same as the simplified one from Crowd(b).)
By applying Theorem 3.3.2, we know that given that user 1 is a non-
legitimate member, ǫs is an upper bound for the privacy levels of Crowd(a)
and (b), as it is also exemplified by the fact that ǫ′2 ≤ ǫs and ǫ
′
3 ≤ ǫs.
3.4 Degradation of privacy by trust
In this section, we first show through a small example that in the presence of
trust information, the anonymity of crowd members may get harmed badly.
In these cases the leak of information is brought in by the trust information
rather than the fault of the Crowds protocol. Thus we introduce a notion
of trustworthy adjacency relation to rule out this factor, thus retrieving a
measure of real privacy. Furthermore, we show how this notion can help to
indicate the cases in which the overestimation in Theorem 3.3.2 is a false
negative, namely, the privacy of a crowd may be very well protected while
the estimation says that the crowd breaks the privacy entirely.
3.4.1 An adjacency relation based on trust
The following example shows that privacy is broken in Crowds due to the
trust information.
Example 3.4.1. Consider the crowd shown in Figure 3.13. It consists of
four honest members 1, 2, 3, 4 and two attackers 5 and 6. Since no trust link
points from users 1 and 2 to users 3 and 4, when user 1 and user 2 are the
initiators, the probabilities of detecting user 3 and user 4 are zero. Thus we
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3 41 2
5 6
Figure 3.13: A crowd of which privacy is broken due to trust.
but p(o63|u3) 6= 0 and p(o
6
3|u4) 6= 0, which breaks the privacy. Analogously,
this problem exists also in the column of o64.
Note that, users 1 and 2 are reachable from each other, but they both
can not reach users 3 and 4. Rather than assuming that the identity of
each user is adjacent to any other, we would like to take into account the
trust information, and consider users 1 and 2 as a pair of close secret
identities, i.e., adjacent, but users 1 and 3 as a pair of far identities, i.e.,
not adjacent, and using this fine notion of adjacency relation to measure
the value of differential privacy.
Now we formalize the notion of adjacency relation illustrated in the
above examples. Intuitively, we consider as adjacent two users who can
reach a same set of members that are directly exposed to attackers. We need
to introduce some notations first. We denote by R(i) the set of identities
of crowd members that can be reached by user i. In Fig. 3.13, we have
R(1) = R(2) = {1, 2, 5} and R(3) = R(4) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. We denote
by Si the subset of identities of crowd members who trust user i, i.e. the
members who can reach user i in one step. We have S5 = {1, 2}, user 3
cannot reach directly the attacker 5, and S6 = {3, 4}. Let W = ∪k∈BSk,
it represents the set of honest members that are exposed to attackers, thus
forms the observable detections. We have W = S5 ∪ S6 = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Definition 3.4.2 (Trustworthy adjacency). Given a crowd with trust infor-
mation, two honest members i, j are trustworthily adjacent to each other,
iff R(i) ∩W = R(j) ∩W .
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Proposition 3.4.3. If in a crowd users i and j are not trustworthily ad-
jacent, then under the adjacency relation defined in terms of a clique, the
crowd does not preserve differential privacy.
Proof. Since R(i) ∩ W 6= R(j) ∩ W , there must exist at least a honest
member l and an attacker k, such that l ∈ Sk, l ∈ R(i) but l /∈ R(j).
When user i initiates the request, the message has a probability of being
forwarded to member l, probably resulting in member l being detected by
attacker k. It is easy to see that in the channel matrix, we have p(okl |ui) 6= 0
but p(okl |uj) = 0. Straightforwardly, the crowd does not provide differential
privacy.
From the above proposition, we see clearly the case in which the privacy
is broken due to the comparison of conditional probabilities between two
users that are not trustworthily adjacent. Therefore, for Crowds with trust
information, we propose using the trustworthy adjacency relation, rather
than the generic adjacency relation for anonymity as previously defined in
terms of a clique (cf. Example 2.6.2), to measure the value of differential
privacy, thus eliminating the factor of the connectivity induced by the trust
links.
3.4.2 False negatives in Theorem 3.3.2
Theorem 3.3.2 offers an upper bound for a crowd containing trust and
legitimacy information, by considering the case in which non-legitimate
members are treated as attackers. It may give an infinity upper bound. As
shown in the next example, the estimation in this case is a false negative,
namely, the privacy of a crowd is actually a bounded value rather than
infinity.
Example 3.4.4. Consider the crowd (a) in Figure 3.14, in which there are
two honest members 1, 2, one non-legitimate member 3 and one attacker.
Observing the trust information, we know that when either user 1 or user
2 is detected by the attacker, both member 1 and member 2 could be the
initiator. There does not exist the case in which both zero and non-zero
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Figure 3.14: A crowd before and after the simplification.
probabilities occur in the same column of the channel matrix. Thus we will
get a finite value of differential privacy for this crowd.
While applying the transformation method of Theorem 3.3.2, considering
user 3 as an attacker and ignoring the links starting from her, we get a
simplified crowd as shown in (b). Now users 1 and 2 are isolated from
each other. When an attacker gets the message from user 1 (resp. 2), she
will know for sure that user 1 (resp. 2) is the initiator. Thus the privacy is
completely revealed, and the resulting estimation announces a false negative.
Now we show how to find the cases in which the estimation given in
Theorem 3.3.2 is a false negative. The following proposition says that if
the transformation of Theorem 3.3.2 makes two honest users, which used to
be trustworthily adjacent, afterward not trustworthily adjacent, then the
estimation will be an infinity value.
Proposition 3.4.5. For Theorem 3.3.2, if two honest users i and j, (i, j 6=
n+1) are trustworthily adjacent in Crowds(H∪{n + 1}, B), while not trust-
worthily adjacent in Crowds(H,B ∪{n + 1}), then Crowds(H,B ∪{n + 1})
does not satisfy differential privacy.
It is easily obtained from a similar analysis to Proposition 3.4.3.
Let us revisit Example 3.4.4. Before applying the transformation, users
1 and 2 are reachable from each other through the connection links offerred
by member 3, however this is not the case any more after applying the
transformation. Because the transformation changes the adjacency relation
between users 1 and 2. By the above proposition, we know that when
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applying Theorem 3.3.2 in this case, we will get the answer that the privacy
is not preserved in this crowd.
3.5 Users’ preference levels in Crowds
In [HPSE10], the authors notice that in the context of Crowds, the message
forwarded in the network reveals also the identity of the end sever. This
additional observation may leak additional information about the initiator
of the transaction when users’ habits of Web browsing is not uniform, which
is usually the case in the real world. In this section we analyze the impact
of these additional observables on the security of a protocol in the context
of differential privacy.
In [HPSE10] the authors express this additional information about the
end server in terms of a random variable E , whose values e1, . . . , el are
assumed to be observable, and the conditional probabilities p(ek|ui), that
is, the correlation between these additional observables and the legitimate
initiators, is publicly known. Here the conditional probability p(ek|ui) ex-
presses the probability that the user i visits the server k when she initiates
a transaction. In other words, the probabilities p(ek|ui) define a channel
matrix modeling the users’ profiles of Web browsing.
In [HPSE10], it is shown that in the context of normal Crowds, the
observables O and the additional observables E are independent for every
initiator. Here again we shall assume this conditional independency, though
the choice of a forwarder may depend on the trust links (e.g. exit policies
of Tor network relays)2. We show that in the context of differential privacy,
the knowledge of users’ habits reduces the privacy of the protocol by a
factor that is less than or equals to the privacy level of the channel matrix
p(ek|ui) modeling the users’ profiles of Web browsing. Formally, let dpJCOK,
dpJCEK, and dpJCO,EK denote respectively the privacy levels of the protocol
as expressed in the previous sections, and the channel p(ek|ui) model the
users’ profiles of Web browsing. The protocol where both observables are
2We leave this general case for future work.
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Figure 3.15: Impact of the knowledge of users’ profiles on privacy in Crowds.
considered is modeled by the channel p(oj, ek|ui). Then the following holds.
This is actually a particular case of a well known property of differential
privacy [McS09], but the formulation is a bit different, so we detail the proof
here.
Theorem 3.5.1. dpJCO,EK ≤ dpJCOK + dpJCEK.
Proof. Let ǫex = dpJCO,EK, ǫ = dpJCOK and ǫ









































Hence by taking the max, we have eǫex ≤ eǫ · eǫ
′
which concludes the proof.
Example 3.5.2 (Crowds with users’ preference for servers). Here we illus-
trate the impact of the users’ preference levels on the security of the crowd
in the setting of differential privacy (cf. Theorem 3.5.1).
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Consider an instance of a crowd where there are two destination servers
e1, e2, and three honest members u1, u2, u3. Assume also that users’ prefer-





q1 u ∈ {u1, u2}, e = e1
1− q1 u ∈ {u1, u2}, e = e2
1− q2 u = u3, e = e1
q2 u = u3, e = e2
where 0.5 ≤ q1, q2 ≤ 1. In other words, users 1 and 2 communicate
more often with server 1. Similarly user 3 prefers server 2. In this set-










Figure 3.15 shows the impact factor dpJCEK when the users’ preferences
for servers vary from 0.5 to 1. It clearly shows that when both q1 and q2 are
equal to 0.5, that is, when both servers are equally preferred by every user,
the impact is null. However, as soon as some users’ preference starts biasing
towards one server, their privacy also starts deteriorating. A preference
strongly biased towards one server will definitely break the privacy, as it is
strong enough to distinguish the users preferring it from the others.
3.6 Related work
- Compositionality properties of probabilistic process calculi for security pro-
tocols. In [DPW06] Deng et al. use the notion of relative entropy to mea-
sure privacy. In [BCP08, CPB] Braun et al. consider the safety measured
by Bayes risk. The compositionality results in this chapter are closely
related to those of [BCP08, CPB], although we use a different measure of
protection (differential privacy).
- Compositionality of Differential Privacy. As already stated, there is a
vast body of work on formal methods for differential privacy. Composi-
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tional methods, as one of the most important features, have been inten-
sively investigated in the field of statistical databases [McS09] and pro-
grams [BKOB12, RP10]. These works investigate the so-called sequential
and parallel compositions of queries (programs), which, in their context,
mean a sequence of queries (programs) applied to the same dataset and to
disjoint parts of the dataset, respectively. Under this setting, they have
proved that the sequential composition decreases the privacy, and the
parallel composition maintains the privacy. Our result about the replica-
tion and the parallel composition in CCSp are reminiscent of the above
results. But the context is different. In particular, the parallel compo-
sition concerned in this chapter is different from the above one, in that
the parallel operator here represents interactions of concurrent agents.
Our restrictions on the parallel composition are incomparable with those
of [McS09, BKOB12, RP10] (disjointness of databases).
- Other extensions on Crowds. In [HPSE10] the authors study the impact of
additional information attackers gather before attacking the protocol. In
[SEH10] Sassone et al. extend Crowds by considering a trust distribution
over participants which is not uniform but the same from all members’
points of view, and therefore can still be thought of as the symmetry
condition. In [SHY10] they consider a more realistic and complicated
scenario in which the forwarding policies are neither uniform nor the
same for every member, however no general privacy-preserving property
is given under this scenario. By checking the proof of Theroem 3.3.2 in
this chapter, it holds regardless of whether the forwarding distributions
are uniform or not.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have defined the degree of differential privacy for concur-
rent systems expressed in a probabilistic process calculus, and investigated
how the privacy is affected under composition of the CCSp constructs. We
have shown a proof for the fact that in Crowds, stopping or continuing
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forwarding the message after the first detection is the same from the point
of view of differential privacy. After pointing out the close relation be-
tween privacy and anonymity, we have applied our compositionality result
to prove an anonymity-preservation property of an extended Crowds pro-
tocol with legitimate initiators and member-wise trusted forwarders. We
have considered also the case in which some leak of privacy is induced by
the trust information, and we have introduced the notion of trustworthy
adjacency relation to exclude this factor. Finally, we have shown that the
impact of users’ preference levels studied in [HPSE10] can be expressed as
a degradation factor that depends only on the privacy level of the channel
modeling the source of the additional observation.
One immediate task is how to compute or verify the levels of privacy of
processes, thus combining our compositional method to obtain the level of
privacy of a compound program. In the next chapter of the thesis, we will
address this issue by developing a quantitative bisimulation-based verifica-
tion approach that can track global privacy leakage from local information.
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Bisimulations for Differential Privacy
In this chapter we deal with the problem of verifying differential privacy
properties for concurrent systems, modeled as probabilistic automata ad-
mitting both nondeterministic and probabilistic behavior. In such sys-
tems, reasoning about the probabilities requires solving the nondetermin-
ism first, and to such purpose the usual technique is to consider func-
tions, called schedulers, which select the next step based on the history
of the computation. However, in our context, as well as in security in
general, we need to restrict the power of the schedulers and make them
unable to distinguish between secrets in the histories, or otherwise they
would plainly reveal them by their choice of the step. See for instance
[CCK+06, CNP09, CP10, APSVR11] for a discussion on this issue. Thus
we consider a restricted class of schedulers, called admissible schedulers,
following the definition of [APSVR11]. Admissibility is introduced to deal
with bisimulation-like notions in security contexts: Two bisimilar processes
are typically considered to be indistinguishable, yet an unrestricted sched-
uler could trivially separate them.
The property of differential privacy requires that the observations gen-
erated by two different secret values be probabilistically similar. In stan-
dard concurrent systems the notion of similarity is usually formalized as an
equivalence, preferably preserved under composition, i.e., a congruence. We
mention in particular trace equivalence and bisimulation. The first is often
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used for its simplicity, but in general is not compositional [JS90]. The sec-
ond one is a congruence and it is appealing for its proof technique. Process
equivalences have been extensively used to formalize security properties like
secrecy [AG99] and noninterference [FG00, RS01, Smi03].
In this chapter we focus on approximate bisimulations suitable for ver-
ifying differential privacy. Namely, bisimulations for which the degree of
similarity between two processes determines an upper bound on the ratio
of the probabilities of the respective observables. We start by considering
the framework proposed by Tschantz et al. [TKD11], which was explicitly
designed for the purpose of verifying differential privacy. Their verification
technique is based on proving the existence of an indexed family of bijec-
tions between states. The parameter of the starting states, representing the
privacy budget, determines the level of differential privacy of the system,
which decreases over time by subtracting the absolute difference of prob-
abilities in each step during mutual simulation. Once the balance reaches
zero, processes must behave exactly the same. We reformulate this notion
in the context of probabilistic automata, showing its metrical properties.
The above technique is sound, but has a rather rigid budget manage-
ment. The goal of this chapter is to make the technique more permissive
by identifying an approximate bisimulation that is more relaxed and still
implies an upper bound on the privacy leakage.
In particular, the bisimulation we propose is based on a thriftier use of
the privacy budget, which is inspired by the notion of amortisation used
in [KAK05, dFERVGR07]. We name it ǫ-amortised probabilistic bisimula-
tion, where ǫ depicts the degree of similarity between processes. The idea is
that, when updating the variation of privacy leakage, the differences among
the probabilities of related states are kept with their sign, and added with
their sign through each step. In this way, successive differences can com-
pensate (amortise) each other, and rather than always being consumed, the
privacy budget may also be refurbished. In [KAK05] the idea of amorti-
sation is applied on a set of cost-based actions. The quantitative feature
considered here is discrete probability distributions over states, which is
shown to benefit from the theory of amortisation as well.
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Furthermore, the bijection condition in [TKD11] is admitted to be too
strict, as, for instance, the resulting relation is not substitutive under pro-
cess combinators; its 0-indexed states fail to fully characterize the standard
probabilistic bisimilarity; and the weak transitions built on it are not tran-
sitive. In our work, the bijection requirement is removed, to allow the split
of probabilities when relations between processes are lifted to distributions
over processes, so that these undesirable consequences are avoided.
In particular, we prove that our amortised bisimulation is substitutive
under several process combinators including parallel composition. We show
that the 0-indexed states in the our notion fully characterise bisimilarity.
For the weak transitions built on it, we will show in the next chapter that
they are transitive.
Finally, we illustrate the verification technique of differential privacy us-
ing the example of the Dining Cryptographers Problem (DCP) with biased
coins.
Contribution. The main contributions of this chapter can be summa-
rized as follows:
- We reformulate the notion of approximate similarity proposed in [TKD11]
in the context of probabilistic automata and we study its metrical prop-
erties (in Section 4.2).
- We propose the ǫ-amortised bisimulation which is more liberal than the
former one, in such a way that the total differences of probabilities get
amortised during the mutual simulation, and the split of probabilities is
allowed in the lifting operation. We show that the level of differential
privacy is continuous with respect to the ǫ-amortised bisimulation, which
says that if every two processes running on two adjacent secrets of a sys-
tem are close in the bisimulation then the system is differentially private,
making our notion suitable for verification (in Section 4.3).




- We present that our amortised bisimulation is substitutive under typical
CCSp operators (in Section 4.5).
- We use the verification framework to show that the Dining Cryptogra-
phers protocol with probability-p biased coins is | ln p
1−p
|-differentially pri-
vate. (in Section 4.6).
In the next section we introduce some preliminary notions that shall




We consider a restricted class of schedulers, called admissible schedulers,
following the definition of [APSVR11]. Essentially this definition requires
that whenever given two adjacent states s, s′, namely, differing only for the
choice for some secret value, then the choice made by the scheduler on s
and s′ should be consistent, i.e. the scheduler should not be able to make a
different choice on the basis of the secret. Note that in [TKD11] scheduling
is not an issue since non-determinism is not allowed.
More precisely, in [APSVR11] admissibility is achieved by introducing
tags for transitions. Admissible schedulers are viewed as entities that have
access to a system through a screen with buttons, where each button rep-
resents one (current) available option, i.e. an enabled tag. A scheduler ζ is
admissible if for all finite executions having the same sequence of screens,
ζ decides the same tagged transition for them.
More formally, given a PA A, we define an operation t : Exec∗(A) → A∗
on executions that maps an execution to its labels.
Definition 4.1.1. Let α = s0a0s1a1 · · · ansn+1 be a finite execution of a PA
A, then we define t as:
t(α) = a0a1 · · ·an.
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Define another operation l : D → A, where D is the transition relation,
as for s
a
−→ µ ∈ D, l(s
a
−→ µ) = a, then we are ready to give the definition
of admissible schedulers as follows.
Definition 4.1.2 (Admissible Schedulers). A scheduler ζ is admissible if
for all executions α, α′ ∈ Exec(A)
t(α) = t(α′) implies l(ζ(α)) = l(ζ(α′)).
In notation, Aζ the fully probabilistic automaton (defined in Section 2.2)
obtained from A where all the non-determinism is resolved by ζ . Given a
trace ~t and an execution α, we add a script ζ and use Prζ [α ⊲ C~t ] to
denote the probability of a cone C~t induced by α, given the scheduler ζ .
Eq. 2.1 can be easily rephrased as follows:




1 if ~t = [ ],
0 if ~t = aa~t′ and act(ζ(α)) 6= a,
∑
si
µ(si)Prζ [αasi ⊲ C~t′]




4.1.2 Differential privacy under admissible scheduler
We have introduced the notion of differential privacy [Dwo06] in Section 2.6.
It was originally defined in the context of statistical databases, by requir-
ing that a mechanism (i.e. a probabilistic query) gives similar answers on
adjacent databases, that is those differing on a single row.
In this chapter, we study concurrent systems taking a secret as input
and producing an observable trace as output. Let U be a set of secrets
and ` an adjacency relation on U , where u ` u′ denotes the fact that two
close secrets u, u′ should not be easily distinguished by the adversary after
seeing observable traces. A concurrent system A is a mapping of secrets
to probabilistic automata, where A(u), u ∈ U is the automaton modelling
the behavior of the system when running on u. Differential privacy can be
directly adapted to this context:
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Definition 4.1.3 (Differential Privacy under admissible scheduler). A con-
current system A satisfies ǫ-differential privacy (DP) iff for any u ` u′, any
finite trace ~t and any admissible scheduler ζ:
Prζ [A(u) ⊲ C~t ] ≤ e
ǫ · Prζ [A(u
′) ⊲ C~t ]
4.2 The accumulative bisimulation
In this section, we present a probabilistic bisimulation, accumulative bisimu-
lation, based on a reformulation of the relation family proposed by Tschantz
et al. in [TKD11] and exhibit its metrical properties.
We start by defining an approximate lifting operation that lifts a relation
over states to a relation over distributions. Intuitively, we use a parameter
ǫ to represent the total privacy leakage budget. A parameter c ranging over
[0, ǫ], starting from 0, records the current amount of leakage and increas-
ing over time by adding the maximum absolute difference of probabilities,
denoted by σ, in each step during mutual simulation. Once c reaches the
budget bound ǫ, processes must behave exactly the same. Since the total
bound is ǫ, only a total of ǫ privacy can be leaked, a fact that will be used
later to verify differential privacy. We use T (short for Tschantz et al.) to
simply differentiate notions of this section from the following sections.
Definition 4.2.1. Let ǫ > 0, c ∈ [0, ǫ], R ⊆ S × S × [0, ǫ]. The T-lifting
of R up to c, denoted by LT (R, c), is the relation on Disc(S) defined as:
µLT (R, c)µ′ iff ∃ bijection β : supp(µ) → supp(µ′) such that






This lifting allows us to define an approximate bisimulation relation:
Definition 4.2.2 (Accumulative bisimulation). A relation R ⊆ S×S×[0, ǫ]
is an ǫ-accumulative bisimulation if for all (s, t, c) ∈ R:
1. s
a
−→ µ implies t
a
−→ µ′ and µLT (R, c)µ′
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2. t
a
−→ µ′ implies s
a
−→ µ and µLT (R, c)µ′
We denote by s ≺
(ǫ,c)
T t, where c ∈ [0, ǫ], if there exists an ǫ-accumulative
bisimulation R such that (s, t, c) ∈ R.
The following proposition lists the metrical properties of ǫ-accumulative
bisimulation.






T s2 iff s2 ≺
(ǫ,c)
T s1;




T s3 then s1 ≺
(ǫ1+ǫ2,c1+c2)
T s3.
Proof. 1. For reflexivity, it is enough to show that the identity relation
over the set S of states, that is the relation IdS = {(s, s, 0)|s ∈ S}, is
an 0-accumulative bisimulation. This is easy.
2. For symmetry, assume that (s1, s2, c) is in an ǫ-accumulative bisim-






2, c) ∈ R} is an





1, c) ∈ R
′, if s′2
a
−→ µ2, we must show that there exists a




−→ µ1 and µ2L




2, c) ∈ R,




−→ µ1 and µ1L
T (R, c)µ2.
According to the definition of T -lifting, there exist a bijection β :
supp(µ1) −→ supp(µ2), such that for all s
′′
1 in supp(µ1), there exists








2, c + σ) ∈ R where
σ = maxs′′1∈supp(µ1) | ln
µ1(s′′1 )
µ2(s′′2 )
|. Consider the inverse of the bijection β





















1, c+ σ) ∈ R
′ and µ2L
T (R′, c)µ1 holds.
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3. For transitivity, assume that (s1, s2, c1) is in an ǫ1-accumulative bisim-
ulation R1 ⊆ S×S× [0, ǫ1], (s2, s3, c2) is in an ǫ2-accumulative bisim-
ulation R2 ⊆ S × S × [0, ǫ2]. It suffices to show that their relational













3, c2) ∈ R2 ∧ c ≤ c1 + c2}
is an ǫ1 + ǫ2-accumulative bisimulation.
For (s′1, s
′




−→ µ1, we must show that there exists a




−→ µ3 and µ1L
T (R1R2, c)µ3. Since there exist








3, c2) ∈ R2 and c ≤ c1+c2,
there exist also a transition s′2
a
−→ µ2 and µ1L
T (R1, c1)µ2, and hence
a transition s′3
a
−→ µ3 and µ2L
T (R2, c2)µ3. By the definition of T -
lifting, there exists a bijection β1 : supp(µ1) −→ supp(µ2), s.t. for all
s′′1 in supp(µ1), there exists s
′′















There exists also a bijection β2 : supp(µ2) −→ supp(µ3), s.t. for all
s′′2 in supp(µ2), there exists s
′′

















Consider the composition β1β2 satisfying β1β2 : supp(µ1) −→ supp(µ3),
s.t. for all s′′1 in supp(µ1), there exists s
′′






















∣∣ ln µ1(s′′1 )
µ2(s′′2 )
∣∣ +




∣∣ ln µ1(s′′1 )
µ2(s′′2 )
∣∣+maxs′′2∈supp(µ1)
∣∣ ln µ2(s′′2 )
µ3(s′′3 )
∣∣
= σ1 + σ2
by c ≤ c1 + c2 hence c+ σ
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and it holds that µ1L
T (R1R2, c)µ3.
Verification of differential privacy using accumulative bisimula-
tion. As shown in [TKD11], the closeness of processes in an indexed fam-
ily implies a level of differential privacy. We here restate this result in terms
of accumulative bisimulation.
Lemma 4.2.4. Given a PA A, let R be an ǫ-accumulative bisimulation,
c ∈ [0, ǫ], let ζ be an admissible scheduler, ~t be a finite trace, α1, α2 two
finite executions of A that enjoy the same sequence of labels. If (lstate(α1),




Prζ [α1 ⊲ C~t]
Prζ [α2 ⊲ C~t]
≤ eǫ−c
The above lemma shows that in an ǫ-accumulative bisimulation, two
states related by a leakage amount c, produce distributions over the same
trace that only deviate by a factor (ǫ − c). Then it is easy to get that
the level of differential privacy is continuous with respect to ǫ-accumulative
bisimulation.




′) for all u ` u′
Note that the converse does not hold. A counter example will be pro-
vided in Example 4.3.1 in the next section. It shows a system that is dif-
ferentially private, however, there does not exists any accumulative bisim-
ulation that can characterize it.
4.3 The amortised bisimulation
As shown in the previous section, accumulative bisimulation is useful for
verifying differential privacy. However, a drawback of it is that its definition
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Figure 4.1: A PIN-checking system.
is too restrictive: first, the amount of leakage is only accumulated, indepen-
dently from whether the difference in probabilities is negative or positive.
Moreover, the accumulation is the same for all branches, and equal to the
worst branch, although the actual difference on some branch might be small.
As a consequence, accumulative bisimulation is inapplicable in several sys-
tems, as shown by the following toy example.
Example 4.3.1. Consider a PIN-checking system A(u) in which the PIN
variable u is chosen from two secret codes u1 and u2. In order to protect the
secrecy of the two PINs, rather than announcing to a user deterministically
whether the password he enters is correct or wrong, the system makes a
response probabilistically. The idea is to give a positive answer with a higher
probability when the password and the PIN match, and to give a negative
answer with a higher probability otherwise.
The PIN-checking system could be defined as the PA shown in Fig. 4.11.
We use label ui to represent that the password is ui, and ai to model the
behavior that the password entered by a user is ui, where i ∈ {1, 2}. We use
label ok and no to represent a positive and a negative answer, respectively.
1The PIN-checking system we show is intentionally designed for showing the differ-
ence between the accumulative bisimulation and our bisimulation. Allowing the user to
enter u1 at s3, t3 or to enter u2 at s7, t7 may result in some cases that our bisimulation
could not characterize either.
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Consider an admissible scheduler always choosing for A(u1) the a1-
branch (the case for the a2-branch is similar), thus scheduling for A(u2) also
the a1-branch. It is easy to see that the ratio of probabilities for A(u1) and




For the remaining sequences (a1no a2 no)
∗a1ok and (a1no a2 no)
∗a1no a2 ok,
we can check that the ratios are bounded by 9
4




However, we can not find an accumulative bisimulation with a bounded
ǫ between A(u1) and A(u2). The problem lies in that the leakage amount is
always accumulated by adding the absolute differences during cyclic simula-
tions, resulting in a convergence to ∞.
Lastly, in accumulative bisimulation, the bijection condition on the sup-
port sets of two related distributions is so stringent that bisimilar processes
such as P1 = ∆(a.b) and P2 = 0.5 a.b⊕0.5 a.(b+0) do not satisfy its lifting
operation.
In order to obtain a more relaxed bisimulation, we employ the amortised
bisimulation relation of [KAK05, dFERVGR07]. The main intuition behind
this notion is that the privacy leakage amount in each simulation step may
be either reduced due to a negative difference of probabilities, or increased
due to a positive difference. Hence, the long-term budget gets amortised,
in contrast to the accumulative bisimulation in which the budget is always
consumed. Note that the current leakage c ranges over [−ǫ, ǫ].
Furthermore, to remove the bijection requirement used in the lifting
operation of accumulative bisimulation, we use instead two weight functions.
The following notion of lifting is used to introduce amortised probabilistic
bisimulation. Given a relation R ⊆ S×S× [−ǫ, ǫ], µ LA(R, c) µ′ informally
means that there is a way to split the probabilities of the states of µ between
the states of µ′ and vice versa, expressed by two weight functions ω and
ω′, so that the relation R is preserved. In other words, each probability
distribution can be embedded to the other up to R and the given variation
c. Using weight functions to define probabilistic relations is not new in the
literature, see for instance the notion of simulation defined in [SL95] where
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the two weight functions coincide.
Letter A (short for amortisation) is simply used to differentiate the lift-
ing notion of amortised bisimulation from the accumulative one of Tschantz
et al..
Definition 4.3.2. Let ǫ > 0, c ∈ [−ǫ, ǫ], R ⊆ S×S× [−ǫ, ǫ]. The A-lifting
of R up to c, denoted by LA(R, c) , is a relation on Disc(S) defined as
µ LA(R, c) µ′, iff there exist two weight functions ω, ω′ : S×S → [0, 1] such
that
1. for all s ∈ S,
∑
t∈S ω(s, t) = µ(s);
2. for all t ∈ S,
∑
s∈S ω
′(s, t) = µ′(t);
3. for all s, t ∈ S, ω(s, t) = 0 iff ω′(s, t) = 0;
4. for all s, t ∈ S, if ω(s, t) > 0, then




Note that if ln ω(s,t)
ω′(s,t)
is positive, then after this mutual step, the amount
of deviation between s and t will be increased, otherwise decreased.
Definition 4.3.3 (Amortised bisimulation). A relation R ⊆ S×S× [−ǫ, ǫ]
is an ǫ-amortised bisimulation if for all (s, t, c) ∈ R:
1. s
a
−→ µ implies t
a
−→ µ′ and µLA(R, c)µ′
2. t
a
−→ µ′ implies s
a
−→ µ and µLA(R, c)µ′
We denote by Q ≺(ǫ,c) Q′, where |c| ≤ ǫ, if there exists an ǫ-amortised
bisimulation R such that (Q,Q′, c) ∈ R.
Using ln ω(s,t)
ω′(s,t)
in the lifting operation allows us to learn the degree of the
behavioral similarity between two related processes, which is, specifically,
measured by the ratio between the probabilities of producing the same trace
starting from the two processes. The behavioral similarity measured in the
multiplicative form is exactly the similarity required by the differential pri-
vacy property. This fact will be proved in Lemma 4.3.7 and Theorem 4.3.8.
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Example 4.3.4. Consider again the two bisimilar probabilistic processes
P1 = ∆(a.b) and P2 = 0.5 a.b⊕0.5 a.(b+0) which accumulative bisimulation
fails to equate. P1 has just one successor state a.b while P2 has two: a.b and
a.(b+ 0). For them to match each other, we need to split the probability of
a.b in P1 into two parts and allocate them to the two states of P2. We can
find weight functions ω, ω′ between them below and conclude that there is a
0-amortised bisimulation between P1 and P2.
ω = ω′ a.b a.(b+ 0)
a.b 0.5 0.5
In the above example, the split of the probability of a state is needed.
The next example shows the case where it happens to be no split of the
probability of a state. More precisely, for all s, t ∈ S, ω(s, t) = µ(s), if
s = t, otherwise 0; ω′(s, t) = µ′(t), if s = t, otherwise 0.
Example 4.3.5. Consider two processes E and F :
E = a.P1 + b.P2 F = a.P3 + b.P4
P1 = 0.5 0⊕ 0.3E1 ⊕ 0.2E2 P3 = 0.5 0⊕ 0.2F1 ⊕ 0.3F2
E1 = c.P4 F1 = c.P2
E2 = d.P5 F2 = d.P2
P2 = 0.5ok ⊕ 0.5no P4 = 0.4ok ⊕ 0.6no
P5 = 0.6ok ⊕ 0.4no
where the Dirac measure ∆(0) after ok and no is omitted for simplicity.
Take P2 and P4 as an example, it is easy to find an ǫ-amortised bisim-
ulation R such that
R =
{
(P2, P4, 0), (ok , ok , ln
5
4





then ǫ = max{| ln 5
4
|, | ln 5
6
|} = ln 5
4




Consider the relation between E and F . The probabilistic automata for
E and F are shown in Figure 4.2. When P1 and P2 are lifted, we can
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Figure 4.2: The probabilistic automata of Example 4.3.5.
allocate all the probability of reaching E1 to F1 and vice versa, and do the
same thing between E2 and F2. According to Def. 4.3.3, we can check that
the following relation R is a ln 9
5
-amortised bisimulation between E and F .




), (ok , ok , ln 6
5






), (ok , ok , ln 4
5
), (no, no, ln 8
15
),
(0, 0, 0), (ok , ok , ln 5
4
), (no, no, ln 5
6
) }.
Analogous to the accumulative bisimulation, the amortised bisimulation
enjoys the metrical properties as well.
Proposition 4.3.6. The following hold:
1. s ≺(0,0) s;
2. s1 ≺
(ǫ,c) s2 iff s2 ≺
(ǫ,−c) s1;
3. If s1 ≺
(ǫ1,c1) s2 ≺
(ǫ2,c2) s3 then s1 ≺
(ǫ1+ǫ2,c1+c2) s3.
Proof. 1. For reflexivity, it is enough to show that the identity relation
over the set S of states, that is the relation IdS = {(s, s, 0)|s ∈ S}, is
an 0-amortised bisimulation. If s
a
−→ µ, the weight functions ω and
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ω′ can be defined as: ω(s, t) = ω′(s, t) = µ(s), if s = t; otherwise 0.
This is easy.
2. For symmetry, assume that (s1, s2, c) is in an ǫ-amortised bisimula-






2,−c) ∈ R} is an




1, c) ∈ R
′, if s′2
a
−→ µ2, we must show that there exists a tran-




−→ µ1 and µ2L









−→ µ1 and µ1L
A(R,−c)µ2.
According to the definition of A-lifting, there are two weight functions
ω, ω′ such that for all s, t ∈ S,
∑
t ω(s, t) = µ1(s),
∑
s ω
′(s, t) = µ2(t);






A(R′, c)µ1 holds, because we can exchange the




3. For transitivity, let (s1, s2, c1) be in an ǫ1-amortised bisimulationR1 ⊆
S × S × [−ǫ1, ǫ1], (s2, s3, c2) be in an ǫ2-amortised bisimulation R2 ⊆
S × S × [−ǫ2, ǫ2]. Let R ⊆ S × S × [−ǫ1 − ǫ2, ǫ1 + ǫ2]:
{ (s1, s3, c) |∃s2, c1, c2.(s1, s2, c1) ∈ R1∧(s2, s3, c2) ∈ R2∧c = c1+c2 }.
We extend R to be RExt as follows:
• R ⊆ RExt.
• If (s, s′, c1) ∈ RExt and (s, s
′, c2) ∈ RExt, then for any c, if c1 ≤
c ≤ c2, (s, s
′, c) ∈ RExt.
We shall prove that RExt is an ǫ1 + ǫ2-amortised bisimulation.
Given (s1, s3, c) ∈ RExt, there are two cases:
a) (s1, s3, c) ∈ R. If s1
a
−→ µ1, by (s1, s2, c1) ∈ R1, there exist
s2
a
−→ µ2 and µ1 L(R1, c1) µ2; by (s2, s3, c2) ∈ R2, there exist
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s3
a
−→ µ3 and µ2 L(R2, c2) µ3. Let ω and ω
′ be two weight
functions between µ1 and µ2, γ and γ
′ be two weight functions
between µ2 and µ3. We shall construct two weight functions
π, π′ between µ1 and µ3 out of ω, ω
′, γ and γ′ in such a way that
µ1 L(RExt, c) µ3 where c = c1 + c2.













We can check that
∑
t π(s, t) = µ1(s) and
∑
s π
′(s, t) = µ3(t);























by the definition of RExt,




Thus π, π′ are the two required weight functions and µ1 L(RExt, c) µ3
holds.
b) Otherwise, (s1, s3, c) ∈ RExt\R. Namely, there exist c1 and c2,
c1 ≤ c ≤ c2, (s1, s3, c1) ∈ R and (s1, s3, c2) ∈ R.
If s1
a
−→ µ, by (s1, s3, c1) ∈ R and the result of case 3a, there
exists s3
a
−→ µ′ and µL(RExt, c1)µ
′. Namely there are two weight








1(s, t) = µ
′(t)
and
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Analogously, by (s1, s3, c2) ∈ R, there are another two weight








2(s, t) = µ
′(t)
and









ω2(s, t) and ω





ω′2(s, t). By the definition of
RExt, it holds




Hence, RExt is an ǫ1 + ǫ2-amortised bisimulation.
Verification of differential privacy using amortised bisimulation.
We now show that amortised bisimulation can be used to verify differential
privacy.
Lemma 4.3.7. Given a PA A, let R be an ǫ-amortised bisimulation, c ∈
[−ǫ, ǫ], let ζ be an admissible scheduler, ~t be a finite trace, α1, α2 two finite
executions of A that enjoy the same sequence of labels.




Prζ [α1 ⊲ C~t ]
Prζ [α2 ⊲ C~t ]
≤ eǫ−c
Proof. We prove by induction on the length of trace ~t: |~t|.
1. |~t| = 0: According to Eq. (4.1), for any ζ ,
Prζ [α1 ⊲ C~t ] = Prζ [α2 ⊲ C~t ] = 1
2. IH: For any two executions α1 and α2 of A, let s1 = lstate(α1) and
s2 = lstate(α2). (s1, s2, c) ∈ R implies that for any admissible sched-




Prζ [α1 ⊲ C~t′ ]
Prζ [α2 ⊲ C~t′ ]
≤ eǫ−c
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3. We have to show that for any admissible scheduler ζ , trace ~t with




Prζ [α1 ⊲ C~t ]
Prζ [α2 ⊲ C~t ]
≤ eǫ−c
Assume that ~t = aa~t′. We prove first the right-hand part Prζ [α1 ⊲
C~t ] ≤ e
ǫ−c ·Prζ [α2 ⊲ C~t ]. According to Eq. (4.1), two cases must be
considered:
- Case act(ζ(α1)) 6= a. Then Prζ [α1 ⊲ C~t ] = 0. Since ζ is admis-
sible, it schedules for α2 a transition consistent with α1, namely,
not a transition labeled by a either. Thus Prζ [α2 ⊲ C~t ] = 0, the
inequality is satisfied.
- Case ζ(α1) = s1
a
−→ µ1. So,
Prζ [α1 ⊲ C~t ] =
∑
s µ1(s)Prζ [α1as ⊲ C~t′ ] (4.2)
Since (s1, s2, c) ∈ R, there must be also a transition from s2 such
that s2
a
−→ µ2 and µ1L




Prζ [α2 ⊲ C~t ] =
∑
t µ2(t) · Prζ [α2at ⊲ C~t′ ] (4.3)
Since µ1L
A(R, c)µ2, there are two weight functions ω, ω
′ such that
for all s, t ∈ S,
∑
t ω(s, t) = µ1(s),
∑
s ω
′(s, t) = µ2(t); ω(s, t) = 0
iff ω′(s, t) = 0; and if ω(s, t) > 0,




Apply the inductive hypothesis to α1as, α2at and ~t′, we get that:





· Prζ [α2at ⊲ C~t′ ] (4.4)
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Therefore,









































µ2(t)Prζ [α2at ⊲ C~t′ ] (4.12)
= eǫ−c · Prζ [α2 ⊲ C~t ] (4.13)
which completes the proof of the right-hand part. Lines (4.6) and
(4.13) follow from the equations (4.2) and (4.3) respectively, Lines
(4.7) and (4.11) from the definitions of ω and ω′ respectively, Line
(4.8) from the inductive hypothesis Line (4.4).
For the left-hand part Prζ [α2 ⊲ C~t ] ≤ e
ǫ+c·Prζ [α1 ⊲ C~t ], exchange
the roles of s1 and s2, ω and ω
′, and all the rest is analogous.
Note that there is a subtle difference between Lemmas 4.2.4 and 4.3.7,
in that the denominator in the left-hand bound is eǫ+c instead of eǫ−c. This
comes from the amortised nature of R. We can now show that differential
privacy is continuous with respect to ǫ-amortised bisimulation as well.
Theorem 4.3.8. A concurrent system A is ǫ-differentially private if
A(u) ≺(ǫ,0) A(u′) for all u ` u′
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Proof. For all u ` u′, there exists an ǫ-amortised bisimulation R such that





Prζ [A(u) ⊲ C~t ]
Prζ [A(u
′) ⊲ C~t ]
≤ eǫ
Thus, A is ǫ-differentially private.
Example 4.3.9 (Example 4.3.1 revisited). Consider again the concurrent
system shown in Fig. 4.1. Let S and T denote the state space of A(u1) and





]. It is straightforward to
check according to Def. 4.3.3 that the following relation is a ln 9
4
-amortised
bisimulation between A(u1) and A(u2).




), (s5, t5, ln
3
2
), (s3, t3, ln
2
3







), (s5, t5, ln
2
3
), (s7, t7, ln
3
2




By Theorem 4.3.8, A is ln 9
4
-differentially private.
4.4 Comparing the two bisimulations
In this section, we formally compare the two bisimulations, showing that
our amortised bisimulation is indeed more liberal than the accumulative
bisimulation. Moreover, we show that 0-accumulative bisimulation only
implies bisimilarity, but the converse direction does not hold because of
the strong requirement of the bijection in their definition; however our 0-
amortised bisimulation can fully characterize bisimilarity.
We show that amortised bisimilarity ≺ is more liberal than accumulative
bisimilarity ≺T . The converse does not hold, since Examples 4.3.1, 4.3.4
and 4.3.9 already show the cases in which ǫ-accumulative bisimulation is
infinite while ǫ-amortised bisimulation is finite.
Lemma 4.4.1. s ≺(ǫ,c
T )
T t implies s ≺
(ǫ,cA) t where |cA| ≤ cT .
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Proof. Assume that RT ⊆ S × S × [0, ǫ] is an ǫ-accumulative bisimulation
such that (s, t, cT ) ∈ RT . We define a relation RA ⊆ S × S × [−ǫ, ǫ] out of
RT as follows:
(s′, t′, cA) ∈ RA iff ∃cT .(s′, t′, cT ) ∈ RT ∧ |cA| ≤ cT (4.14)
Given (s′, t′, cA) ∈ RA, if s′
a
−→ µ1, we must show that there exists a
transition from t′: t′
a
−→ µ2 and µ1L
A(RA, cA)µ2. By Eq. (4.14) we know
that there exists cT such that |cA| ≤ cT and (s′, t′, cT ) ∈ RT . Thus there
exists a transition from t′ such that t′
a
−→ µ2 and µ1L
T (RT , cT )µ2. Accord-
ing to the definition of T -lifting, there exists a bijection β : supp(µ1) −→
supp(µ2), s.t. for all s
′′ in supp(µ1), there exists t
′′ ∈ supp(µ2), t
′′ = β(s′′),
(s′′, t′′, cT + σ) ∈ RT where σ = maxs′′∈supp(µ1) | ln
µ1(s′′)
µ2(t′′)
|. We have |cA +
lnµ1(s
′′)− lnµ2(t
′′)| ≤ cT +σ and hence (s′′, t′′, cA+ lnµ1(s
′′)− lnµ2(t
′′)) ∈
RA by Eq. (4.14).











µ2(t) if t = β(s);
0 otherwise.
According to Definition 4.3.2 of A-lifting, it holds that µ1L
A(RA, cA)µ2 as
required.
4.4.1 Relations with conventional probabilistic
bisimilarity
The following propositions say that the 0-accumulative bisimulation implies
conventional probabilistic bisimilarity, while 0-amortised bisimulation fully
characterizes bisimilarity.
Proposition 4.4.2. s ≺
(0,0)
T t ⇒ s ∼ t.
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Proof. Consider the relation R induced by 0-accumulative bisimulation.
Namely,
(s, t) ∈ R iff s ≺(0,0)T t.
Clearly it is an equivalence relation. We show that it is a probabilistic
bisimulation. Let s ≺
(0,0)
T t. Consider some s
a
−→ µ1. Since s ≺
(0,0)
T t, there
exists an 0-amortised bisimulationR′ ⊆ S×S×[0, 0] such that (s, t, 0) ∈ R′.
There exist a bijection β and a distribution µ2 such that t
a
−→ µ2, for any
si ∈ supp(µ1), there exists ti ∈ supp(µ2), ti = β(si) and (si, ti, σ) ∈ R
′
where σ = maxs | ln
µ(s)
µ′(β(s))
|. Because the leakage budget is 0, which says
that during the mutual simulation, every step must have exactly the same




T ti, thus [si] = [ti]. Henceforth, µ1([si]) = µ2([si]) for all [si] ∈ S/R
as required.
Proposition 4.4.3. s ≺(0,0) t ⇔ s ∼ t.
Proof. (⊆) Consider the relation R induced by 0-amortised bisimulation.
Namely,
(s, t) ∈ R iff s ≺(0,0) t.
Clearly, R is an equivalence relation. The procedure of showing that it is
a probabilistic bisimulation proceeds analogously to the proof in Proposi-
tion 4.4.2.
(⊇) Let
R = {(s, t, 0) | s ∼ t}.
We need to prove that R is a 0-amortised bisimulation. The key is to show
that for any µ1, µ2 ∈ Disc(S):
µ1L(∼)µ2 implies µ1L
A(R, 0)µ2.
By Lemma 18 in [SL95], µ1L(∼)µ2 implies that there exists a weight func-
tion ω such that
∑
t ω(s, t) = µ1(s),
∑
s ω(s, t) = µ2(t) and if ω(s, t) > 0
then s ∼ t, namely, (s, t, 0) ∈ R. Thus µ1L




In this section we consider a simple process calculus. It contains prefixing,
non-deterministic choice, probabilistic choice, restriction and parallel com-
position constructors and show that ǫ-amortised bisimulation is substitutive
under them. The syntax and semantics of the process calculus have already
been introduced in Section 2.3 and Fig. 2.1, respectively.
Proposition 4.5.1. If Q ≺(ǫ,c) Q′, then
1. a.Q ≺(ǫ,c) a.Q′
2. R⊕p Q ≺
(ǫ,c) R ⊕p Q
′
3. R +Q ≺(ǫ,c) R +Q′
4. (νa)Q ≺(ǫ,c) (νa)Q′
5. R |Q ≺(ǫ,c) R |Q′.
Proof sketch. Let R be an ǫ-amortised bisimulation with (Q,Q′, c) ∈ R.
Define the relation IdS = {(s, s, 0)|s ∈ S}. We construct for each clause
a relation R′ as follows and show that it is an ǫ-amortised bisimulation
relation.
1. R′ = { (a.Q, a.Q′, 0) } ∪ R,
2. R′ = { (R⊕p Q,R⊕p Q
′, 0) } ∪ R ∪ IdR,
3. R′ = { (R +Q,R +Q′, 0) } ∪ R ∪ IdR,
4. R′ = { ((νa)Q, (νa)Q′, c) | (Q,Q′, c) ∈ R},
5. R′ = { (R |Q,R |Q′, c) | (Q,Q′, c) ∈ R} ∪ IdR.
We detail the proof for Case 2, the case when Q = Q′ is trivial. Otherwise,
let the two weight functions ω, ω′ between R ⊕p Q and R⊕p Q
′ be defined
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as follows:





p if E1 = E2 = R,
1− p if E1 = Q and E2 = Q
′,
0 otherwise.
such that (R,R, 0) ∈ R′ and (Q,Q′, 0) ∈ R′.
However ǫ-accumulative bisimulation is not substitutive under the prob-
abilistic choice. For example, we have a.b ≺
(0,0)
T a.(b + 0), while due to
the bijection requirement, there is no accumulative bisimulation between
a.b⊕0.5 a.b and a.b⊕0.5 a.(b+ 0).
4.6 An application to the Dining
Cryptographers Protocol
In this section we use the bisimulation method to reason about the degree
of differential privacy of the Dining Cryptographers Protocol [Cha88] with
biased coins. In particular, we show that with probability-p biased coins, the
degree of differential privacy in the case of three cryptographers is | ln p
1−p
|.
This result can also be generalized to the case of n cryptographers.
The problem of the Dining Cryptographers is the following: Three cryp-
tographers dine together. After the dinner, the bill has to be paid by either
one of them or by another agent called the master. The master decides who
will pay and then informs each of them separately whether he has to pay
or not. The cryptographers would like to find out whether the payer is the
master or one of them. However, in the latter case, they wish to keep the
payer anonymous.
The Dining Cryptographers Protocol (DCP) solves the above problem as
follows: each cryptographer tosses a fair coin which is visible to himself and
his neighbor to the left. Each cryptographer checks his own coin and the
one to his right and, if he is not paying, announces “agree” if the two coins
are the same and “disagree” otherwise. However, the paying cryptographer
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Figure 4.3: Chaum’s system for the Dining Cryptographers.
says the opposite. It can be proved that the master is paying if and only if
the number of disagrees is even [Cha88].
The graph shown in Fig. 4.3 illustrates the dinner-table and the alloca-
tion of the coins between the three cryptographers. We consider the coins
which are probability-p biased, i.e., producing 0 (for “head”) with proba-
bility p, and 1 (for “tail”) with 1− p. We consider the final announcement
in the order of out0out1out2, with out i ∈ {a, d} (a for “agree” and d for
“disagree”, i ∈ {0, 1, 2}) announced by Crytpi. For example, if Crytp0 is
designated to pay, Coin0Coin1Coin2 = 010, then out0out1out2 = ada.
We are interested in the case when one of the cryptographers is paying,
since that is the case when they want to keep the payer anonymous. We use
Master(mi) to denote the system in which Crytpi is designated to pay. To
show that the DCP is differentially private, both bisimulations introduced
before can be used. In this problem, it suffices to find between Master(mi)’s
bounded accumulative bisimulation relations.
Proposition 4.6.1. A DCP with three cryptographers and with probability-
p biased coins is | ln p
1−p
|-differentially private.
Proof. Fig. 4.4 shows two probabilistic automataMaster(m0) andMaster(m1)
when Crytp0 and Crytp1 are paying respectively. Basically they are proba-
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Figure 4.4: The probabilistic automata of the Dining cryptographers.
bilistic distributions over all possible outcomes Coin0Coin1Coin2 (i.e. inner
states) produced by the three-coins toss, followed by an announcement de-
termined by each outcome. For simplicity initial τ transitions are merged
harmlessly. Let b0b1b2 and c0c1c2 represent two inner states of Master(m0)
and Master(m1) respectively. There exists a bijection f between them:
c0c1c2 = f(b0b1b2) = b0(b1 ⊕ 1)b2
where ⊕ represents the addition modulo 2 (xor), such that the announce-
ment of b0b1b2 can be shown equal to the one of c0c1c2.
Note that, the probability of reaching an inner state b0b1b2 fromMaster(m0)
is pi(1− p)(3−i), where i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} is the number of zeroes in {b0, b1, b2}.
Because c0 = b0, c1 = b1 ⊕ 1, c2 = b2, the ratio between the probabilities
of reaching b0b1b2 from Master(m0) and c0c1c2 from Master(m1) differs at
most by | ln p
1−p
|. It is easy to see that {(Master(m0),Master(m1), 0)} ∪
{ (b0b1b2, f(b0b1b2), | ln
p
1−p









Similarly, we consider the probabilistic automataMaster(m2) when Crytp2
is paying (though omitted in Fig. 4.4). Let e0e1e2 represent one of its inner
states. We can also find a bijection f ′ between c0c1c2 and e0e1e2:
e0e1e2 = f
′(c0c1c2) = c0c1(c2 ⊕ 1)
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and a bijection f ′′ between b0b1b2 and e0e1e2:
e0e1e2 = f
′′(b0b1b2) = (b0 ⊕ 1)b1b2
such that they output same announcements. The rest proceeds as above.
By Theorem 4.2.5, the DCP is | ln p
1−p
|-differentially private.
The above proposition can be extended to the case of n dining cryp-
tographers where n ≥ 3. We assume that the n cryptographers are fully
connected, i.e., that a coin exists between every pair of cryptographers.
Let ckl (k, l ∈ Z, k, l ∈ [0, n − 1], k < l) be the coin linking two cryptog-
raphers Crytpk and Crytp l. In this case the output of Crytpi would be
out i = c0i ⊕ c1i ⊕ · · · ci(n−1) ⊕ pay(i), where pay(i) = 1 if Crytpi pays and 0
otherwise.
Proposition 4.6.2. A DCP with n fully connected cryptographers and with
probability-p biased coins is | ln p
1−p
|-differentially private.
Proof sketch. The proof proceeds analogously to the case of three cryp-
tographers. To find an accumulative bisimulation relation between every
two instances of the DCP Master(mi) and Master(mj), (i, j ∈ Z, i, j ∈
[0, n − 1], i < j), we point out here mainly the bijection between their
inner states. Let b12b13 · · · b(n−1)n and c12c13 · · · c(n−1)n represent the inner
states ofMaster(mi) andMaster(mj) respectively, where the subscript (kl),
(k, l ∈ Z, k, l ∈ [0, n − 1], k < l), indicates the coin linking two cryptogra-
phers Crytpk and Crytp l. There exists a bijection f between them defined





bkl ⊕ 1 if kl = ij,
bkl otherwise.
We can check that the bijective states defined in this way produce the same
announcement inMaster(mi) andMaster(mj). Moreover, only the coin (ij)
is different, the ratio between the probability mass of every pair of bijective





We can see that the more the coins are biased, the worse the privacy
gets. If the coins are fair, namely, p = 1 − p = 1
2
, then the DCP is 0-
differentially private, in which case the privacy is well protected. With
the help of the bisimulation method, we get a general proposition about
the degree of differential privacy of DCP. Moreover, it is obtained through
some local information, rather than by computing globally the summations
of probabilities for each trace.
4.7 Conclusion
In this section we have first studied the metrical properties of the accu-
mulative bisimulation, which is a reformulation of the notion proposed
in [TKD11], and proposed the amortised bisimulation where the total pri-
vacy leakage gets amortised. Both of them establish a framework for the
formal verification of differential privacy for concurrent systems. Namely,
the closer processes are in the bisimulations, the higher level of differential
privacy they can preserve. We have showed that the amortised bisimula-
tion is more liberal than the former one; it fully characterizes bisimilarity
while the accumulative bisimulation only implies bisimilarity; moreover, the
amortised bisimulation is substitutive under typical process algebra opera-
tors. We have used the bisimulation verification method to learn that: A




Related Works. Amortised bisimulations were initially proposed in [KAK05]
and further studied in [dFERVGR07, Hen11, DH13] concerning cost-based
and weight-based quantitative behaviors of processes. In [KAK05, Hen11,
DH13] a given budget can be increased or decreased but never gets nega-
tive. In our setting the variations are within a given distance but ranging
from −ǫ to ǫ, which is similar to the idea in [dFERVGR07].
A similar notion, called ǫ-bisimulation, was proposed for labelled Markov
processes in [DLT08, TDZ11]. Although their ǫ-bisimulation and ǫ-amortised
bisimulation in this thesis are both proposed to allow small deviations in
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probabilities when comparing processes, our notion is intended to character-
ize the kind of deviation as defined by ǫ-differential privacy. Because of this
motivation, our notion is different from theirs in two aspects: (a) the dif-
ference between probabilities is measured in a multiplicative sense (thanks
to the ln expression), rather than an additive sense as in [DLT08, TDZ11];
(b) the total variation allowed is ǫ, while in [DLT08, TDZ11] the variation
allowed in each simulation step is ǫ.
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Five
Complete Proof Systems for Amortised
Probabilistic Bisimulations
The aim of this chapter is to provide sound and complete proof systems for
the amortised bisimulation proposed in the previous chapter. Proof systems
are important both at the theoretical level, as they provide a deep insight
into the nature of process combinators and of the kind of transformations
of expressions which preserve bisimulations, and at the practical level, as
they provide a foundation for developing verification tools.
As introduced in the previous chapter, for two processes Q and Q′, we
denote by Q ≺(ǫ,c) Q′ if there exists an ǫ-amortised bisimulation R such
that (Q,Q′, c) ∈ R. The judgments of our inference system are therefore
indexed inequalities of the form
(ǫ, c) ⊲ Q ≺ Q′
The proof system consists of a set of axioms and a set of inference rules.
The axioms include the standard monoid laws for bisimulation and three
laws for probabilistic choice. The set of inference rules encompasses rules
for manipulating the combinators in the calculus, plus one structural rule
used to glue pieces of derivations together.
Since the usual rules for equality (substitutivity, reflexivity, symmetry
and transitivity) cannot be straightforwardly applied when reasoning with
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inequalities, especially on indexed inequalities, the completeness proof relies
on a careful maintenance of indices when rewriting terms. In particular, the
set of (0, 0)-indexed pairs of states is still an equivalence relation, while for
non-(0, 0)-indexed pairs, the inference rule for transitivity takes a form like
triangle inequality, more specifically:
Triangle
(ǫ1, c1) ⊲ Q1 ≺ Q2 (ǫ2, c2) ⊲ Q2 ≺ Q3
(ǫ1 + ǫ2, c1 + c2) ⊲ Q1 ≺ Q3
We also developed weak notions of amortised bisimulation and provide
a sound and complete proof system for amortised observational congruence.
It turns out that it is sufficient to add the probabilistic extensions of Milner’s
three τ -laws [Mil89] to the proof system of strong amortised bisimulation.
They can also be considered as the reminiscent of Segala’s τ -laws for non-
alternating models in [BS01], of which the only difference is that here they
are decorated with indexed inequalities.
Related Works. Developing sound and complete proof systems for be-
havioral equivalences has long been a research focus in the process algebra
community. Among the works on analyzing quantitative systems, a lot of at-
tention has been devoted to the analysis of probabilistic behaviors. For the
classical notion of probabilistic bisimulations, Bandini and Segala in [BS01]
gave axiomatizations for strong and weak behavioral equivalences on simple
probabilistic automata. Deng et al. provided similar axiomatizations for
a language that includes parallel composition and (guarded) recursion on
simple probabilistic automata [DPP05] and probabilistic automata [DP05],
respectively. For more related work, we refer to references therein.
5.1 A simple probabilistic process algebra
Following [BS01] we consider a subset of probabilistic process algebra. Com-
pared with the PPA introduced in Section 2.3, it excludes the recursion, the
parallel composition and the restriction operators and requires the proba-
bilistic choice operator to be prefixed.
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Let I be a set of finite indices, a range over a finite set A of labels.
Let τ ∈ A, we recall that τ is the silent action. Let NProc denote the
set of nondeterministic processes, ranged over by E, F or G, and PProc
denote the set of probabilistic processes, ranged over by P . Finally, let
Proc , NProc ∪ PProc denote the set of processes, ranged over by Q. The
syntax of our probabilistic process algebra (PPA) is defined by the following
BNF grammar:




Process a.P performs action a and then becomes P which must be a
probabilistic choice.
The semantics of a SPPA term is a probabilistic automaton defined ac-
cording to the rules in Fig. 5.1, essentially following the non-alternating
model defined in [BS01]. P 7→ µ simply states that the probability distri-
bution associated with P is µ.
We define the depth of a process Q, d(Q), to be the maximum number




j∈J pjEj) = 1 + maxj∈J d(Ej)
d(a.P ) = d(P )
d(
∑
i∈I Ei) = maxi∈I d(Ei)
5.2 Amortised probabilistic bisimulation
We denote by Q ≺(ǫ,c) Q′, where |c| ≤ ǫ, if there exists an ǫ-amortised
bisimulationR such that (Q,Q′, c) ∈ R. We refer to Def. 4.3.3 in Section 4.2
for the definition of amortised bisimulation.
5.2.1 Basic properties
Some basic properties of ≺(ǫ,c) are given in the next proposition.
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Figure 5.1: The operational semantics of SPPA.
Proposition 5.2.1. The following hold:
1. Q ≺(0,0) Q;
2. Q ≺(ǫ,c) Q′ iff Q′ ≺(ǫ,−c) Q;
3. If Q1 ≺
(ǫ1,c1) Q2 ≺
(ǫ2,c2) Q3 then Q1 ≺
(ǫ1+ǫ2,c1+c2) Q3;
4. ≺(ǫ1,c1)⊆≺(ǫ2,c2) where ǫ1 ≤ ǫ2 and |c2 − c1| ≤ ǫ2 − ǫ1;
5. For any ǫ and any |c| ≤ ǫ, ≺(0,0)⊆≺(ǫ,c).
Proof sketch. The proof proceeds by constructing an amortised bisim-
ulation relation R′ witnessing each pair of related processes. The proofs
for Cases 1 -3 are analogous to the proofs in Prop. 4.3.6. We discuss the
remaining two cases:
4 Assuming Q ≺(ǫ1,c1) Q′, there exist an ǫ1-amortised bisimulation R
and |c1| ≤ ǫ1 such that (Q,Q
′, c1) ∈ R. Let R
′ ⊆ Proc × Proc ×
[−ǫ2, ǫ2] where ǫ1 ≤ ǫ2:
{ (Q,Q′, c2) | ∃c1, (Q,Q
′, c1) ∈ R ∧ |c2 − c1| ≤ ǫ2 − ǫ1 }.
It is routine to verify that R′ is the required amortised bisimulations.
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a ∈ A ∪ {ε}
Weak5









a ∈ A ∪ {ε}
Figure 5.2: Weak transitions
5 An immediate consequence of 4.
The following proposition lists the congruence properties of≺(ǫ,c), namely
≺(ǫ,c) is substitutive under all SPPA combinators.
Proposition 5.2.2 (Substitutivity). Let E ≺(ǫ,c) E ′ and P ≺(ǫ,c) P ′. Then
1. E + F ≺(ǫ,c) E ′ + F
2.
⊕
i∈1..n−1 piEi ⊕ pnE ≺
(ǫ,c)
⊕
i∈1..n−1 piEi ⊕ pnE
′
3. a.P ≺(ǫ,c) a.P ′
Proof sketch. Analogous to the proofs of Cases 1 -3 in Prop. 4.5.1.
5.3 Weak amortised probabilistic
bisimulation
In this section we shall introduce the notion of weak amortised bisimulations
and amortised observational congruence.
The definition of weak transitions [BS01] is given in Fig. 5.2. Rules
Weak1− 3 say that a weak transition either starts from a strong transition,
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or is a self-loop of a process, while Weak4 and Weak5 allow internal










Note that E =⇒ µ means that there are zero or more τ actions per-
formed, while E
τ
=⇒ µ means at least one τ action is performed; In Weak4
and Weak5, ε represents the empty string,
ε
=⇒ is actually =⇒ where ε is
omitted for simplicity.
Following [Mil89], given a sequence t ∈ A∗ of labels, we denote by t̂ the
sequence obtained from t by removing all occurrences of τ in t.
Definition 5.3.1 (Weak amortised bisimulation). Given ǫ ≥ 0 and |c| ≤ ǫ.
A relation R ⊆ Proc × Proc × [−ǫ, ǫ] is an ǫ-weak amortised bisimulation
if for all (Q,Q′, c) ∈ R:
1. Q
a
−→ µ implies Q′
â
=⇒ µ′ and µ LA(R, c) µ′;
2. Q′
a
−→ µ′ implies Q
â
=⇒ µ and µ LA(R, c) µ′.
We write Q 4(ǫ,c) Q′, if there exists an ǫ-weak amortised bisimulation R
such that (Q,Q′, c) ∈ R.
Note that although invisible actions are abstracted away in weak bisim-
ulation, the contribution of the probabilities of each internal action is still
taken into account when constituting a weak transition, as can be seen
from Rules Weak4-5 in Fig. 5.2. The performance of every invisible action
(if is not an empty move) will alter the probability distribution of the re-





{R : R is an ǫ-weak amortised bisimulation}
We can check by Def. 5.3.1 that 4ǫ is itself an ǫ-weak amortised bisimula-
tion, and is the largest one.
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5.3.1 Basic properties of 4
This subsection aims at showing the metrical properties of 4ǫ, namely re-
flexivity, symmetry and triangle inequality.
The following lemma says an interesting fact that two processes that
satisfy both (ǫ, c1) and (ǫ, c3) indexed weak amortised bisimulation satisfy
(ǫ, c2) indexed weak amortised bisimulation for any c3 < c2 < c1.
Lemma 5.3.2. If Q 4(ǫ,c1) Q′, Q 4(ǫ,c3) Q′ and there exists c2 satisfying
c3 < c2 < c1, then Q 4
(ǫ,c2) Q′.
Proof. Let R ⊆ Proc × Proc × [−ǫ, ǫ] be:
{ (Q,Q′, c2)| ∃c1, c3, c3 < c2 < c1 ∧ (Q,Q
′, c1) ∈4
ǫ ∧ (Q,Q′, c3) ∈4
ǫ }.
Assume (Q,Q′, c2) ∈ R, ifQ
a
=⇒ µ, by (Q,Q′, c1) ∈4
ǫ there exists Q′
a
=⇒ µ′
and µLA(4ǫ, c)µ′. Namely there are two weight functions ω1 and ω
′
1 s.t.∑




1(E, F ) = µ
′(F ) and




Analogously, by (Q,Q′, c3) ∈4
ǫ, there are another two weight functions ω3
and ω′3 s.t.
∑




3(E, F ) = µ
′(F ) and




We define weight functions ω2 and ω
′







and ω′2(E, F ) =
1
2
ω′1(E, F ) +
1
2
ω′3(E, F ). By the definition of R, it holds




Hence, R is an ǫ-weak amortised bisimulation, namely Q 4(ǫ,c2) Q′ as re-
quired.
In order to prove the triangle inequality in the setting of weak transi-
tions, we need to ensure that weak transitions are transitive, as shown in
the next lemma.
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Lemma 5.3.3. If Q 4(ǫ,c) Q′, then Q
a
=⇒ µ implies there exists µ′: Q′
â
=⇒
µ′ and µ LA(4ǫ, c) µ′.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of the strong transi-
tions which
a
=⇒ is composed of.
- The basis is when the length equals to 1, Q
a
=⇒ µ degenerates to a strong
transition and the result is trivial.
- For the inductive step: consider the case where the length equals to N








=⇒. Note that the other case
is when the first move is
τ




−→ ν and ∀Ei ∈ supp(ν), Ei
τ
=⇒ µi whose length of strong




a weak transition Q′
â
=⇒ ν ′ and ν LA(4ǫ, c) ν ′. Namely, there are two








ω′(Ei, Fj) = ν
′(Fj); and ω(Ei, Fj) = 0
iff ω′(Ei, Fj) = 0; if ω(Ei, Fj) > 0, then






=⇒ µi and inductive hypothesis, there exists a weak transition
Fj
τ
=⇒ µ′j such that µi L
A(4ǫ, c + ln ω(Ei,Fj)
ω′(Ei,Fj)
) µ′j. Namely, there exist














′) = 0 iff γ′ij(G,G
′) = 0; if γij(G,G













ω(Ei, Fj) · γij(G,G
′)









j . We shall construct desirable weight func-
tions π and π′ for µ and µ′ out of ω, ω′, γij and γ
′
ij in such a way that
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µi(G)ν(Ei) Definition of ω
= µ(G) Definition of µ
Analogously, we can check that
∑
Gπ
′(G,G′) = µ′(G); and π(G,G′) = 0


























Thus π, π′ are the two required weight functions and µ LA(4ǫ, c) µ′ holds.
After proving that weak transitions are transitive, we now can show the
following basic properties of 4:
Proposition 5.3.4. The following hold:
1. Q 4(0,0) Q;
2. Q 4(ǫ,c) Q′ iff Q′ 4(ǫ,−c) Q;
3. If Q1 4
(ǫ1,c1) Q2 4
(ǫ2,c2) Q3 then Q1 4
(ǫ1+ǫ2,c1+c2) Q3.
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Proof sketch. The proof of cases 1, 2 and 3 are similar to the proofs of
1, 2 and 3 of Proposition 5.2.1, respectively, where case 3 needs the help
of Lemma 5.3.3.
The following proposition shows that the first τ -transition can be ig-
nored for weak bisimulation:
Proposition 5.3.5. τ.∆(E) 4(0,0) E.
Proof sketch. The essence of the proof is the observation that
R = {(τ.∆(E), E, 0)} ∪ IdProc
is a 0-weak amortised bisimulation.
5.3.2 Amortised observational congruence
It is well known that weak bisimulation is not preserved by the external
choice operator + [Mil89]. A typical example is
τ.∆(b.∆(0)) 4(0,0) b.∆(0),
while
a.∆(0) + τ.∆(b.∆(0)) $(0,0) a.∆(0) + b.∆(0).
Hence, as usual, we define observational congruence on top of weak
bisimulation 4ǫ as follows.
Definition 5.3.6 (Amortised observational congruence). Given ǫ ≥ 0 and
|c| ≤ ǫ. Q and Q′ are (ǫ, c)-amortised observationally congruent, written
Q (ǫ,c) Q′, if for all a ∈ A
1. Q
a
−→ µ implies Q′
a
=⇒ µ′ and µ LA(4ǫ, c) µ′;
2. Q′
a
−→ µ′ implies Q
a
=⇒ µ and µ LA(4ǫ, c) µ′.





=⇒ µ′, is required to match Q
a
−→ µ. This implies that a τ -transition
from a process must be matched by at least one τ -transition from the other.
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Note also that this is required only for the first transitions. For their corre-
sponding derivative distributions µ and µ′, they are required to satisfy the
lifting operation just w.r.t 4, rather than .
The following two propositions establish the relations between 4 and .
Proposition 5.3.8 will play an important role when proving the completeness
of the proof system for  in Section 5.5.
Proposition 5.3.7. Q (ǫ,c) Q′ implies Q 4(ǫ,c) Q′.
Proof. Straightforward by their definitions.
Proposition 5.3.8. Q 4(ǫ,c) Q′ iff Q (ǫ,c) Q′ or Q (ǫ,c) τ.∆(Q′) or
τ.∆(Q) (ǫ,c) Q′.
Proof. (⇐=) By Proposition 5.3.7, we have Q 4(ǫ,c) Q′ or Q 4(ǫ,c) τ.∆(Q′)
or τ.∆(Q) 4(ǫ,c) Q′. Together with Proposition 5.3.4 (2 ), (3 ) and Proposi-
tion 5.3.5, we obtain Q 4(ǫ,c) Q′.
(=⇒) Assume Q 4(ǫ,c) Q′, we need to consider three cases. First, sup-
pose that Q
τ
−→ µ for some µ, Q′ has no τ -transition but to match it
with a null label Q′
ε
=⇒ δ(Q′) and µ LA(4ǫ, c) δ(Q′), then it is easy to
see that Q (ǫ,c) τ.∆(Q′). Second, suppose that Q′
τ
−→ µ′ for some µ′,
Q has no τ -transition but to match it with a null label Q
ε
=⇒ δ(Q) and
δ(Q) LA(4ǫ, c) µ′, then similarly we show that τ.∆(Q) 4(ǫ,c) Q′. Thirdly,
neither of these conditions holds, namely, if Q performs a τ -transition, then
Q′ also has a non-zero τ -transition to match it, and vise versa. Since 
and 4 naturally coincide on performing visible transitions, we show that
Q (ǫ,c) Q′ as required.
Similar to the strong case, we have
Proposition 5.3.9. The following hold:
1. Q (0,0) Q;
2. Q (ǫ,c) Q′ iff Q′ (ǫ,−c) Q;
3. If Q1 
(ǫ1,c1) Q2 
(ǫ2,c2) Q3 then Q1 
(ǫ1+ǫ2,c1+c2) Q3;
4. (ǫ1,c1)⊆(ǫ2,c2) where ǫ1 ≤ ǫ2 and |c2 − c1| ≤ ǫ2 − ǫ1.
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Proof sketch. The proofs of the first three cases proceed analogously as
in the proof of Proposition 5.3.4. Case 4 ’s proof is similar to the proof of
Proposition 5.2.1.
Proposition 5.3.10 (Substitutivity). Let E (ǫ,c) E ′ and P (ǫ,c) P ′.
Then
1. E + F (ǫ,c) E ′ + F ;
2.
⊕
i∈1..n−1 piEi ⊕ pnE 
(ǫ,c)
⊕
i∈1..n−1 piEi ⊕ pnE
′;
3. a.P (ǫ,c) a.P ′.
Proof sketch. The proofs for Clause 1 and 3 are straightforward. We
detail below the proof of Clause 2.
By assumption, there exists an ǫ-amortised observational congruence R
s.t. (E,E ′, c) ∈ R. Let







′, c) } ∪ R ∪ IdProc .
Let
⊕
i∈1..n−1 piEi ⊕ pnE
a
=⇒ µ, we have to show that there exists also a
weak transition
⊕
i∈1..n−1 piEi ⊕ pnE
′ a=⇒ µ′ such that µ LA(4ǫ, c) µ′.
Assume that µ = ◦
∑





=⇒ ν. Since (E,E ′, c) ∈ R, there exists E ′
a
=⇒ ν ′ such that
ν LA(4ǫ, c) ν ′. Namely, there exist two weight functions ω, ω′ : NProc ×
NProc → [0, 1] such that for each G ∈ NProc,
∑
G′ ω(G,G
′) = ν(G); for
each G′ ∈ NProc,
∑
G ω
′(G,G′) = ν ′(G′); and ω(G,G′) = 0 iff ω′(G,G′) =





Let µ′ = ◦
∑
i∈1..n−1 piµi ⊕ pnν
′. We shall construct two desirable weight
functions π, π′ for µ and µ′ out of ω, ω′.
We rename the states in the support set of ν and ν ′, such that for any
i ∈ 1..n− 1, supp(µi) ∩ supp(ν) = ∅ and also supp(µi) ∩ supp(ν
′) = ∅.
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Let π, π′:
π(G,G′) = pn · ω(G,G
′) if G ∈ supp(ν) and G′ ∈ supp(ν ′);
π′(G,G′) = pn · ω
′(G,G′) if G ∈ supp(ν) and G′ ∈ supp(ν ′);





i∈1..n−1 pi · µi(G) if G = G
′ /∈ supp(ν) ∪ supp(ν ′);
0 otherwise.
We can check by definition that π, π′ satisfy the lifting condition, and
µ LA(4ǫ, c) µ′ holds as required.
5.4 Proof system A1 for amortised
bisimulation
This section is devoted to presenting a proof system A1 for strong amortised
probabilistic bisimulation ≺ and proving its soundness and completeness.
Soundness ensures the correctness of the proof system. Completeness as-
serts that all amortised bisimulations can be syntactically derived from the
proof system.
The statements of the proof system are of the form (ǫ, c) ⊲ Q ≺ Q′.
The proof system consists of axioms and inference rules, shown in Fig. 5.3
and Fig. 5.4, in the spirit of [HL93].
Axioms A′1-4 are reminiscent of the monoid laws for bisimulation. Ax-
iom A′5 will be used to transform probabilistic processes terms into normal
forms. The two axioms A′6-7 allow us to permute and merge branches of a
probabilistic choice.
The usual rules for equality (substitutivity, reflexivity, symmetry and
transitivity) hold only for (0, 0)-indexed pairs of processes, and can not
straightforwardly apply when reasoning on non-zero indexed inequalities.
Hence we need Subs, Refl, Symm and a more general rule Triangle
(short for triangle inequality) to regulate indexing inequalities when rewrit-
ing processes.
The Weakening rule does not deal with any specific operator in the
language. It is a kind of structural rule used to glue proofs together. Rules
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A1 E + 0 = E
A2 E + E = E
A3 E + F = F + E
A4 (E + F ) +G = E + (F +G)
A5 τ.P = P
A6 p1E1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ piEi ⊕ pjEj ⊕ · · · ⊕ pnEn
= p1E1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ pjEj ⊕ piEi ⊕ · · · ⊕ pnEn
A7
⊕
i∈I piEi ⊕ pE ⊕ qE =
⊕
i∈I piEi ⊕ (p+ q)E
Figure 5.3: The proof system A1: Axioms
Sum, Prefix and Prob manipulates nondeterministic choice, prefixing and
probabilistic choice, respectively. The side condition of Prob requires that
probabilistic combinations be permitted only when for every ci indexing
a related pair Ei ≺ Fi and the corresponding probability weights pi and
qi, the updated index ci − ln pi + ln qi agrees on the same value c. The
side condition ensures that the resulting pair of probabilistic distributions
satisfies the conditions of the lifting operation (Def. 4.3.2).
Theorem 5.4.1 (Soundness of A1). If A1 ⊢ (ǫ, c) ⊲ Q ≺ Q
′ then Q ≺(ǫ,c)
Q′.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of the derivation for
(ǫ, c) ⊲ Q ≺ Q′, with a case analysis on the last applied axiom or inference
rule:
When the length equals to 1, for axioms (A′1-7), let R = {(Q,Q′, 0)} ∪
IdProc . It is easy to check that R is a 0-amortised bisimulation. Refl is
trivial from Proposition 5.2.1 (1 ).
For the inductive step:
• The soundness of the rules Subs, Symm, Triangle and Weakening
are supported by Proposition 5.2.2, Proposition 5.2.1 (2 ), (3 ) and (4 ),
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A′1-7 (0, 0) ⊲ Q ≺ Q′,
where Q = Q′ is an instance of one of the axioms A1-A7
Subs If (0, 0) ⊲ Q ≺ Q′,
then Q and Q′ are substitutive under all PPA operators.
Refl (0, 0) ⊲ Q ≺ Q Symm
(0, 0) ⊲ Q ≺ Q′
(0, 0) ⊲ Q′ ≺ Q
Triangle
(ǫ1, c1) ⊲ Q1 ≺ Q2 (ǫ2, c2) ⊲ Q2 ≺ Q3
(ǫ1 + ǫ2, c1 + c2) ⊲ Q1 ≺ Q3
Weakening
(ǫ1, c1) ⊲ Q ≺ Q′
(ǫ2, c2) ⊲ Q ≺ Q′
ǫ1 ≤ ǫ2 and |c2 − c1| ≤ ǫ2 − ǫ1
Sum
(ǫ, c) ⊲ E1 ≺ F1 (ǫ, c) ⊲ E2 ≺ F2
(ǫ, c) ⊲ E1 + E2 ≺ F1 + F2
Prefix
(ǫ, c) ⊲ P1 ≺ P2
(ǫ, c) ⊲ a.P1 ≺ a.P2
Prob






∀i ∈ I, ci − ln pi + ln qi = c, |c| ≤ ǫ
Figure 5.4: The proof system A1: Inference Rules
respectively.
• Sum By the induction hypothesis, there exist ǫ-amortised bisimula-
tions R1 and R2 s.t. (E1, F1, c) ∈ R1 and (E2, F2, c) ∈ R2. Let
R = {(E1 + E2, F1 + F2, c)} ∪ R1 ∪ R2.
• Prefix By the induction hypothesis, there exists an ǫ-amortised
bisimulation R′ s.t. (P1, P2, c) ∈ R
′. Let
R = {(a.P1, a.P2, c)} ∪ R
′.
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• Prob By the induction hypothesis, there exists an ǫ-amortised bisim-











For any i, j ∈ I, let ω(Ei, Fj) = pi if i = j; otherwise 0; let ω
′(Ei, Fj) =
qi if i = j, otherwise 0. By the definition of lifting operation, ω and
ω′ can be shown to be two desirable weight functions between the two
probabilistic processes.
It is routine to check that R’s defined above are all ǫ-amortised bisim-
ulations.
The proof of the completeness result is similar to the corresponding proof
for CCS [Mil89]: Processes are transformed to equivalent normal forms.
Equivalence here means two processes are (0, 0)-indexed. Then processes
are compared almost syntactically piece by piece, and finally duplicate terms
are merged. We first give the notion of normal form that will be needed in
the proof:
Definition 5.4.2. A process Q is in normal form(NF) if
• either Q ≡ 0;







j, where each E
i
j is also in normal form.
Lemma 5.4.3. For any Q, there is a normal form Q̂ such that
A1 ⊢ (0, 0) ⊲ Q ≺ Q̂.
We will use Q̂ to denote one normal form of Q.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the depth d(Q) of Q.
If d(Q) = 0, then Q ≡ 0.
For the inductive step, two cases need to be considered:
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j , by the induction
hypothesis every Eij has a normal form. Using the proof system, the
term 0 may be eliminated, and this results in a normal form.
• Otherwise Q ∈ PProc, assume Q ≡
⊕
j∈J pjEj , by the induction
hypothesis every Ei has a normal form Êi. We apply Axiom (A
′5) and
Rule Symm and obtain a normal form τ.Q′ where Q′ ≡
⊕
j∈J pjÊi
such that A1 ⊢ (0, 0) ⊲ Q ≺ τ.Q
′.
The following lemma says that normal forms inherit indices from their
original processes, and vise versa.
Lemma 5.4.4. Q ≺(ǫ,c) Q′ iff Q̂ ≺(ǫ,c) Q̂′.
Proof. By Lemma 5.4.3 and the soundness of the proof system, we have
Q ≺(0,0) Q̂ and Q′ ≺(0,0) Q̂′. By use of Proposition 5.2.1 (2 ) and (3 ),
Q ≺(ǫ,c) Q′ iff Q̂ ≺(ǫ,c) Q̂′.
Theorem 5.4.5 (Completeness of A1). If Q ≺
(ǫ,c) Q′ then A1 ⊢ (ǫ, c) ⊲
Q ≺ Q′.
Proof. By Lemmas 5.4.3 and 5.4.4 we may assume Q and Q′ are already in


















Assume that there exist an ǫ-amortised bisimulation R and |c| ≤ ǫ such
that (Q,Q′, c) ∈ R. The proof proceeds by induction on the maximum
depth of Q and Q′.
• If the maximum depth is 0 then Q and Q′ are both 0, by Refl and
Weakening it is easy to see that A1 ⊢ (ǫ, c) ⊲ 0 ≺ 0.
• Otherwise the maximum depth is greater than 0, let a.
⊕
i∈1..n piEi
be a summand of Q. Then Q
a
−→ µ where µ = ◦
∑
i∈1..n piEi. Since
(Q,Q′, c) ∈ R, there is some µ′ = ◦
∑
j∈1..m qjFj such that Q
′ a−→ µ′
and µ LA(R, c) µ′. Namely, there exist two weight functions ω and
ω′ s.t.
∑
j∈1..m ω(Ei, Fj) = pi,
∑
i∈1..n ω
′(Ei, Fj) = qj; for any i, j,
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ω(Ei, Fj) = 0 iff ω






A1 ⊢ (ǫ, c + ln
ω(Ei, Fj)
ω′(Ei, Fj)
) ⊲ Eij ≺ Fij By the IH














′6-7, Defs. of ω, ω′







Similarly, every summand a′.P ′ of Q′ can be proved related to a sum-
mand a′.P of Q with respect to (ǫ, c). Namely,
A1 ⊢ (ǫ, c) ⊲ a
′.P ≺ a′.P ′
By applying Sum to combine all these related pairs of summands, us-
ing (A′1-4), Symm and Triangle to reorder and regroup summands
as necessary, eliminating duplicate summands, and finally it follows
that A1 ⊢ (ǫ, c) ⊲ Q ≺ Q
′.
5.5 Proof system A2 for amortised
observational congruence
In this section we extend A1 to obtain a proof system for amortised observa-
tional congruence . It turns out that, as in the standard axiomatisations
of bisimulations in CCS, it is sufficient to add the probabilistic versions of
the τ -laws T1,T2 and T3, presented in Fig. 5.5, to A1. T2 and T3 can be
considered as the reminiscent of A6 and A7 in the τ -laws for non-alternating
models in [BS01], with the only difference that here they are decorated with
indexed inequalities, rather than equalities.
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T1 (0, 0) ⊲ a.
(⊕




i∈I piEi ⊕ p F
)
T2 (0, 0) ⊲ τ.
⊕
i∈I pi(Ei + a.Pi) + a.
⊕
i∈I piPi ≺ τ.
⊕
i∈I pi(Ei + a.Pi)
T3 (0, 0) ⊲ a.
(⊕













, where for j ∈ J, Pj = ∆(Ej)
Figure 5.5: τ -laws
Convex
∀i ∈ I. Pi 7→ µi
⊕
i∈I piPi 7→ ◦
∑
i∈I piµi
Figure 5.6: The operational semantics of the convex combinator
Note that a new combinator
⊕
i∈I piPi is used in Fig. 5.5, it is the
convex combination of probabilistic processes [BS01]. Its semantics is given
in Fig. 5.6. Observe that this combinator is not really new in the sense that
it is, in fact, equivalent to
⊕
i∈I piτ.Pi in the weak semantics.
Let A2 = A1 ∪ {T1,T2,T3}. The main body of this section is devoted
to proving that A2 is sound and complete w.r.t. .
We first show that Rules Sum, Prefix and Prob are sound w.r.t. .
Proposition 5.5.1. The following hold:
1. Let i ∈ {1, 2}, Ei 
(ǫ,c) Fi, then E1 + E2 
(ǫ,c) F1 + F2;
2. If P1 
(ǫ,c) P2, then a.P1 
(ǫ,c) a.P2;





i∈I qiFi satisfy that






Proof. We sketch the proofs for Clauses 1 and 2, while detail the proof of
Clause 3.
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Clause 1 By assumption, there exist ǫ-amortised observational congruence R1
and R2 s.t. (E1, F1, c) ∈ R1 and (E2, F2, c) ∈ R2. Let
R = {(E1 + E2, F1 + F2, c)} ∪ R1 ∪ R2.
Clause 2 By assumption, there exists an ǫ-amortised observational congruence
R′ s.t. (P1, P2, c) ∈ R
′. Let
R = {(a.P1, a.P2, c)} ∪ R
′.
It is routine to check that the twoR’s defined above are all ǫ-amortised
observational congruence.
Clause 3 By assumption, for each ci there exists an ǫ-amortised observational




















=⇒ µ′ such that µ LA(4ǫ, c) µ′.
Assume that µ = ◦
∑
i∈I piµi where for each i, Ei
a
=⇒ µi. Since
(Ei, Fi, ci) ∈ Ri, there exists Fi
a


















(G,G′, ci + ln γi(G,G
′)− ln γ′i(G,G
′)) ∈4ǫ .
By assumption that ci−ln pi+ln qi = c, replacing ci with c+ln pi−ln qi
in the above equation allows us to deduce
(
G,G′, c+ ln(pi · γi(G,G










i. We shall construct desirable weight functions π




























i∈Ipi · µi(G) Def. of γi
=µ(G) Def. of µ
Analogously, we can show
∑
Gπ























By Lemma 5.3.2 and Eq. (5.3), it follows:
(
G,G′, c+ ln π(G,G′)− ln π′(G,G′)
)
∈4ǫ .
Hence, µ LA(4ǫ, c) µ′ which completes the proof.
Theorem 5.5.2 (Soundness of A2). If A2 ⊢ (ǫ, c) ⊲ Q ≺ Q
′ then Q (ǫ,c)
Q′.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of the derivation
for (ǫ, c) ⊲ Q ≺ Q′, with a case analysis on the last applied axiom or
inference rule. Here we show the soundness of axioms T1,T2 and T3.
The remaining reasonings follow straightforwardly from Propositions 5.3.9,
5.3.10 and 5.5.1.
Case T1 By Prop. 5.3.5 we have τ.∆(F ) 4
(0,0) F , namely, (τ.∆(F ), F, 0) ∈40.





piEi ⊕ p τ.∆(F )
) a
=⇒ µ implies a.
(⊕
i∈I
piEi ⊕ p F
) a
=⇒ µ′,
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Case T2 Compared with the right-hand side (RHS) of the inequality, the left-
hand side (LHS) is enriched with just one summand a.
⊕
i∈I piPi.
Thus we only need to show that if the LHS proceeds any weak transi-
tions in a.
⊕
i∈I piPi, the RHS has corresponding transitions to match





=⇒ µ, in which µ = ◦
∑
i∈I piµi where Pi 7→
µi. We aim to find also a weak transition from the RHS such that
τ.
⊕
i∈I pi(Ei + a.Pi)
a
=⇒ µ. Then it allows us to obtain easily that
µ LA(40, 0) µ holds.










i∈I pi(Ei + a.Pi) ⇒ ◦
∑
i∈I pi(Ei + a.Pi)
τ.
⊕






where (1) is obtained from p-idle and Weak2; (2) is from Weak1,





=⇒ µ as required.
Case T3 Similarly to the above case, we only need to show that, for any weak






=⇒ µ, in which µ = ◦
∑
i∈I∪J piµi where
Pi 7→ µi. We aim to find also a weak transition from the RHS such
that a.
(⊕










Ei + τ.Pi ⇒ µi
(2′),
where (1′), (2′) are obtained in the same way as the foregoing (1), (2)
in Case T2.
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Hence, we obtain a.
(⊕




=⇒ µ as re-
quired.
Now we turn to the proof of the completeness result. As usual we need
to use a stronger version of a normal form.
Definition 5.5.3. A process Q is in full normal form(FNF) if
• either Q ≡ 0;







j, where each E
i




=⇒ µ, then Q
a
−→ µ.
Lemma 5.5.4. (saturation) If Q
a
=⇒ µ, then A2 ⊢ (0, 0) ⊲ Q ≺ Q + a.P
where P 7→ µ.
Proof. We prove by induction on the depth d(Q) of Q.
The case when d(Q) = 0 is trivial.
For the inductive step, three cases need to be considered. Let P 7→ µ.
Case 1 If a.P is a summand of Q, then the conclusion holds by A′2, Symm
and Triangle.
109
5.5. Proof system A2 for amortised observational congruence





where for each i ∈ I, Ei
τ
=⇒ µi, and for each j ∈ J , Ej stays un-
changed, namely Ej ⇒ µj where µj = δ(Ej). Let ◦
∑
i∈I∪J piµi = µ.
By the induction hypothesis, for i ∈ I, A2 ⊢ (0, 0) ⊲ Ei ≺ Ei + τ.Pi
where Pi 7→ µi. For j ∈ J let Pj 7→ µj, so A2 ⊢ (0, 0) ⊲
Q ≺ Q + a.P ′ by A′2, Symm and Triangle






≺ Q + a.
(⊕




by IH and Subs
≺ Q + a.
(⊕







by T3, Symm and Triangle
≺ Q + a.
⊕
i∈I∪J piPi by reversing previous steps
≺ Q + a.P by P 7→ µ, ∀i ∈ I ∪ J. Pi 7→ µi and ◦
∑
i∈I∪J piµi = µ.
Case 3 If τ.P ′ is a summand of Q, assume that P ′ ≡
⊕
i∈I piEi where for each
i, Ei
a
=⇒ µi and ◦
∑
i∈I piµi = µ. Then by induction A2 ⊢ (0, 0) ⊲
Ei ≺ Ei + a.Pi where Pi 7→ µi, so A2 ⊢ (0, 0) ⊲
Q ≺ Q + τ.P ′ by A′2, Symm and Triangle
≺ Q + τ.
⊕
i∈I piEi
≺ Q + τ.
⊕
i∈I pi(Ei + a.Pi) by IH and Subs
≺ Q + τ.
⊕
i∈I pi(Ei + a.Pi) + a.
⊕
i∈I piPi
by T2, Symm and Triangle
≺ Q + a.
⊕
i∈I piPi by reversing previous steps
≺ Q + a.P by P 7→ µ, ∀i ∈ I. Pi 7→ µi and ◦
∑
i∈I piµi = µ.
This completes the proof.
With the help of Lemma 5.5.4, we can further convert a normal form to
a full normal form:
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Lemma 5.5.5. For any normal form Q there is a full normal form Q′ of
equal depth, such that A2 ⊢ (0, 0) ⊲ Q ≺ Q
′.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the depth of Q, essentially fol-
lowing the same idea as Lemma 17 in Chapter 7.4 of [Mil89].
Analogous to the strong case, we can show that full normal forms and
their original processes share the same indices.
Lemma 5.5.6. Q (ǫ,c) Q′ iff Q̂ (ǫ,c) Q̂′, where Q̂ and Q̂′ are full normal
forms of Q and Q′ respectively.
Now we are in a position to prove the completeness of A2.
Theorem 5.5.7 (Completeness of A2). If Q 
(ǫ,c) Q′ then A2 ⊢ (ǫ, c) ⊲
Q ≺ Q′.
Proof. By Lemmas 5.5.5 and 5.5.6, we may assume that Q and Q′ are in
full normal form. The proof proceeds by induction on the sum of the depths
of Q and Q′.
If d(Q) = d(Q′) = 0, then Q ≡ 0 ≡ Q′, so the result is trivial.
Otherwise, assume that Q (ǫ,c) Q′. Let a.P be a summand of Q.
We aim to prove that Q′ has a summand provably equal to a.P . Now
Q
a
−→ µ where P 7→ µ, so there is a P ′ such that P ′ 7→ µ′, Q′
a
=⇒ µ′ and
µ LA(4ǫ, c) µ′. Moreover Q′
a
−→ µ′ since Q′ is a full normal form, so a.P ′
is a summand of Q′.
By µ LA(4ǫ, c) µ′, there exist weight function ω and ω′ satisfying
∑
F ω(E,
F ) = µ(E),
∑
E ω
′(E, F ) = µ′(F ) and if ω(E, F ) > 0,
E 4(ǫ,c+lnω(E,F )−lnω
′(E,F )) F.
Here we cannot yet use the induction hypothesis. But by Proposition 5.3.8,
we know that either
E (ǫ,c+lnω(E,F )−lnω
′(E,F )) F, (5.4)
or
τ.∆(E) (ǫ,c+lnω(E,F )−lnω
′(E,F )) F, (5.5)
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or
E (ǫ,c+lnω(E,F )−lnω
′(E,F )) τ.∆(F ). (5.6)
In the first case (Eq. (5.4)), since E and F are full normal form, and of
lesser depth than Q and Q′, by induction
A2 ⊢ (ǫ, c+ lnω(E, F )− lnω
′(E, F )) ⊲ E ≺ F.
In the second case (Eq. (5.5)) we must first convert τ.∆(E) to full normal
form before applying induction. From Lemma 5.5.5, there is a full normal
form E ′, of equal depth to τ.∆(E), such that A2 ⊢ (0, 0) ⊲ τ.∆(E) ≺ E
′;
but the sum of depths of E ′ and F is one less than the sum of depths of Q
and Q′, so by induction we infer that
A2 ⊢ (ǫ, c+ lnω(E, F )− lnω
′(E, F )) ⊲ E ′ ≺ F,
so
A2 ⊢ (ǫ, c+ lnω(E, F )− lnω
′(E, F )) ⊲ τ.∆(E) ≺ F.
In the third case (Eq. (5.6)), we can similarly infer that
A2 ⊢ (ǫ, c+ lnω(E, F )− lnω
′(E, F )) ⊲ E ≺ τ.∆(F ).
Given a process E, we use E to denote either simply E itself: E ≡ E
or a τ -guarded E: E ≡ τ.∆(E). Applying first Prob to combine the sets
{ E | E ∈ supp(µ) } and { F | F ∈ supp(µ′) }, and then T1 to simplify all
τ -guarded processes, A′6-7 to combine duplicate probabilistic summands,
we obtain that
A2 ⊢ (ǫ, c) ⊲ P ≺ P
′,
furthermore by Prefix we get that
A2 ⊢ (ǫ, c) ⊲ a.P ≺ a.P
′ .
Thus, we have shown that from A2 each summand a.P of Q can be
proved equal to a summand of Q′. Similarly each summand a′.P ′ of Q′ can
be proved equal to a summand of Q. Finally, using Rules A′2, Symm and





In this chapter, we have presented a weak version of the amortised bisimula-
tion introduced in Section 4.2, Chapter 4, formulated proof systems for the
amortised strong bisimulation and observational congruence, and proved




Originally proposed in the seminal works of van Breugel andWorrel [vBW01b,
vBW01a] and of Desharnais et al. [DGJP99, DJGP02, DJGP04], the pseu-
dometric based on the Kantorovich lifting has become very popular in the
process algebra community. One reason for its success is that, when deal-
ing with probabilistic processes, distances are more suitable than equiv-
alences, since the latter are not robust wrt small variation of probabili-
ties. Another important reason is that, thanks to the dual presentation of
the Kantorovich lifting in terms of the mass transportation problem, the
distance can be efficiently computed using linear programming algorithms
[vBW01a, vBW06, vBW14, BBLM13b]. Furthermore, this pseudometric
is an extension of probabilistic bisimilarity, in the sense that two states
have distance distance 0 if and only if they are bisimilar. In fact, this
pseudometric also shares with bisimilarity a similar coinductive definition.
More precisely, it is defined as the greatest fixpoint of a transformation
that has the same structure as the one used for bisimilarity.1 This allows
to transfer some of the concepts and methods that have been extensively
explored in process algebra, and to use lines of reasoning which the process
1In the original definition the Kantorovich bisimilarity pseudometric was defined as
the greatest fixpoint, but such definition requires using the reverse order on metrics.
More recently, authors tend to use the natural order, and define the bisimilarity metric
as the least fixpoint, see [BBLM13a, BBLM13b, CvBW12]. Here we follow the latter
approach.
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algebra community is familiar with. Along the same lines, a nice property
of this pseudometric is that the standard operators of process algebra are
non-expansive w.r.t. it. This generalizes the result that bisimulation is a
congruence, and can be used in a similar way, for compositional reasoning
and verification.
Last but not least, the Kantorovich bisimilarity metric provides a bound
on the corresponding distance on probabilistic traces [CvBW12] (corre-
sponding in the sense that the definition is based on the same Kantorovich
lifting). This means that it can be used to verify certain probabilistic prop-
erties on traces. More specifically, it can be used to verify properties that
are expressed in terms of difference between probabilities of sets of traces.
These properties are linear, in the sense that the difference increases linearly
wrt variations on the distributions.
Many properties, however, such as several privacy and security ones, are
not linear. This is the case of the popular property of differential privacy
[Dwo06], which is expressed in terms of ratios of probabilities. In fact, there
are processes that have small Kantorovich distance, and which are not ǫ-
differentially private for any finite ǫ. Another example are the properties
used in quantitative information flow, which involve logarithmic functions
on probabilities.
The purpose of this work is to generalize the Kantorovich lifting to
obtain a family of pseudometrics suitable for the verification of a wide class
of properties, following the principles that:
i. the members of this family should depend on a parameter related to
the class of properties (on traces) that we wish to verify,
ii. each member should provide a bound on the corresponding distance on
trace distributions,
iii. the kernel of each member should correspond to probabilistic bisimi-
larity,
iv. the general construction should be coinductive,
v. the typical process-algebra operators should be non-expansive,
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vi. each member should be feasible to compute.
In this chapter we have achieved the first four desiderata. Regarding the
last two, so far we have studied a particular case (hereafter called multi-
plicative variant of the Kantorovich lifting) based on the notion of distance
used in the definition of differential privacy. We were able to find a dual
form of the lifting, which allows to reduce the problem of its computation to
a linear optimization problem solvable with standard algorithms. We have
also proved that several typical process-algebra operators are non-expansive,
and we have given explicitly the expression of the bound. For some of them
we were able to prove this result in a general form, i.e., non-expansiveness
wrt all the metrics of the family, and with the bound represented by the
same expression.
As an example of application of our framework, we show how to instanti-
ate our construction to obtain the multiplicative variant of the Kantorovich
pseudometric, and how to use it to verify the property of differential privacy.
Related Work Bisimulation metrics based on the standard Kantorovich
distance have been used in various applications, such as systems biology [TK10],
games [CdAMR08], planning [CP12] and security [CG09]. We consider in
this chapter discrete state spaces. Bisimulation metrics on uncountable
state spaces have been explored in [DJGP04, FPP05, FPP11]. We define
bisimulation metrics as fixed point of an appropriate transformation. Al-
ternative characterizations were provided in terms of coalgebras [vBW01b,
vBW05] and real-valued modal logics [DGJP99, DJGP04].
6.1 Preliminaries
The ball , w.r.t. a metric m : X2 → [0,+∞), of radius r centered at x ∈ X
is defined as Bmr (x) = {x
′ ∈ X : m(x, x′) ≤ r}. A point x ∈ X is called
isolated iff there exists r > 0 such that Bmr (x) = {x}; m is called discrete
if all points are isolated. The diameter (wrt m) of A ⊆ X is defined as
diamm(A) = supx,x′∈A m(x, x
′). A geodesic is a curve on which paths have
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minimum distance, i.e. a curve γ : I → X , where I is an interval of reals,
such that m(γ(a), γ(b)) = |a − b| for all a, b ∈ I. The kernel ker(m) is an
equivalence relation on X defined as
(x, x′) ∈ ker(m) iff m(x, x′) = 0
6.2 A general family of Kantorovich liftings
We introduce here a family of liftings from pseudometrics on a set X to
pseudometrics on Prob(X). This family is obtained as a generalization of
the Kantorovich lifting, in which the Lipschitz condition plays a central
role.
Definition 6.2.1. Given two pseudometric spaces (X,m), (Y, dY ), we say
that f : X → Y is 1-Lipschitz wrt m, dY iff dY (f(x), f(x
′)) ≤ m(x, x′) for
all x, x′ ∈ X.
We denote by 1-Lip[(X,m), (Y, dY )] the set of all such functions.
A function f : X → R can be lifted to a function f̂ : Prob(X) → R by





while for continuous distributions we need to restrict f to be measurable
wrt the corresponding σ-algebra on X , and take f̂(µ) =
∫
fdµ.
Given a pseudometric m on X , the standard Kantorovich lifting of m
is a pseudometric K(m) on Prob(X), defined as:
K(m)(µ, µ′) = sup{|f̂(µ)− f̂(µ′)| : f ∈ 1-Lip[(X,m), (R, dR)]}
where dR denotes the standard metric on reals. For continuous distributions
we implicitly take the sup to range over measurable functions.
Generalization. A generalization of the Kantorovich lifting can be nat-
urally obtained by extending the range of f from (R, dR) to a generic met-
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ric space (V, dV ), where V ⊆ R is a convex subset of the reals
2, and dV
is a metric on V . A function f : X → V can be lifted to a function
f̂ : Prob(X) → V in the same way as before (cfr. (6.1)); the requirement
that V is convex ensures that f̂(µ) ∈ V .
Then, similarly to the standard case:
Definition 6.2.2. Given a pseudometric space (X,m), we can define a
lifted pseudometric KV (m) on Prob(X) as:
KV (m)(µ, µ
′) = sup{dV (f̂(µ), f̂(µ
′)) : f ∈ 1-Lip[(X,m)(V, dV )]}
The subscript V in KV is to emphasize the fact that for each choice of
(V, dV ) we may get a different lifting. We should also point out the difference
between m, the pseudometric on X being lifted, and dV , the metric (not
pseudo) on V which parameterizes the lifting.
The constructed KV (m) can be shown to be an extended pseudometric
for any choice of (V, dV ), i.e. it is non-negative, symmetric, identical ele-
ments have distance zero, and it satisfies the triangle inequality. However,
without extra conditions, it is not guaranteed to be bounded (even if m
itself is bounded). For the purposes of this chapter this is not an issue.
Below we show that under the condition that dV is ball-convex (i.e. all
its balls are convex sets, which holds for all metrics in this chapter), the
following bound can be obtained:
KV (m)(µ, µ
′) ≤ diamm(supp(µ) ∪ supp(µ
′))
We say that (V, dV ) is ball-convex if B
dV
r (x) is convex for all r > 0, x ∈ V .
Not all metrics have this property, in fact in [Nor91] it is shown that (V, dV )
is ball-convex iff
dV (x, λy1 + λ̄y2) ≤ max{dV (x, y1), dV (x, y2)} ∀x, y1, y2 ∈ V, λ ∈ [0, 1]
i.e. iff dV (x, ·) is a quasi-convex function for any fixed x ∈ V.Many standard
metrics (for instance all norms) satisfy this property. Moreover the metric
2V could be further generalized to be a convex subset of a vector space. It is unclear
whether such a generalization would be useful, hence it is left as future work.
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d⊗ used in the multiplicative Kantorovich variant (Section 6.4) also satisfies
it.
The usefulness of ball-convexity is given by the following proposition,
stating that on such metrics, convex combinations cannot increase dis-
tances. We denote by ch(A) the convex hull of A.
Proposition 6.2.3. Let (V, dV ) be ball-convex and A ⊆ V . Then
diamdV (ch(A)) = diamdV (A)
Proof. From A ⊆ ch(A) we get diamdV (A) ≤ diamdV (ch(A)). We now show
that diamdV (ch(A)) ≤ diamdV (A).
Let δ = diamdV (A) and assume that diamdV (ch(A)) > δ, i.e. ∃x, y ∈
ch(A) s.t. dV (x, y) > δ. If A ⊆ B
dV
δ (x) then ch(A) ⊆ ch(B
dV
δ (x)) = B
dV
δ (x)
(balls are convex) which is a contradiction since y 6∈ BdVδ (x). Hence it must
hold that A 6⊆ BdVδ (x), that is ∃z ∈ A with dV (x, z) > δ.
Assume that A ⊆ BdVδ (z). Then ch(A) ⊆ ch(B
dV
δ (z)) = B
dV
δ (z). Since
x ∈ ch(A), x ∈ BdVδ (z) which contradicts dV (x, z) > δ. Hence A 6⊆ B
dV
δ (z).
Therefore, d(w, z) > δ for some w ∈ A. This contradicts our assumption
that diamdV (A) = δ.
As a corollary of the previous result, we can bound the Kantorovich
lifting of a pseudometric m.
Proposition 6.2.4. Let (V, dV ) be ball-convex. Then
KV (m)(µ, µ
′) ≤ diamm(supp(µ) ∪ supp(µ
′))
Proof. Let f ∈ 1-Lip[(X,m)(V, dV )], let A = supp(µ) ∪ supp(µ
′), and let
f(A) denote the set {f(x) : x ∈ A}. We have that
dV (f̂(µ), f̂(µ
′)) ≤ diamdV (ch(f(A))) f̂(µ), f̂(µ
′) ∈ ch(f(A))
= diamdV (f(A)) Prop 6.2.3
≤ diamm(A) 1-Lipschitz
This holds for all 1-Lipschitz functions, hence KV (m)(µ, µ
′) ≤ diamm(A).
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Examples The standard Kantorovich lifting is obtained by taking (V, dV )
= (R, dR). When 1-bounded pseudometrics are used, like in the construction
of the standard bisimilarity metric, then we can equivalently take V = [0, 1].
Moreover, a multiplicative variant of the Kantorovich lifting can be ob-
tained by taking (V, dV ) = ([0, 1], d⊗) (or equivalently ([0,∞), d⊗)) where
d⊗(x, y) = | ln x − ln y|. The resulting lifting is discussed in detail in Sec-
tion 6.4 and its relation to differential privacy is shown in Section 6.4.2.
6.3 A general family of bisimilarity
pseudometrics
In this section we define a general family of pseudometrics on the states
of a PA which have the property of extending probabilistic bisimilarity in
the usual sense. Following standard lines, we define a transformation on
state pseudometrics by first lifting a state pseudometric to a pseudometric
on distributions (over states), using the generalized Kantorovich lifting de-
fined in previous section. Then we apply the standard Hausdorff lifting to
obtain a pseudometric on sets of distributions. This last step is to take into
account the nondeterminism of the PA, i.e., the fact that in general, from
a state, we can make transitions to different distributions. The resulting
pseudometric naturally corresponds to a state pseudometric, obtained by
associating each set of distributions to the states which originate them. Fi-
nally, we define the intended bisimilarity pseudometric as the least fixpoint
of this transformation wrt the ordering  on the state pseudometrics (or
equivalently, as the greatest fixpoint wrt the reverse of ). We recall that
m  m′ means that m(s, s′) ≤ m′(s, s′) for all s, s′ ∈ S.
Let A = (S, s, A,D) be a PA, assume that A is finitely branching. Let
(V, dV ) be a metric space (for some convex V ⊆ R), and let M be the set
of pseudometrics m on S such that diamm(S) ≤ diamdV (V ). Recall that
inf ∅ = diamdV (V ) and sup ∅ = 0.
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Definition 6.3.1. The transformation FV : M → M is defined as follows.



















We can also characterize FV in terms of the following zigzag formulation:
Proposition 6.3.2. For any ǫ ≥ 0, FV (m)(s, t) ≤ ǫ if and only if:
• if s
a
−→ µ, then there exists ν such that t
a
−→ ν and KV (m)(µ, ν) ≤ ǫ,
• if t
a
−→ ν, then there exists µ such that s
a
−→ µ and KV (m)(ν, µ) ≤ ǫ.
Proof. The proposition can be proved by directly checking the definition of
FV .
The following result states that KV and FV are monotonic wrt (M,).
Proposition 6.3.3. Let m,m′ ∈ M. If m  m′ then:
FV (m)(s, s
′) ≤ FV (m
′)(s, s′) for all states s, s′
KV (m)(µ, µ
′) ≤ KV (m
′)(µ, µ′) for all distributions µ, µ′
Proof. The essence of the proof is the observation that
1-Lip[(V, dV ), (S,m)] ⊆ 1-Lip[(V, dV ), (S,m
′)]
whenever m  m′.
Since (M,) is a complete lattice and FV is monotone onM, by Tarski’s
theorem [Tar55] FV has a least fixpoint, which coincides with the least pre-
fixpoint. We define the bisimilarity pseudometric bmV as this least fixpoint:
Definition 6.3.4. The bisimilarity pseudometric bmV is defined as:
bmV = min
{




m ∈ M|FV (m)  m
}
In addition, if the states of A are finite, then the closure ordinal of
FV is ω (cf: [DJGP02], Lemma 3.10). Hence we can approximate bmV by
iterating the function FV from the bottom element:
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Proposition 6.3.5. Assume that S is finite. Let m0 = ⊥ and mi+1 =
FV (mi). Then bmV = supi mi.
Proof. Since the closure ordinal of FV is ω, following the standard way, one
can approximate the least fixpoint bmV by iterating the function FV from
the bottom element.
The next section shows that bmV is indeed a bisimilarity metric, in the
sense that its kernel coincides with probabilistic bisimilarity.
6.3.1 Bisimilarity as 0-distance
We now show that under certain conditions, the pseudometric constructed
from KV (m) characterizes bisimilarity at its kernel. Recall that the kernel
ker(m) of m is an equivalence relation relating states at distance 0.
To obtain the characterization result we assume that (a) the PA is
finitely branching, and (b) there exists a geodesic in (V, dV ). The main
result is that, under condition (b), the kernel operator and the lifting op-
erators L, KV commute on distributions with finite support.
3 This is then
sufficient to obtain the characterization result due to condition (a).
Lemma 6.3.6. If (V, dV ) has a geodesic then L(ker(m)) and ker(KV (m))
coincide on all distributions of finite support.
Proof. Direction ⊆: let (µ, µ′) ∈ L(ker(m)) and let f : S → V be 1-
Lipschitz wrt m, dV . Every such function needs to map equivalent elements
of S to the same element of V , since (s, s′) ∈ ker(m) implies m(s, s′) =
0 which, from 1-Lipschitz, means that dV (f(s), f(s
′)) = 0 which in turn
implies f(s) = f(s′).
3cfr. [DD09] for the analogous property for the standard Kantorovich lifting.
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For simplicity, we write [s] for [s]ker(m). Let Sr be a set of representatives














f(s)µ′([s]) (µ, µ′) ∈ L(ker(m))
= f̂(µ′)
Hence dV (f̂(µ), f̂(µ
′)) = 0 and this happens for all such f , which implies
KV (m)(µ, µ
′) = 0, that is (µ, µ′) ∈ ker(KV (m)). Note that this direction
requires neither an assumption on (V, dV ), nor that µ, µ
′ have finite support.
Direction ⊇: let (µ, µ′) 6∈ L(ker(m)) such that S+ = supp(µ)∪ supp(µ
′)
is finite; we show that (µ, µ′) 6∈ ker(KV (m)). Since µ, µ
′ are not equivalent,
there exists s0 ∈ S such that µ([s0]) 6= µ
′([s0]). Let ζ > 0 be the minimum




Moreover, let γ : [0, d] → V be a geodesic4 of (V, dV ), and take some ǫ > 0
that is smaller than both ζ and d.
We define a function f : S → V as:
f = γ ◦ g where g(s) = min{m(s, s0), ǫ}
We first show that f is 1-Lipshitz wrt m, dV . Let s, s
′ ∈ S and assume wlog
that g(s) ≥ g(s′). From the definiton of g it follows that:
g(s)− g(s′) ≤ m(s, s0)−m(s
′, s0) (6.2)
Then we have that:
dV (f(s), f(s
′)) = dV (γ(g(s)), γ(g(s
′)) Def. of f
= g(s)− g(s′) γ is a geodesic
≤ m(s, s0)−m(s
′, s0) (6.2)
≤ m(s, s′) triangle ineq.
4Wlog we can take γ’s domain to be of the form [0, d].
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hence f is 1-Lipshitz wrt m, dV .
Moreover, since ǫ < ζ , for all elements s ∈ S+ we have that either
g(s) = 0 (when s ∈ [s0]) or g(s) = ǫ, hence f maps all elements of S+ ∩ [s0]
to γ(0) and all elements of S+ \ [s0] to γ(ǫ). Finally, for any a 6= b ∈ R, λ 6=





= γ(0)µ ([s0]) + γ(ǫ)(1− µ ([s0]))
6= γ(0)µ′([s0]) + γ(ǫ)(1− µ
′([s0]))
= f̂(µ′)
Hence dV (f̂(µ), f̂(µ
′)) > 0 which implies KV (m)(µ, µ
′) > 0, that is (µ, µ′) 6∈
ker(KV (m)).
Note that in the above proof we need a geodesic γ since in general there
might be elements of S arbitrarily close to s0, and we need to map such
elements to V while preserving the 1-Lipshitz condition. However, if S is
finite, we can always find an ǫ > 0 smaller than the distance between s0
and any s 6∈ [s0]. In this case it is enough that (V, dV ) has a non-isolated
point a, so we can find b ∈ V s.t. dV (a, b) < ǫ, then define f as f(s) = a iff
s ∈ [s0] and f(s) = b otherwise, and continue the proof in the same way.
If S is finite, the same result can be obtained under the weaker condition
that (V, dV ) is non-discrete. We also expect the result to be extensible to
distributions with infinite support.
We now show the correspondence between pre-fixpoint metrics and bisim-
ulations. Using Lemma 6.3.6, we can see that the definition of the trans-
formation B for bisimulations in Chapter 2.4 corresponds to the charac-
terization of FV in Proposition 6.3.2, for ǫ = 0. Hence we have the follow
proposition hold. Note that here distributions are assumed to have finite
support sets.
Proposition 6.3.7. Assume that (V, dV ) has a geodesic. For everym ∈ M,
if FV (m)  m then ker(m) ⊆ B(ker(m)), i.e., ker(m) is a bisimulation.
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Proof. Let (s, t) ∈ ker(m), i.e. m(s, t) = 0. Since FV (m)  m, by
Prop. 6.3.2, we have that if s
a
−→ µ, then there exists ν such that t
a
−→ ν
and KV (m)(µ, ν) = 0. Clearly (µ, ν) ∈ ker(KV (m)), by Lemma 6.3.6, it fol-
lows that (µ, ν) ∈ L(ker(m)). A similar condition holds for the converse di-
rection where t initiates transitions. Hence, we have (s, t) ∈ B(ker(m)).
As a consequence, ker(bmV ) ⊆∼. The converse of Proposition 6.3.7 does
not hold, because the fact that ker(m) ⊆ B(ker(m)) does not say anything
about the effect of FV on the distance between elements that are not in
the kernel. However, in the case of bisimilarity we can make a connection:
consider the greatest metric m∼ whose kernel coincides with bisimilarity,
namely, m∼(s, s
′) = 0 if s ∼ s′ and m∼(s, s
′) = diamdV (V ) otherwise.
We have that FV (m∼)  m∼, and therefore ∼= ker(m∼) ⊆ ker(bmV ).
Therefore we can conclude that the kernel of the bisimilarity pseudometrics
coincides with bisimilarity.
Theorem 6.3.8. If (V, dV ) has a geodesic, then ker(bmV ) = ∼.
Proof. Since bmV is a fixpoint of FV , then by definition FV (bmV ) = bmV , by
Prop. 6.3.7 ker(bmV ) ⊆ B(ker(bmV )), and hence ker(bmV ) is a probabilistic
bisimulation relation, namely, ker(bmV ) ⊆ ∼.
Vice versa, define m(s, t) = 0 if s ∼ t, and m(s, t) = diamdV (V ) other-
wise. Due to Lemma 6.3.6 we have FV (m)  m, hence bmV  m, therefore
∼= ker(m) ⊆ ker(bmV ).
6.3.2 Relation with trace distributions
In this section, we show the relation between the bisimilarity metric bmV
and the corresponding metric on traces, in the case of FPAs (fully proba-
bilistic automata). Note that we restrict to the fully probabilistic case here,
where probabilities on traces can defined in the way shown in the prelimi-
naries. The full case of PAs can be treated by using schedulers, but a proper
treatment involves imposing scheduler restrictions which complicate the for-
malism. Since these problems are orthogonal to the goals of this chapter,
we keep the discussion simple by restricting to the fully probabilistic case.
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The distance between trace distributions (i.e. distributions over Aω)
will be measured by the Kantorovich lifting of the discrete metric. Given
(V, dV ), let δV = diamdV (V ). Then let dmδV be the δV -valued discrete
metric on Aω, defined as dmδV (~t, ~t
′) = 0 if ~t = ~t′, and dmδV (~t, ~t
′) = δV
otherwise.
Then KV (dmδV )(µ, µ
′) is a pseudometric on Prob(Aω), whose kernel
coincides with probabilistic trace equivalence.
Proposition 6.3.9. KV(dmδV )(µ, µ





iff for any f ∈ 1-Lip[(Aω, dmδV )(V, dV )], dV (f̂(µ), f̂(µ
′)) = 0 Def. 6.2.2
iff for any f ∈ 1-Lip[(Aω, dmδV )(V, dV )], f̂(µ) = f̂(µ
′) dV is a metric.
(6.3)
We shall show that the right hand part (6.3) of the above relation is equiv-
alent to the right hand part of Proposition 6.3.9.
(⇐) If µ(σ)=µ′(σ) for all measurable σ⊆Aω, by checking the definition
of f̂ , it is straightforward that f̂(µ) = f̂(µ′) for any f .
(⇒) For the converse direction, we assume that there exists a measur-
able σ⊆Aω such that µ(σ) 6=µ′(σ). We construct a non-expansive function
f ∈ 1-Lip[(Aω, dmδV )(V, dV )]: f(~t) = c for ~t ∈ σ, 0 otherwise, where c is a
constant in V . We get that f̂(µ) = c · µ(σ) and f̂(µ′) = c · µ′(σ). Due to
the assumption, f̂(µ) 6= f̂(µ′), which contradicts (6.3).
The following theorem expresses that our bisimilarity metric bmV is
a bound on the distance on traces, which extends the standard relation
between probabilistic bisimilarity and probabilistic trace equivalence.
Theorem 6.3.10. Let µ = Pr[s ⊲ · ] and µ′ = Pr[s′ ⊲ · ]. Then
KV (dmδV )(µ, µ
′) ≤ bmV (s, s
′)
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0 if ~th = ~t′h
δV otherwise,





′) proceeds by induction on h.
For the base case h = 0, we have dm0δV (
~t, ~t′) = 0 for any ~t, ~t′. Namely,
for any f ∈ 1-Lip[(T, dm0δV )(V, dV )], dV (f(
~t), f(~t′)) ≤ dm0δV (
~t, ~t′) = 0.







fdµ′) = 0, we have KV (dm
0
δV




)(µ, µ′) ≤ bmV (s, s
′) holds.












fdµ′) : f ∈ 1-Lip[(T, dmh+1δV )(V, dV )]
}
Consider the case where both s and s′ have no outgoing transitions,
then both KV (dm
h+1
δV
)(µ, µ′) = 0 and bmV (s, s
′) = 0. Consider another case
where s can perform a transition with a label that can not be matched by
any transition from s′, then both KV (dm
h+1
δV
)(µ, µ′) = δV and bmV (s, s
′) =
δV . Hence, the only interesting case is when s
a
−→ ν and s′
a
−→ ν ′.
Let f ∈ 1-Lip[(T, dmh+1δV )(V, dV )]. The main idea is to show that for any
such function f , we can construct a function g : S → V that is 1-Lipschitz
wrt bmV , dV .
We define fa(~t) = f(a
a~t). Clearly fa ∈ 1-Lip[(T, dm
h
δV
)(V, dV )] and also
define g : S → V as




We have that for all s, s′ ∈ S
dV (g(s), g(s
′)) = dV (f̂a(µ), f̂a(µ








≤ bmV (s, s
′) induction hypothesis
hence g is 1-Lipschitz wrt bmV , dV .
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Moreover, ∀σ ∈ ΣT , i.e., σ is an element of the Σ-algebra on traces. We
have σ = σa ∪X s.t. σa = a
aσ′, σ′ ∈ ΣT , and X is a set of traces that do



































ν(si)g(si) Def. of g
= ĝ(ν)
and similarly f̂(µ′) = ĝ(ν ′). Hence
dV (f̂(µ), f̂(µ
′)) = dV (ĝ(ν), ĝ(ν
′))
≤ KV (bmV )(ν, ν
′) g is 1-Lipschitz wrt bmV , dV
= bmV (s, s
′) FV (bmV ) = bmV




Now we only need the condition that KV is continuous w.r.t. m, i.e.,
∀ǫ > 0, ∃δ : if supa,b |m(a, b) − m
′(a, b)| < δ, then ∀µ, µ′.|KV (m)(µ, µ
′) −
KV (m
′)(µ, µ′)| < ǫ. Hence the bound holds also for KV (dmδV )(µ, µ
′).
It should be noted that, although the choice of KV (dmδV ) as our trace
distribution metric might seem arbitrary, this metric is in fact of great in-
terest. In the case of the standard bisimilarity pseudometric, i.e. when
(V, dV ) = ([0, 1], dR), this metric is equal to the well-known total varia-
tion distance (also known as statistical distance), defined as tv(µ, µ′) =
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supσ |µ(σ)− µ
′(σ)|:
K(dmδV ) = tv (6.4)
Theorem 6.3.10 reduces to the result of [CvBW12] relating the total vari-
ation distance to the bisimilarity pseudometric. Moreover, in the case of
the multiplicative pseudometric, discussed in the next section, KV (dmδV )
is the same as the multiplicative distance between distributions, discussed
in Section 6.4.2, which plays a central role in differential privacy.
6.4 The multiplicative variant
In this section we investigate the multiplicative variant of the Kantorovich
pseudometric, obtained by considering as distance dV the ratio between
two numbers instead of their difference. This is the distance used to define
differential privacy. We show that this variant has a dual form, which can
be used to compute the metric by using linear programming techniques. In
the next section, we will show how to use it to verify differential privacy.
Definition 6.4.1. The multiplicative variant K⊗ of the Kantorovich lifting
is defined as the instantiation of KV with ([0, 1], d⊗) where d⊗(x, y) = | lnx−
ln y|.
It is well known that the standard Kantorovich metric has a dual form
which can be interpreted in terms of the Transportation Problem, namely,
the lowest total cost of transporting the mass of one distribution µ to the
other distribution µ′ given the cost (distance) m between locations (in our
case, states). The dual form is shown in Fig. 6.1. Note that both the
primal and the dual forms are linear optimization problems. The dual form
is particularly suitable for computation, via standard linear programming
techniques.
For our multiplicative variant, the objective function of the primal form
is not a linear expression, hence the linear programming techniques cannot
be applied directly. However, since ln f̂(µ)−ln f̂(µ′) = ln f̂(µ)/f̂(µ′) and ln is
a monotonically increasing function, the primal problem is actually a linear-
fractional program. It is known that such kind of program can be converted
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Standard K(m)(µ, µ′) Multiplicative K⊗(m)(µ, µ
′)
maxf |f̂(µ)− f̂(µ′)| maxf | ln f̂(µ)− ln f̂(µ′)|
Primal subject to subject to
∀s, s′. |f(s)− f(s′)| ≤ m(s, s′) ∀s, s′. | ln f(s)− ln f(s′)| ≤ m(s, s′)
minℓ
∑
i,j ℓijm(si, sj) min ln z
Dual subject to subject to
∀i, j. ℓij ≥ 0 ∀i, j. ℓij , ri ≥ 0
∀i.
∑
j ℓij = µ(si) ∀i.
∑
j ℓij − ri = µ(si)
∀j.
∑




m(si,sj) − rj ≤ z · µ′(sj)
Figure 6.1: The standard Kantorovich metric and its multiplicative variant.
to an equivalent linear programming problem and then to a dual program.
The detailed transformation is shown in the coming subsection. The dual
form of the multiplicative variant obtained in this way is shown in Fig. 6.1.
(For the sake of simplicity, the figure shows only the dual form of ln f̂(µ)−
ln f̂(µ′). The dual form of ln f̂(µ′) − ln f̂(µ) can be obtained by simply
switching the roles of µ and µ′.) Hence, the multiplicative pseudometric
can be computed by using linear programming techniques.
Finally, note that the curve γ : [0, a] → [0, 1], for a > 0, defined by
γ(t) = e−t is a geodesic of ([0, 1], d⊗), since d⊗(γ(a), γ(b)) = | ln e
−a −
ln e−b| = |a − b|. Hence, the conditons of Theorem 6.3.8 are satisfied,
which means that bm⊗, i.e. the bisimulation metric constructed by K⊗,
characterizes bisimulation at its kernel.
6.4.1 Transformations of the linear-fractional
program
In case S is finite, and since ln is a monotonically increasing function, the
multiplicative Kantorovich distance for ln f̂(µ)− ln f̂(µ′) can be computed
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subject to: ∀i, j. xi ≤ e
m(si,sj)xj .
By the constraint, we know that if ∃i, xi > 0 then all the xi’s are positive,
and if ∃i, xi < 0 then all the xi’s are negative, namely, they have the same
polarity, thus it does not matter whether xi’s are positive or negative. We
now show how the program can be converted to a linear one, and then
written in dual form.
Following the techniques in [vBW01a], we extend the dimensions of the
feasible region by adding new decision variables yi for i ∈ [1, |s|]. The
extension does not affect the optimal value. This is justified by the new








subject to: ∀i, j. xi − e
m(si,sj)yj ≤ 0













Let the two constraints be devided by
∑
j µ
′(sj)yj, the above linear-fractional




subject to: ∀i, j. αi − e
m(si,sj)βj ≤ 0




∀i. αi, βi ≥ 0.
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m(si,sj) − rj ≤ z · µ
′(sj)
∀i, j. lij , ri ≥ 0
which is equivalent to the following program where the first kind of








m(si,sj) − rj ≤ z · µ
′(sj)
∀i, j. lij , ri ≥ 0.
6.4.2 Application to differential privacy
We recall the notion of differential privacy (Def. 2.6.1). Given a set of
databases X ; two databases x, x′ ∈ X are adjacent, written x ` x′, if
they differ in the value of a single individual. A mechanism is a function
M : X → Prob(Z) where Z is some set of reported values. Intuitively,
M(x) gives the outcome of the query when applied to database x, which is
a probability distribution since noise is added.
Let tv⊗ be a multiplicative variant of the total variation distance on








Then differential privacy can be rephrased as follows:
A mechanism M : X → Prob(Z) is ǫ-differentially private iff
tv⊗(M(x),M(x
′)) ≤ ǫ ∀x ` x′
5See [Lah08] for how to take the dual of a linear program.
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In our setting, we assume that the mechanism M is modelled by a FPA,
and the result of the mechanism running on x is the trace produced by the
execution of the FPA starting from some corresponding state sx. That is,
Z = Aω and
M(x) = Pr[sx ⊲ ·] (6.5)
The relation between differential privacy and the multiplicative bisimilarity
metric comes from the fact that tv⊗ can be obtained as the K⊗ lifting of
the discrete metric on Aω.
Lemma 6.4.2. Let a, a′, b, b′ ∈ [0, 1] s.t. a+ b ≤ 1, a′ + b′ ≤ 1, and let
g(x) = d⊗(a+ bx, a
′ + b′x)
Then g(x) ≤ max{g(0), g(1)} for all x ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Wlog assume a, a′, b, b′ > 0, we can extend to the case 0 by continu-
ity. Define
h(x) =
a + b x
a′ + b′x
The derivative of h is h′(x) = a
′b−ab′
(a′+b′x)2
, hence h is monotonically increasing
when a′b ≥ ab′ and monotonically decreasing otherwise. This implies that
h(x) ≤ max{h(0), h(1)} and h−1(x) ≤ max{h−1(0), h−1(1)} (6.6)
We have:
g(x) = | lnh(x)| Def. of d⊗
= max{ln h(x), ln h−1(x)}
≤ max{ln h(0), lnh(1), lnh−1(0), lnh−1(0)} (6.6), monot. of ln
= max{g(0), g(1)}
Lemma 6.4.3. Let δV = diamd⊗([0, 1]) = +∞ and let dmδV be the discrete
metric on Aω. Then tv⊗ = K⊗(dmδV ).
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Let 1Z be the indicator function, defined as 1Z(x) = 1 iff x ∈ Z and
1Z(x) = 0 otherwise. We have that 1̂Z(µ) = µ(Z), hence
d⊗(1̂Z(µ), 1̂Z(µ
′)) = d⊗(µ(Z), µ
′(Z)) (6.7)
Direction ≤) This is the easy case, since (6.7) implies that every Z in
the definition of tv⊗(µ, µ
′) can be matched by an f in the definition of
K⊗(dmδV )(µ, µ
′).
Direction ≥) A function φ is called simple if its image img(φ) is a finite
set. Let Φ be the set of all measurable simple functions from Aω to [0, 1].
Any φ ∈ Φ can be represented as φ =
∑
v∈img(f) v · 1f−1(v) hence φ̂(µ) =∑
v∈img(f) v · µ(f
−1(a)). A simple function φ is an indicator function iff
img(φ) ⊆ {0, 1}.
We are going to show that
d⊗(φ̂(µ), φ̂(µ
′)) ≤ tv⊗(µ, µ
′) ∀φ ∈ Φ (6.8)
The intuition is that we can bound d⊗(φ̂(µ), φ̂(µ
′)) from above by changing
φ’s values to either 0 or 1. After replacing all values we end up with an
indicator function, for which the distance is bounded by tv⊗(µ, µ
′) because
of (6.7).
Formally, we show (6.8) by induction on n = |img(φ) \ {0, 1}|, i.e. the
(finite) number of φ’s values that are neither 0 nor 1. For the base case
n = 0, φ is an indicator function and (6.8) follows directly from (6.7). Now
assume (6.8) holds for n ≤ k and let φ ∈ Φ s.t. n = k + 1. Then there
exists some v ∈ img(φ) s.t. 0 < v < 1.
Let φx ∈ Φ be the function obtained from φ after mapping v to x (hence
φ = φv). Note that φ̂x(µ), φ̂x(µ
′) can be written as a + bx and a′ + b′x
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respectively, with a, a′, b, b′ satisfying the conditions of Lemma 6.4.2. As a
consequence we have that
d⊗(φ̂v(µ), φ̂v(µ
′)) ≤ max{d⊗(φ̂0(µ), φ̂0(µ
′)), d⊗(φ̂1(µ), φ̂1(µ
′))}
From the induction hypothesis both d⊗(φ̂0(µ), φ̂0(µ
′)) and d⊗(φ̂1(µ), φ̂1(µ
′))
are bounded from above by tv⊗(µ, µ
′), which concludes the proof of (6.8).
Having shown (6.8), it only remains to extend it to any non-simple
measurable f : Aω → [0, 1]. This comes by approximating f using simple
functions: there exist φn increasing pointwise and converging pointwise
to f . From the Monotone Convergence Theorem we have that f̂(µ) =
limn→∞ φ̂n(µ) (see [Che08], Thm 2.4.10 and 3.1.1). We conclude by the
continuity of d⊗, since limn→∞ d⊗(φ̂n(µ), φ̂n(µ
′)) = d⊗(f̂(µ), f̂(µ
′)).
Let bm⊗ be the instantiation of the bisimilarity metric bmV with K⊗.
The above Lemma, together with Theorem 6.3.10, imply the following re-
sult, which makes bm⊗ useful to verify differential privacy:
Theorem 6.4.4. Let M be the mechanism defined by (6.8), and assume
that
bm⊗(sx, sx′) ≤ ǫ for all x ` x
′
Then M satisfies ǫ-differential privacy.
Proof. We have that M(x) = Pr[sx ⊲ · ] and M(x
′) = Pr[sx′ ⊲ · ], hence:
tv⊗(M(x),M(x
′)) = K⊗(dmδV )(M(x),M(x
′)) Lemma 6.4.3
≤ bm⊗(sx, sx′) Theorem 6.3.10
≤ ǫ hypothesis
Note that the use of the multiplicative bm⊗ is crucial in the above re-
sult. The following example shows that the standard bisimilarity metric
bm (generated by the original Kantorovich lifting) may be very different
from the level of differential privacy, which is expected, since bm bounds
the additive total variation metric (Theorem 6.3.10 and (6.4)) instead of
the multiplicative tv⊗.
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Figure 6.2: The bisimilarity pseudometric bm does not imply differential
privacy.
Example 6.4.5. Consider the processes s, t shown in Fig. 6.2 (a). We have
that bm(s, t) = 0.1−0.001 = 0.099 while their level of differential privacy is
ǫ = ln 0.1/0.001 = ln 100. Moreover, for the processes s′, t′ shown in Fig. 6.2
(b) we have bm(s′, t′) = 0.7− 0.2 = 0.5 while their level of differential pri-
vacy is ǫ′ = ln 0.7/0.2 = ln 3.5. Using the original Kantorovich metric, s
and t are considered more indistinguishable than s′ and t′, in sharp contrast
to the corresponding differential privacy levels. That is because the stan-
dard Kantorovich metric exhibits an additive nature, which is inadequate
for verifying a multiplicative property such as differential privacy.
Approximate differential privacy. An approximate, also known as
(ǫ, δ) version of differential privacy is also widely used [DKM+06], relax-
ing the definition by an additive factor δ. It requires that:
M(x)(Z) ≤ eǫM(x′)(Z) + δ ∀x ` x′, Z ⊆ Z
The α-distance on distributions is proposed in [BKOB12] to capture (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy. For two real numbers a, b and a skew parameter α ≥ 1,
the α-distance between a and b is max{a− αb, b−αa, 0}. An instantiation
of the Kantorovich lifting based on the α-distance seems promising for ex-
tending Theorem 6.4.4 to the approximate case; we leave this extension as
future work.
Weak probabilistic anonymity. Weak probabilistic anonymity was pro-
posed in [DPP07] as a measure of the degree of protection of user’s identi-
ties. It is defined in a way similar to differential privacy, with the crucial
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difference (apart from the lack of an adjacency relation) that it uses the
(additive) total variation instead of the multiplicative one. Formally, let X
contain the users’ identities, and let M : X → Prob(Z) be the system in
which users operate. We say that M is ǫ-weakly probabilistically anonymous
iff tv(M(x),M(x′)) ≤ ǫ for all x, x′ ∈ X .
For systems modelled by FPAs, by (6.4) and Theorem 6.3.10, we have
that if bm(sx, sx′) ≤ ǫ for all x, x
′ ∈ X , then M satisfies ǫ-weak probabilis-
tic anonymity. Hence bm can be used to verify this anonymity property.
6.5 Non-expansiveness
Process algebras provide the link to the desired compositional reasoning
about approximate equality in such a pseudometric framework. In order to
specify and verify systems in a compositional manner, it is necessary that
the behavioral semantics is compatible with all operators of the language
that describe these systems. For behavioral equivalence semantics there
is the common agreement that compositional reasoning requires that the
considered behavioral equivalence is a congruence wrt all operators. On the
other hand, for behavioral metric semantics there are several proposals of
properties that operators should satisfy in order to facilitate compositional
reasoning [DJGP04, BBLM13a].
Non-expansiveness is the most widely studied compositionality prop-
erty. In this section we select three most typical non-recursive constructs
of process algebra: nondeterministic choice, probabilistic choice and par-
allel composition, showing that they are non-expansive w.r.t. bisimilarity
metrics. More precisely, we find a universal bound for the nondeterministic
choice operator w.r.t. the generalized bisimilarity metric bmV . We give
the according bounds for the other two constructs w.r.t. bm⊗. In fact, we
will provide upper bounds on the distance between the composed processes
which are in case of the nondeterministic and probabilistic composition even
stricter than the non-expansiveness condition.
Non-expansiveness corresponds to the quantitative analogue of congru-
ence in behavioral equivalence, stating that the distance between composed
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processes is at most the sum of the distance between its parts.
Definition 6.5.1 (Non-expansiveness). An n-ary operator f is non-expansive
wrt a pseudometric m if




When f is a binary operator, which is common for process algebra, by
the property of the triangle inequality of m, to prove the non-expansiveness
of f , it suffices to show that f satisfies the following condition:
Proposition 6.5.2. A binary operator f is non-expansive wrt a pseudo-
metric m if
m(f(s, t), f(s, t′)) ≤ m(t, t′) and m(f(s, t), f(s′, t)) ≤ m(s, s′)
Proof. By assumption, we have m(f(s, t), f(s, t′)) ≤ m(t, t′) and m(f(s, t′),
f(s′, t′)) ≤ m(s, s′). By the triangle inequality ofm, we getm(f(s, t), f(s′, t′))
≤ m(f(s, t), f(s, t′)) +m(f(s, t′), f(s′, t′)) ≤ m(t, t′) +m(s, s′) as required.
We first show a general bound for the nondeterministic choice operator
w.r.t. bmV . The importance of this result lies in that this bound holds for
all the metrics in the family of generalized bisimilarity metrics, rather than
just for a particular member.
Theorem 6.5.3. Let s, t, s′, t′ be probabilistic processes. Then
bmV (s+ t, s
′ + t′) ≤ max(bmV (s, s
′), bmV (t, t
′))
Proof. We sketch the proof as follows. By Def. 6.3.1 we get that
FV (bmV )(s+ t, s
′ + t′) ≤ max{FV (bmV )(s, s
′), FV (bmV )(t, t
′)}
Using the fact bmV = FV (bmV ) completes the proof of the required result.
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Now we move to the study of non-expansiveness w.r.t. the multiplicative
one bm⊗. We start by showing an important auxiliary property how the
distance between convex combinations of probability distributions relates
to the distance between the combined probability distributions.



















2) = max | ln
∑








under the constraints: ∀i, j. xi ≤ e
bm⊗(si,sj)xj . Let x
∗
i ’s be the variables that
realize the maximum value on the problem. We have:
K⊗(bm⊗)(pµ1 + (1− p)µ2, pµ
′












































































































































Now we can show that the following operators are non-expansive w.r.t.
bm⊗.
Theorem 6.5.5. Let s, t, s′, t′ be probabilistic processes. Then
1. bm⊗(s⊕p t, s
′ ⊕p t
′) ≤ max(bm⊗(s, s
′), bm⊗(t, t
′))
2. bm⊗(s | t, s
′ | t′) ≤ bm⊗(s, s
′) + bm⊗(t, t
′)





















K⊗(bm⊗)(pµ1 + (1− p)µ2, pµ
′
















1 + (1− p)µ
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′)) Def. 6.3.4 and 6.3.1
Case 2 : By Prop. 6.5.2, it suffices to show that
bm⊗(s | t, s | t










′) if Q = s | t and R = s | t′
0 if Q = R
∞ otherwise.
(6.9)
For any ǫ ≥ 0, if m(s | t, s | t′) ≤ ǫ, then also bm⊗(t, t
′) ≤ ǫ.
We assume that if there exists one transition from t labelled by a, then
there exists also one transition from t′ labelled by a. Otherwise, bm⊗(t, t
′) =
∞ which completes the proof.
If s | t
a
−→ ν is due to one transition from t: t
a
−→ µ, then by rule PAR1





−→ s |µ′. By the definition of K⊗ (Def. 6.4.1), we can check that
K⊗(m)(s |µ, s |µ
′) = K⊗(µ, µ
′) ≤ ǫ.
If s | t
a
−→ ν is due to two transitions s
b
−→ δ(s1) and t
b
−→ δ(t1), then
a must be τ and by rule COM (Fig. 2.1) ν = δ(s1 | t1). Also there exists
one transition from t′ s.t. t′
b
−→ δ(t′1) and s | t
′ τ−→ δ(s1 | t
′
1). By the defini-
tion of K⊗, we deduce that K⊗(m)(δ(s1 | t1), δ(s1 | t
′






The case when s | t
a
−→ ν is due to a transition from s is trivial.
By the definition that the function F⊗ is the Hausdorff distance between
the transitions of s | t and s | t′, we obtain F⊗(m)(s | t, s | t
′) ≤ ǫ. Thus, the
constructed metric m satisfies F⊗(m)  m, namely, it is a pre-fixpoint of
F⊗. Remember that bm⊗ is the least one, thus we have bm⊗(s | t, s | t
′) ≤
m(s | t, s | t′) = bm⊗(t, t
′) as required.
A similar result can be gained for the bisimilarity metric bm based on the
standard Kantorovich lifting. This generalizes a similar result of [DJGP04]





We have proposed a family of Kantorovich pseudometrics depending on
the notion of distance used to specify properties over traces. We have
developed the theory of this notion, and showed how we can use it to verify
the corresponding kind of properties. We have also showed that for the
multiplicative variant, which is an interesting case because of its relation
with differential privacy, it is possible to give a dual form that makes the




In this thesis, we presented three ways of analyzing differentially private
behaviors in concurrent setting. They are compositional, metrical and ax-
iomatic methods, respectively. In Chapter 3 of the thesis, we focused on
the compositional method and examined how the composition under each
process constructor affects the level of differential privacy of the resulting
system, which makes it possible to deduce the degree of differential privacy
of a system from its sub-components. In Chapter 4, we borrowed the idea
of amortisation and coined an amortised probabilistic bisimulation. It al-
lows us to verify differential privacy, and it was shown to be a more liberal
notion than the work in [TKD11]. In Chapter 5 we moved to the axiomatic
method and provided sound and complete proof systems for our amortised
bisimulation and its weak counterpart. Chapter 6 presents an extension of
the bisimulation metric based on the Kantorovich distance. The standard
notion is additive in nature and therefore not suitable to prove the property
of differential privacy (which is multiplicative), the extension developed in
the thesis is parametric with respect to the underlying distance, and there-
fore suitable to capture a vast range of properties, including differential
privacy.
A great deal of future work may be worth considering on these issues.
One interesting direction would be to explore the applicability of our modu-
lar reasoning approach to the problem of preserving privacy in geolocation-
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related applications. More specifically, we intend to use (a possibly ex-
tended version of) our probabilistic process calculus to express systems of
concurrent agents moving in space and time, and interacting with each
other in ways that depend on the adjacency relation. We believe that our
compositional method will provide a way to synthesize differentially private
mechanisms in a (semi-)automatic way.
The pseudometric based on the Kantorovich metric proposed in [DJGP02]
was recently axiomatized in [DGL14]. We have generalized this pseudomet-
ric to a family of pseudometrics in Chapter 6. It would be exciting to
find an axiomatization for the family of generalized bisimulation metrics,
thus obtaining a general framework of inference systems for probabilistically
behavioral pseudometrics. As another future extension of the axiomatic
theories developed in this thesis, we would like to extend the process lan-
guage considered in the proof systems with recursion, following the lines of
[DPP05, DP05].
For the computation of the pseudometric [DJGP02] based on the stan-
dard Kantorovich distance, thanks to its fixed point characterization, sev-
eral iterative algorithms have been developed in order to compute its ap-
proximation up to any degree of accuracy [FPP04, vBW06, BSW07]. Re-
cently, Chen et. al. [CvBW12] proved that, for finite fully probabilistic
automata with rational transition function, the bisimilarity pseudometrics
can be computed exactly in polynomial time. Despite its theoretical impor-
tance, the method used in the proof is known to be inefficient in practice.
In [BBLM13b], an on-the-fly algorithm was proposed for computing the ex-
act behavioral pseudometric in practice. One very important and natural
future work is the investigation of methods to compute other members in
the family of generalized bisimulation metrics and of conditions that make
possible a general dual form. It would be interesting to see how the afore-
mentioned algorithmic ideas can be exploited for the computation of the
metrics in the family.
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los Gregorio-Rodŕıguez. New bisimulation semantics for dis-
tributed systems. In FORTE, pages 143–159, 2007.
[DGJP99] Josee Desharnais, Vineet Gupta, Radha Jagadeesan, and
Prakash Panangaden. Metrics for labeled Markov systems.
In CONCUR, volume 1664 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 258–273. Springer, 1999.
[DGL14] Pedro R. D’Argenio, Daniel Gebler, and Matias David Lee.
Axiomatizing bisimulation equivalences and metrics from
probabilistic SOS rules. In Proc. of FoSSaCS, volume 8412
of LNCS, pages 289–303. Springer, 2014.
149
Bibliography
[DH13] Yuxin Deng and Matthew Hennessy. Compositional reason-
ing for weighted Markov decision processes. Sci. Comput.
Program., 78(12):2537–2579, 2013.
[DJGP02] Josee Desharnais, Radha Jagadeesan, Vineet Gupta, and
Prakash Panangaden. The metric analogue of weak bisim-
ulation for probabilistic processes. In Proc. of LICS, pages
413–422. IEEE, 2002.
[DJGP04] Josee Desharnais, Radha Jagadeesan, Vineet Gupta, and
Prakash Panangaden. Metrics for labelled Markov pro-
cesses. Theor. Comp. Sci., 318(3):323–354, 2004.
[DKM+06] Cynthia Dwork, Krishnaram Kenthapadi, Frank Mcsherry,
Ilya Mironov, and Moni Naor. Our data, ourselves: Privacy
via distributed noise generation. In In EUROCRYPT, pages
486–503. Springer, 2006.
[DL09] Cynthia Dwork and Jing Lei. Differential privacy and robust
statistics. In Proc. of the 41st Annual ACM Symposium on
Theory of Computing (STOC), pages 371–380. ACM, 2009.
[DLT08] Josée Desharnais, François Laviolette, and Mathieu Tracol.
Approximate analysis of probabilistic processes: Logic, sim-
ulation and games. In QEST, pages 264–273. IEEE Com-
puter Society, 2008.
[DMS04] Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson, and Paul Syverson.
Tor: The second-generation onion router. In Proc. of the
13th USENIX Security Symposium, 2004.
[DP05] Yuxin Deng and Catuscia Palamidessi. Axiomatizations for
probabilistic finite-state behaviors. In Proc. of FOSSACS,
volume 3441 of LNCS, pages 110–124. Springer, 2005.
[DPP05] Yuxin Deng, Catuscia Palamidessi, and Jun Pang. Compo-
sitional reasoning for probabilistic finite-state behaviors. In
150
Bibliography
Processes, Terms and Cycles: Steps on the Road to Infinity,
volume 3838 of LNCS, pages 309–337. Springer, 2005.
[DPP07] Yuxin Deng, Catuscia Palamidessi, and Jun Pang. Weak
probabilistic anonymity. In Proc. of the 3rd Int. Workshop
on Security Issues in Concurrency (SecCo), volume 180 (1)
of ENTCS, pages 55–76. Elsevier, 2007.
[DPW06] Yuxin Deng, Jun Pang, and PengWu. Measuring anonymity
with relative entropy. In Proc. of the 4th Int. Worshop
on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust, volume 4691 of
LNCS, pages 65–79. Springer, 2006.
[Dwo06] Cynthia Dwork. Differential privacy. In Automata, Lan-
guages and Programming, 33rd International Colloquium,
ICALP 2006, Proceedings, Part II, volume 4052 of LNCS,
pages 1–12. Springer, 2006.
[Dwo11] Cynthia Dwork. A firm foundation for private data analysis.
Communications of the ACM, 54(1):86–96, 2011.
[FG00] Riccardo Focardi and Roberto Gorrieri. Classification of
security properties (part i: Information flow). In FOSAD,
pages 331–396, 2000.
[FPP04] Norm Ferns, Prakash Panangaden, and Doina Precup. Met-
rics for finite Markov decision processes. In UAI, pages 162–
169. AUAI Press, 2004.
[FPP05] Norm Ferns, Prakash Panangaden, and Doina Precup. Met-
rics for Markov decision processes with infinite state spaces.
In UAI, pages 201–208. AUAI Press, 2005.
[FPP11] Norm Ferns, Prakash Panangaden, and Doina Precup.
Bisimulation metrics for continuous Markov decision pro-
cesses. SIAM J. Comput, 40(6):1662–1714, 2011.
151
Bibliography
[GHH+13] Marco Gaboardi, Andreas Haeberlen, Justin Hsu, Arjun
Narayan, and Benjamin C. Pierce. Linear dependent types
for differential privacy. In POPL, pages 357–370, 2013.
[Hen11] Matthew Hennessy. A calculus for costed computations.
Logical Methods in Computer Science, 7(1), 2011.
[HJ90] Hans Hansson and Bengt Jonsson. A calculus for communi-
cating systems with time and probabitilies. In Proceedings
of the Real-Time Systems Symposium - 1990, pages 278–
287. IEEE Computer Society, 1990.
[HL93] Matthew Hennessy and Huimin Lin. Proof systems for
message-passing process algebras. In CONCUR, volume 715
of LNCS, pages 202–216. Springer, 1993.
[HO05] Joseph Y. Halpern and Kevin R. O’Neill. Anonymity and
information hiding in multiagent systems. J. of Comp. Se-
curity, 13(3):483–512, 2005.
[Hoa85] C. A. R. Hoare. Communicating Sequential Processes.
Prentice-Hall, 1985.
[HPSE10] Sardaouna Hamadou, Catuscia Palamidessi, Vladimiro Sas-
sone, and Ehab ElSalamouny. Probable innocence in the
presence of independent knowledge. In Postproceedings of
the 6th Int. Workshop on Formal Aspects in Security and
Trust, volume 5983 of LNCS, pages 141–156. Springer, 2010.
[JJS13] Rob Jansen, Aaron Johnson, and Paul F. Syverson. Lira:
Lightweight incentivized routing for anonymity. In NDSS.
The Internet Society, 2013.
[JS90] Chi-Chang Jou and Scott A. Smolka. Equivalences, congru-
ences, and complete axiomatizations for probabilistic pro-




[KAK05] Astrid Kiehn and S. Arun-Kumar. Amortised bisimulations.
In FORTE, pages 320–334, 2005.
[Lah08] Sébastien Lahaie. How to take the dual of
a linear program. Technical report, 2008.
http://www.cs.columbia.edu/coms6998-3/lpprimer.pdf.
[Lin95] Huimin Lin. Pam: A process algebra manipulator. Formal
Methods in System Design, 7(3):243–259, 1995.
[LS89] Kim G. Larsen and Arne Skou. Bisimulation through proba-
bilistic testing. In Proceedings of the 16th ACM Symposium
on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL), pages
344–352, 1989.
[LS91] Kim G. Larsen and Arne Skou. Bisimulation through prob-
abilistic testing. Inf. and Comp., 94(1):1–28, 1991.
[LY00] Huimin Lin and Wang Yi. A proof system for timed au-
tomata. In FoSSaCS, volume 1784 of LNCS, pages 208–222.
Springer, 2000.
[Mal07] Pasquale Malacaria. Assessing security threats of looping
constructs. In Proc. of POPL, pages 225–235. ACM, 2007.
[McS09] Frank McSherry. Privacy integrated queries: an extensible
platform for privacy-preserving data analysis. In Proc. of the
ACM SIGMOD Int. Conf. on Management of Data, pages
19–30. ACM, 2009.
[Mil89] Robin Milner. Communication and Concurrency. Series in
Computer Science. Prentice Hall, 1989.
[MKA+08] Ashwin Machanavajjhala, Daniel Kifer, John M. Abowd,
Johannes Gehrke, and Lars Vilhuber. Privacy: Theory




[Mu09] Chunyan Mu. Measuring information flow in reactive pro-
cesses. In ICICS, volume 5927 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 211–225. Springer, 2009.
[NDW10] Tsuen-Wan Ngan, Roger Dingledine, and Dan S. Wallach.
Building incentives into tor. In Radu Sion, editor, Financial
Cryptography, volume 6052 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 238–256. Springer, 2010.
[Nor91] Timothy Norfolk. When does a metric gen-
erate convex balls? Technical report, 1991.
http://www.math.uakron.edu/~norfolk/convex.ps.
[NS09] Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov. De-anonymizing
social networks. In Proc. of S&P, pages 173–187. IEEE,
2009.
[RP10] Jason Reed and Benjamin C. Pierce. Distance makes the
types grow stronger: a calculus for differential privacy. In
Proceeding of the 15th ACM SIGPLAN international con-
ference on Functional programming (ICFP), pages 157–168.
ACM, 2010.
[RR98] Michael K. Reiter and Aviel D. Rubin. Crowds: anonymity
for Web transactions. ACM Trans. on Information and Sys-
tem Security, 1(1):66–92, 1998.
[RS01] Peter Y. A. Ryan and Steve A. Schneider. Process alge-
bra and non-interference. Journal of Computer Security,
9(1/2):75–103, 2001.
[RSK+10] Indrajit Roy, Srinath T. V. Setty, Ann Kilzer, Vitaly
Shmatikov, and Emmett Witchel. Airavat: security and
privacy for MapReduce. In Proc. of the 7th USENIX Sym-
posium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation
(NSDI), pages 297–312. USENIX Association, 2010.
154
Bibliography
[Seg95] Roberto Segala. Modeling and Verification of Random-
ized Distributed Real-Time Systems. PhD thesis, Depart-
ment of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology, June 1995. Available as
Technical Report MIT/LCS/TR-676.
[SEH10] Vladimiro Sassone, Ehab ElSalamouny, and Sardaouna
Hamadou. Trust in crowds: Probabilistic behaviour in
anonymity protocols. In Proc. of the Fifth Int. Symposium
on Trustworthly Global Computing, volume 6084 of LNCS,
pages 88–102. Springer, 2010.
[SGR97] Paul F. Syverson, David M. Goldschlag, and Michael G.
Reed. Anonymous connections and onion routing. In Proc.
of S&P, pages 44–54, 1997.
[SHY10] Vladimiro Sassone, Sardaouna Hamadou, and Mu Yang.
Trust in anonymity networks. In Paul Gastin and François
Laroussinie, editors, CONCUR, volume 6269 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 48–70. Springer, 2010.
[SL94] Roberto Segala and Nancy Lynch. Probabilistic simulations
for probabilistic processes. In Proceedings of CONCUR, vol-
ume 836 of LNCS, pages 481–496. Springer, 1994.
[SL95] Roberto Segala and Nancy Lynch. Probabilistic simulations
for probabilistic processes. Nordic Journal of Computing,
2(2):250–273, 1995.
[Smi03] Geoffrey Smith. Probabilistic noninterference through weak
probabilistic bisimulation. In CSFW, pages 3–13, 2003.
[Smi08] Adam Smith. Efficient, differentially private point estima-
tors. arXiv preprint arXiv:0809.4794, 2008.
155
Bibliography
[Smi09] Geoffrey Smith. On the foundations of quantitative infor-
mation flow. In Proc. of FOSSACS, volume 5504 of LNCS,
pages 288–302. Springer, 2009.
[SV04] Ana Sokolova and Erik P. de Vink. Probabilistic automata:
system types, parallel composition and comparison. In Vali-
dation of Stochastic Systems: A Guide to Current Research,
volume 2925 of LNCS, pages 1–43. Springer, 2004.
[Tar55] Alfred Tarski. A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its
applications. Pacific Journal of Mathematics, 5(2):285—
309, 1955.
[TDZ11] Mathieu Tracol, Josée Desharnais, and Abir Zhioua. Com-
puting distances between probabilistic automata. In QAPL,
volume 57 of EPTCS, pages 148–162, 2011.
[TK10] D. Thorsley and E. Klavins. Approximating stochastic bio-
chemical processes with Wasserstein pseudometrics. Sys-
tems Biology, IET, 4(3):193–211, May 2010.
[TKD11] Michael C. Tschantz, Dilsun Kaynar, and Anupam Datta.
Formal verification of differential privacy for interactive sys-
tems (extended abstract). Electron. Notes Theor. Comput.
Sci., 276:61–79, sep 2011.
[vBW01a] Franck van Breugel and James Worrell. An algorithm for
quantitative verification of probabilistic transition systems.
In Proc. of CONCUR’01, pages 336–350. Springer, 2001.
[vBW01b] Franck van Breugel and James Worrell. Towards quantita-
tive verification of probabilistic transition systems. In Proc.




[vBW05] Franck van Breugel and James Worrell. A behavioural pseu-
dometric for probabilistic transition systems. Theor. Comp.
Sci., 331(1):115–142, 2005.
[vBW06] Franck van Breugel and James Worrell. Approximating and
computing behavioural distances in probabilistic transition
systems. Theor. Comp. Sci., 360(1-3):373 – 385, 2006.
[vBW14] Franck van Breugel and James Worrell. The complexity
of computing a bisimilarity pseudometric on probabilistic
automata. In Horizons of the Mind, volume 8464 of LNCS,
pages 191–213. Springer, 2014.
[vGSS95] Rob J. van Glabbeek, Scott A. Smolka, and Bernhard Stef-
fen. Reactive, generative, and stratified models of proba-
bilistic processes. Information and Computation, 121(1):59–
80, 1995.
[XCL14] Lili Xu, Konstantinos Chatzikokolakis, and Huimin Lin.
Metrics for differential privacy in concurrent systems. In
Proc. of FORTE, volume 8461 of LNCS, pages 199–215.
Springer, 2014.
[XHP14] Lili Xu, Sardaouna Hamadou, and Catuscia Palamidessi.
Privacy-preserving process constructors, 2014. Technical re-
port.
[XL14] Lili Xu and Huimin Lin. Complete proof systems for amor-
tised probabilistic bisimulations. Journal of Computer Sci-
ence and Technology, 2014. To appear.
[Xu12] Lili Xu. Modular reasoning about differential privacy in
a probabilistic process calculus. In TGC, volume 8191 of
LNCS, pages 198–212. Springer, 2012.
[YSH12] Mu Yang, Vladimiro Sassone, and Sardaouna Hamadou. A
game-theoretic analysis of cooperation in anonymity net-
157
Bibliography
works. In Pierpaolo Degano and Joshua D. Guttman, ed-
itors, POST, volume 7215 of Lecture Notes in Computer









observational congruence , 95





















in CCSp with secret labels, 27
Differential privacy





Discrete probability measure, 12
Execution, 13
Execution tree, 14



























with secret labels, 24
Trace, 14
Transformation FV , 119
Trustworthy adjacency, 50
160
